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1 Introduction
1.1 The Event in Contemporary Literature
she decided she would stay there and wait until something significant 
happened to her. This was the challenge she was putting to existence—
she would not stir, not for dinner, not even for her mother calling her in. 
She would simply wait on the bridge, calm and obstinate, until events, 
real events, not her own fantasies, rose to her challenge, and dispelled her 
insignificance (Atonement 77).
McEwan portrays a subject in a state of pure anticipation, patiently 
waiting for what life has in store for her, hoping it will be significant. 
The wish of McEwan’s protagonist will eventually be fulfilled. In the 
course of the novel an event will take place that will set a series of 
actions in motion which will not only change her life, but also that 
of others irrevocably. It will help her to become a powerful author, 
enable her to manipulate fates around her as if they were only textual 
appearances, and render her the Goddess of their universe. Thus, the 
event merges issues connected with authorship, ethics and the sacred 
into one powerful experience.
This dissertation is interested in exactly such highly charged events 
that alter the course of the narrative and, more importantly, leave as an 
outcome a determinate imprint on the subject who is strongly affected 
by the event. This passive construction is important here in the gram-
matical sense, since it attributes to subjectivity something that I rec-
ognize as the principle element of characters in contemporary texts: 
receptivity. The subject is forced into receptivity by an event that makes 
it react and respond to it. In my opinion it is this dynamic relationship 
between event and subject that characterizes contemporary literature 
and that can no longer be categorized as postmodern. It is with a new 
understanding of eventfulness and subjectivity that literature enters 
a literary period which I will refer to here, due to the lack of a better 
word, as ‘post-postmodernism.’ 
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The dissertation therefore aims to explore this new post-postmodern 
aesthetic by analyzing seven books taken from contemporary Anglo-
phone literature and written from 1990 onwards. In order to present a 
systematic approach I will focus on the two mentioned elements—the 
event and the subject—and examine what effect their treatment in con-
temporary literature has on the text in general, and in particular how 
it influences three topics that played a major role in postmodern texts: 
authorship, ethics, and the sacred. How these topics are interpreted will 
not only indicate a distinct renunciation from a postmodern under-
standing, but also the way in which new concepts of authorship, ethics 
and the sacred are formulated in contemporary literature. The novels 
selected for this dissertation were taken from British, Irish, Cana-
dian, American and Indian literature and include the following seven 
works: David Mitchell’s Ghostwritten (1999), Ian McEwan’s Atonement 
(2001), Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003), Nicole Krauss’s The 
History of Love (2005), Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006), Anne 
Enright’s The Gathering (2007), and Aravind Adiga’s The White Tiger 
(2008). All of the novels selected have touched a nerve in contemporary 
thought, and have been intensely discussed by literary scholars. This is 
also reflected in the prizes the novels have won, which underscores that 
they have approached their issues in new and innovative ways.1 
In my introduction, an overview of the state of research on contem-
porary literature since 1990 will be provided in order to point out 
whether and how different approaches have been used to find a com-
mon denominator that relates contemporary works to each other. I will 
then present my own systematic approach by elaborating on the func-
tion of the event as formulated by narratology, show how the event is 
employed in modernist and postmodernist texts and finally, how the 
subject reacts to it in the respective cases. Subsequently, I will sketch 
my own definition of the ‘event’ and the ‘subject’ in contemporary lit-
erature. This definition draws heavily on the philosophical ideas of two 
1 Ghostwritten won the John Llewellyn Rhys Prize in 1999, Atonement was shortlisted for 
the Booker Prize in 2001 and Oryx and Crake in 2003. The History of Love was short-
listed for the Orange Prize in 2006, The Gathering won the Booker Prize in 2007, The 
Road the Pulitzer Prize in 2007, and The White Tiger the Booker Prize in 2008.
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contemporary philosophers, Jean-Luc Marion and Giorgio Agamben. 
With the help of their ideas I construct my own terminology and use it 
throughout the dissertation to analyze the novels. The sketch provided 
in this introduction should give a presentation of this terminology and 
an indication of the theoretical approach the dissertation will take. 
An extended elaboration will be included in the chapter “Relating the 
Subject to the Event.” The introduction will conclude with an outline 
of the structure of my dissertation, with a short overview of the ana-
lytical chapters that deal with the subject’s empowerment in the areas 
of authorship, ethics and the sacred.
1.2 Defining Contemporary Literature
The critical publications to be discussed here all contend that there has 
been a shift observable in contemporary literature. This shift is often 
located somewhere in the 1990s (van Dijk/Vaessens 10; Eshelman xii; 
Green vii). The reasons suggested to explain this timing are multiple; 
however, they often seem contrived and more or less arbitrary. Vaessens 
and van Dijk argue, referring to Minsoo Kang and Maggie Humm, that 
postmodernism came to an end when it arrived in mainstream media 
(Kang cited in Hoberek 2007: 233). Timmer describes a growing wea-
riness of writers during the 1990s towards postmodern aesthetics, bas-
ing her argument on the critical comments of the writer David Fos-
ter Wallace, whom she sees as a cultural voice (14). Toth and Brooks 
give several reasons for locating this change of aesthetics in the 1990s: 
they cite Samuel Beckett’s death in 1989, note Derrida’s attention to 
ethical issues in the 1990s, and point out an increased interest in the-
ories that have a theological foundation, such as Emmanuel Lévinas’s 
work (2). They also mention a conference in 1991 in Stuttgart that was 
titled “The End of Postmodernism: New Directions,” which featured 
writers like John Barth, Raymond Federman, William Gass, Ihab Has-
san and Malcolm Bradbury (ibid., 3). As a result, they conclude: “By 
1989, then, the demise of postmodernism seemed to be, for most, an 
inevitability. And, by the mid-nineties, the phrase ‘after (or beyond) 
postmodern’ was to be found on the cover of any number of critical 
works” (ibid., 5).
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When it comes to a significant date in western history the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 are often discussed, however, many critics point out 
that the changes were visible before this date and could in any case only 
account for a turning point in American fiction, not for fiction around 
the world (cf. Domsch 10; Haselstein 15; Timmer 16–17, Schloss/
Jakubzik 10; van Dijk/Vaessens 12). Van Dijk and Vaessens give a per-
suasive explanation for why this reasoning has become so popular, nev-
ertheless. They write of a “reorientation towards the deconstructed 
values of liberal humanism,” which became “more visible after 9/11 
because we were suddenly more sensitive to them” (12). In arriving 
at a conclusion, it seems safe to assume that the change in literature 
indeed became obvious in the 1990s, but the sheer number of reasons 
put forward in the relevant publications suggests that there might not 
be simply one cause to attribute for this shift. 
On the level of fiction writing, however, it seems rather intuitive to 
assume that after thirty to forty years of postmodern play, an exhaus-
tion of postmodern ideas and conventions has set in. Critics like Schloss 
and Jakubzik, for example, note an “Übersättigung des Lesepublikums 
mit postmodernen Darstellungen des fragmentierten Lebens“ (1–2), 
Gruber even speaks of a “decline” of postmodernist principles (92). 
Toth and Brooks argue that postmodernism has become “institution-
alized and programmatic,” elitist (7), and thus part of a system post-
modernists wanted to deconstruct in the first place. Whichever way 
one might define postmodernism’s limitations—as ‘too elitist’ or ‘too 
mainstream’—each of them covers a different aspect of postmodern-
ism’s heterogenic state. 
However, there are still some critics who refuse to speak of post-post-
modernism just yet. This hesitation might be explained by the fact 
that even though the question of what comes ‘after’ postmodernism 
has become almost redundant, it is often asked with the implication 
that there cannot be an ‘after.’ Postmodernism is basically a method 
that challenges all other methods, systems and preconceived notions. 
In its constant state of contest, it has made itself unassailable. Rebein, 
in a hypothetical critique, summarizes these kinds of objections:
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For what could possibly come ‘after’ postmodernism? Does not postmod-
ernism itself connote a kind of finality, ‘the end of things’—not least of 
which would be the end of innocence with regard to language and mime-
sis? Does not the term refer to a period of time we are still, demonstrably, 
in? And anyway, doesn’t a denial of the domination of postmodernism 
amount to a de facto admission of artistic and cultural conservatism? Are 
we not speaking here of a kind of regression, aesthetically speaking? (7).
Rebein emphasizes that there is a logical and even ideological dilemma 
when speaking of an ‘after,’ since it pessimistically implies a recur-
rence to old ideas and forms. This might be the reason that there are 
still a number of scholars who refuse to call contemporary literature 
post-postmodern. A few of them view contemporary literature still as 
part of a very late form of postmodernism. Even though, van Dijk and 
Vaessens present articles which argue for both late postmodernism and 
post-postmodernism, in their introduction to Reconsidering the Post-
modern. European Literature beyond Relativism they eventually iden-
tify features of a ‘late postmodern literature’ (18ff.) which sets the tone 
for how the individual articles are to be perceived. Green calls his book 
on contemporary literature Late Postmodernism (2005), and describes 
it being situated in a “phase of decadence and decline” (1) which for 
him, however, is still taking place within postmodernism. Toth and 
Brooks, in The Mourning After (2007), although talking of a failed or 
limited postmodernism and claiming that “its demise […] was inevita-
ble,” likewise express resistance towards the idea of the post-postmod-
ern. Even though they mention numerous times the narrowness (and 
even ideology) postmodernism has created in some respects, they still 
insist on an “awakening postmodernism” that points “to all those issues 
postmodernism in its refined form seemed so anxious to circumvent: 
issues of faith, ethical responsibility, politics, community, etc.” (8). For 
them, contemporary literature is in a state of mourning and is attend-
ing postmodernism’s ‘wake,’ rather than leaving postmodernism fully 
behind. Similarly, Holland, in Succeeding Postmodernism, although 
presenting an insightful take on language, linking it to humanist issues 
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and liberating it from postmodern play, rejects speaking of post-post-
modernism, explaining that it might be too early to make this kind of 
appeal (14-15).
The publications which I will discuss in the following, take a more opti-
mistic and progressive view, concentrating on the formulations of new 
ideas and forms. A number of critics observe an increasing interest in 
established styles and genres that were unpopular before, in particular 
for postmodernist writers. The example of neorealism indicates how 
contemporary authors revive known genres by embracing a current 
viewpoint instead of being completely faithful to the tradition. Gruber 
underscores that neorealism 
does not attempt to reflect ‘the Real’—a claim that has become impos-
sible since the postmodern crisis of representation at the very latest—
but understands itself as a representational technique which necessarily 
selects and orders, offering but one version. It thus acknowledges both the 
subjectivity of the experience and the intricacies inherent in processes of 
representation. Yet like its nineteenth-century predecessor and in strong 
contrast to postmodernism, it is based on the assumption that it is pos-
sible to refer to the world beyond the text, a world preceding linguistic 
representation (92).
Thus, neorealism should not be understood as a return, but rather as 
an evolution. The rules have changed since the 19th century and the 
texts that employ such a writing style reflect this. These kinds of altera-
tions when it comes to traditional genres are a common thread in con-
temporary literature. Domsch’s publication, Amerikanisches Erzählen 
nach 2000 (2008), examines the recurring interest in established gen-
res—the family novel, the historical novel—, but also notes the emer-
gence of new ones: the white trash novel, and 9/11 fiction. Not only 
traditional genres are of interest again, also philosophical notions that 
have been heavily criticized and even rejected in postmodernist texts, 
have suddenly become significant. Haselstein, Gross and Snyder-Kör-
ber note a desire for a form of authenticity in The Pathos of Authenticity 
(2010). They claim that “[a]uthenticity is making a comeback, in the 
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guises of memory, ethics, religion, the new sincerity, and the renewed 
interest in ‘real things’” (19). In particular the awakened interest in eth-
ics and religion present a distinct renunciation of typical postmodern 
topics. Haselstein qualifies this interest, underlining that contempo-
rary literature is not operating in a naïve way: “[a]lthough sometimes 
envisioned as the rejection of postmodernism, the ‘new’ authenticity 
remains profoundly shaped by postmodern skepticism regarding the 
grand narratives of origin, telos, reference, and essence” (19). This is 
certainly true for every proclaimed ‘comeback’ in this regard: none of 
the genres and strategies is utilized in a traditional way; they all reflect 
their postmodern history and heritage.
The most fruitful publications in this respect are those that deal explic-
itly with phenomena that have been previously determined exclusively 
by a postmodern approach, and that are now experiencing a noticeable 
shift. This applies to issues of subjectivity, identity, language and the 
role of fiction. The authors of these publications make strong cases for 
a post-postmodern aesthetic in literature. Fiction is the main topic in 
Huber’s insightful study titled Literature after Postmodernism. Recon-
structive Fantasies (2014), in which she outlines what role the fan-
tastic mode had in postmodern texts and explains further why this 
mode, because of its subversive nature, has proved to be so fruitful to 
postmodern endeavors. She convincingly argues for a change in con-
temporary texts and how this can be observed best through analyzing 
the role of the fantastic mode and of fiction in general. Throughout 
her work she identifies enabling and innovative effects of the fantastic 
mode, for example when she writes about David Mitchell’s Number-
9Dream (2001): “The recourse to the fantastic mode is no longer a 
result of the projections of desires, but an attempt to account for the 
inexplicable, to find meaning and reason behind loss and grief ” (193-
194). The fantastic mode cannot be reduced to its playfulness or its 
subversive effect alone, but takes on deep meaning for the subject in 
contemporary literature and is significant to his/her self-construction 
of identity. By pointing out the relevance of the fantastic mode in con-
temporary fiction Huber provides the reader with a way to make a clear 
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distinction between postmodern and contemporary texts and offers 
a systematic approach towards identifying and describing post-post-
modern writing.
For this dissertation, the issue of subjectivity and how contemporary 
literature deals with the question of the subject, in contrast to a post-
modern approach, is significant. Kucharzewski and others ask in Hello, 
I say, It’s me. Reconstructions of Subjectivity in Contemporary Litera-
ture and Culture (2009): “Can the subject be put on its feet again by 
approaches that aptly acknowledge postmodern insights about the 
powers and the discourses that shape us, without returning to dogmas 
about human nature?” (3) The authors of this publication argue that 
contemporary fiction has made this one of its key questions, and have 
collected a number of articles that underscore their argument. They 
also point out that the reemergence of the subject has wide-spread 
effects, since it has generated an interest in other topics previously 
neglected by postmodernism, most importantly ethics: “literary stud-
ies and philosophy have started to investigate the relation between 
literature, reading and ethics, at the center of which the perceiving 
subject is established” (4). In the introduction to their book, Zwei-
undzwanzig amerikanische Romane aus dem neuen Jahrhundert: lite-
raturkritische Essays zur Einführung (2009), Schloss and Jakubzik also 
focus on the increasing interest in issues of constructed identity. They 
contend that this is a reaction to the dominance of postmodern dis-
orientation that has finally sparked the desire to find a fixed and stable 
‘anchor’ for the self again (cf. 11). Even though, so they say, the concept 
of a fixed identity has been proclaimed to be an illusion by postmod-
ern writers, they want to explore in what ways it might be not solely 
illusory but also productive (8).
Timmer is one of the few academics who deals with subjectivity exten-
sively and works towards a systematic approach. She makes a historic 
and social argument, describing how contemporary authors today, who 
were born when postmodernism was already extant, must necessarily 
have a different approach towards postmodern ideas than the ‘original’ 
postmodernists who came from the more conservative and constric-
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tive backgrounds of the 1940s and 1950s. To her, authors today are 
more ‘used’ to the defragmentation of identity, the liberty of sexual 
identity and postmodern language games. They will not react in the 
same way to it as a reader or author of the 1960s. Timmer even argues 
that some of the innovations of postmodernism have become a cliché 
(15) which naturally stimulates authors to go beyond them, even to 
go directly against them: “it is not unthinkable that after endless pro-
posals for deconstruction, a desire to construct will break through” 
(21). Timmer sees especially two issues that are of more concern to 
contemporary writers, namely the “empathic expression of feelings 
and sentiments” and “a drive towards inter-subjective connection and 
communication” (13). Since Timmer is in particular interested in the 
self and how it is constructed through storytelling, she links in her 
approach narrative psychology to literary studies and lets herself be 
guided by the question of “how we still do try to make sense of our 
selves, even when fractured and mediated” (42). In her book, she iden-
tifies a new characterizing theme of contemporary literature, writing 
that “self-narratives […] eventually seem to be structured not around a 
centered and stable self-concept, but are constructed, primarily, around 
feelings” (46) which is a clear move beyond postmodernism’s playful-
ness and conscious insincerity.
Another critic who deals extensively with subjectivity is Eshelman, 
who also provides a systematic approach, terming it “performatist sub-
jectivity,” which is a stabilized version of subjectivity defined as fol-
lows: “As a reaction to the plight of the postmodern subject, who is 
constantly being pulled apart and misled by signs in the surrounding 
context, the performatist subject is constructed in such a way that it 
is dense or opaque relative to its milieu” (8). For Eshelman, the main 
feature of postmodernism is how the “formal closure of the art work 
is continually being undermined by narrative or visual devices that 
create an immanent, inescapable state of undecidability regarding the 
truth status of some part of that work” (1). Against this overarching 
context Eshelman introduces the idea of a fixed frame against which 
the subject struggles and gains some sort of constructed and limited 
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subjectivity. Since Eshelman’s concept is crucial for my own argument, 
I will elaborate on his ideas in detail later in this introduction when 
discussing my own theoretical approach.
In my contribution to the examination of contemporary literature I 
will attempt to expand the investigation of the subject by linking it 
to the event. In the following, I describe how the event is treated in 
modernism and postmodernism and what effect this has on the sub-
ject. The subject’s connection to the event is different in contemporary 
literature than it is in postmodern literature, which makes an analysis 
of these elements helpful in outlining a post-postmodern approach.
1.3 The Event
1.3.1 Defining the Event
In narratology, ‘event’ is a fixed term and is defined as the key element 
in every narrative. For Schmid, the event means a “change of state” 
(19) which he considers to be the “minimal condition” (ibid.) for a 
narrative.2 Lotman has defined the event as a transgression of a textual 
border: “An event in a text is the shifting of a persona across the bor-
ders of a semantic field” (233). An example would be William Shake-
speare’s Romeo and Juliet (1597) in which Romeo falls in love with the 
daughter of his family’s enemy. This transgression becomes the starting 
point for Romeo and Juliet’s story and their eventual fates.3 The event 
2 Gerald Prince defines the event in the same way, but distinguishes further an event 
that is caused by an agent from a ‘happening’ where no agent is involved, e.g. “‘the rain 
started to fall’” (28).
3 However, transgressions can occur in a variety of ways. They do not necessarily prom-
ise a progression. Hühn expands Lotman’s concept, presenting a variation of events: 
“Lotman’s model allows for the conceptualization of successive and progressive events, 
but also of regressive events. The protagonist might become immobile in the new sub-
field or progress further, in which case the semantic field is re-defined, the previous sec-
ond sub-field changing into a new first sub-field, which in turn is delimited by another 
boundary that the protagonist, if he/she continues to be mobile, may cross and so forth 
and so on. But it is also possible for the protagonist, having crossed the boundary, to 
retrace his/her steps, as it were, re-entering the initial field and revoking or cancelling 
the event” (2008: 149).
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creates a ‘before’ and ‘after,’ thereby becoming “a special occurrence, 
something which is not part of the everyday routine” (Lotman 24). 4 
Schmid underscores the singularity of the event, too, by claiming an 
event is unpredictable; it “breaks with expectations” and he further 
notes: “[a] highly eventful change is paradoxical in the literal sense of 
the word: it is not what we expect” (26). Even though there is a basic 
definition of the event, the way events are treated in fiction varies, in 
particular when it comes to the issues of expectation and calculation 
that connect the event to the subject. How the difference in the way 
the event is portrayed effects the narrative in general will be explained 
in the following sections.
1.3.2 The Event in Modernist and Postmodernist Texts
The event in the modernist work Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften [The 
man without qualities] (1930) by Robert Musil conveys key principles 
of the modernist attitude. In the first chapter of the novel an accident 
occurs:
Schon vorher war etwas aus der Reihe gesprungen, eine quer schlagende 
Bewegung; etwas hatte sich gedreht, war seitwärts gerutscht, ein schwerer, 
jäh gebremster Lastwagen war es, wie sich jetzt zeigte, wo er, mit einem 
Rad auf der Bordschwelle, gestrandet dastand. Wie die Bienen um das 
Flugloch hatten sich im Nu Menschen um einen kleinen Fleck angesetzt, 
den sie in ihrer Mitte freiließen. Von seinem Wagen herabgekommen, 
stand der Lenker darin, grau wie Packpapier, und erklärte mit groben 
Gebärden den Unglücksfall. Die Blicke der Hinzukommenden richteten 
sich auf ihn und sanken dann vorsichtig in die Tiefe des Lochs, wo man 
einen Mann, der wie tot dalag, an die Schwelle des Gehsteigs gebettet 
hatte (Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften 10).
4 For an overview of the history of the event in narratology see Peter Hühn “Event and 
Eventfulness,” in which he outlines how the concept of the event can be found in Aris-
totle, in Goethe’s discussion of the Novelle and its later applications in narratology. In 
“Functions and Forms of Eventfulness in Narrative Fiction” Hühn demonstrates how 
there can be different versions of the event. A “completed eventfulness” in the case of 
Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (150f.)—and a “staged eventfulness” as in James Joyce’s 
“Grace” (156f.).
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An unforeseen accident breaks into everyday life, upsetting those who 
witness it. The sudden appearance of death disrupts daily routines and 
suggests to the onlookers that any one of them could have been the 
unlucky victim. The beginning of Musil’s passage speaks of something 
that ‘breaks ranks,’ meaning a sudden movement that introduces a frac-
ture. Two causal chains have come together that should not have: a 
truck driving down the road and a man walking. The pedestrians who 
witness the accident are shocked, in particular a woman whose com-
panion tries to calm her down by explaining that the braking distance 
for these types of trucks is too long. This information leads to a curious 
effect: the woman is relieved. She is relieved because she has been given 
an explanation: “es genügte ihr, daß damit dieser gräßliche Vorfall in 
irgend eine Ordnung zu bringen war und zu einem technischen Prob-
lem wurde, das sie nicht mehr unmittelbar anging” (ibid., 11). It ceases 
to affect her, since the accident is integrated into a rational, determin-
istic system; the event has been ‘mastered.’ The technical information 
frames the event, makes it part of a structure and gives sense to it. In 
retrospect, and enriched with this ‘helpful’ information, the disturbing 
accident loses its shocking effect: 
Man hob den Verunglückten auf eine Tragbahre und schob ihn mit dieser 
in den Wagen. Männer in einer Art Uniform waren um ihn bemüht, und 
das Innere des Fuhrwerks, das der Blick erhaschte, sah so sauber und 
regelmäßig wie ein Krankensaal aus. Man ging fast mit dem berechtigten 
Eindruck davon, daß sich ein gesetzliches und ordnungsgemäßes Ereignis 
vollzogen habe (ibid., 11).
Because the ensuing process evokes familiar impressions, it can be 
dealt with. The passage concludes with the word “gesetzlich” [law-
ful], underscoring that the event has become part of the common 
world order. The event and how it is employed in Musil’s introduc-
tory chapter can be connected to general aspects of modernism. The 
modern subject at the beginning of the 20th century finds itself in a 
challenging situation. Everyday circumstances have changed rapidly, 
modern cities emerge, industrialization has already transformed all 
working conditions, and the individual is expected to adapt to a mod-
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ern lifestyle. Musil’s passage reflects the unstable reality of the mod-
ern city and its attendant fears, but it also shows how the individual 
tries to deal with this situation. The companion in Musil’s passage 
gives a rather tautological explanation for the accident, attempting 
to describe the accident as the outcome of a logical and causal chain. 
He takes control of the event by interpreting it. Since this successfully 
calms the woman, this creates a comic effect, because nothing is really 
explained by the reference to the braking distance of trucks. Never-
theless, it serves its purpose—the event can be forgotten, or at least 
categorized as a tragic but not so uncommon accident. Thus, the event 
is fully controlled by the subject, who puts it in its place. However, 
this also devalues the event’s influence. Accordingly, the novel treats 
the event with indifference; after this chapter the reader never hears 
of the event again.
Postmodern writers employ the event differently than writers from pre-
vious decades. Foremost, I would argue the narratological ‘event’ rep-
resents a symbolical center, which implicates a hierarchy postmodern 
writers tend to undermine. In fact, many poststructuralist writers and 
thinkers have proposed distinct anti-hierarchical structures. Derrida 
proposes the notion of différance which describes the constant deferral 
of meaning as an inherent characteristic of language; a process which 
never stops and thus never allows meaning to take on ultimate form 
(cf. “Différance” 7). Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in Thousand 
Plateaus, introduce their concept of the rhizome:
the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not 
necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very dif-
ferent regimes of signs, and even nonsign states.[…] Unlike a structure, 
which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations 
between the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, 
the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification 
as its dimensions, and the line of flight or deterritorialization as the max-
imum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis 
[…]. The rhizome is anti-genealogy (21).
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Structures like these do not allow for a singular event that takes on a 
bigger role than other events, since this would create an unwanted and 
arbitrary hierarchy. Instead, postmodern literature, fully aware of the 
event’s role, plays with the concept and the conventions of the event 
by questioning its eventfulness. Don DeLillo’s White Noise (1985) is 
the perfect example of this. Here, the event is an unspecified chemi-
cal accident/spill that produces a big, mysterious cloud. The nature 
and the exact dangers of the cloud are never revealed. The event is 
referred to by different names. The radio calls it at first a “feathery 
plume” (DeLillo 111), then a “black billowing cloud” (ibid., 113) and 
finally an “airborne toxic event” (ibid., 117). The father and mother in 
the story are adamant about playing down the seriousness of the event 
to the rest of the family, denying that it is an event in the first place, 
which creates a comic effect: “Air-raid sirens sounded again, this time 
so close to us that we were negatively affected, shaken to the point of 
avoiding each other’s eyes as a way of denying that something unusual 
was going on” (ibid., 118). Soon, the radio station provides some symp-
toms of exposure to the cloud. These, like the appearance of the cloud, 
are repeatedly revised. When the children exhibit some of the symp-
toms, their validity is constantly doubted; there is no way to know 
for sure if the symptoms are real, psychosomatic, or unconnected to 
the “airborne toxic event.” This situation alludes to Jean Baudrillard’s 
theory on simulacra, in which he describes the case of a patient who 
is feigning an illness yet develops symptoms nevertheless: “simulation 
threatens the difference between ‘true’ and ‘false,’ between ‘real’ and 
‘imaginary.’ Since the simulator produces ‘true’ symptoms, is he ill or 
not? He cannot be treated objectively either as ill, or as not-ill” (3). 
As a consequence, the parents in White Noise refuse to react at all and 
decide to do absolutely nothing. In addition to the general confusion 
about the symptoms, one supposed symptom is to perceive events as 
déjà vues. Thus, in a comic reverse, the event produces subjects that are 
unable to recognize an event as such but who might consider it a mere 
repetition of a previous situation. The notion of the event is further 
destabilized by the fact that the only people who consider the cloud an 
event are religious fanatics: “How do you plan to spend your resurrec-
tion?’ he [a stranger talking to the father] said, as though asking about 
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a long weekend coming up” (ibid., 136). The qualification of the event 
is supported by another instance, namely by the men working at the 
emergency shelters who are wearing arm wrists that spell out “SIMU-
VAC,” short for “simulated evacuation” (ibid., 139). The event serves 
as a simulation practice for a real case scenario, thus blurring again the 
boundaries between real and imaginary. The nature and truthfulness 
of the event is therefore questioned and satirized on both an episte-
mological level (what are the symptoms produced by the event?) and 
on an ontological level (is the event even real?).
1.3.3 Diminished by the Event: the Postmodern Subject
Subjectivity is destabilized through the treatment of the event. The 
parents in White Noise become unable to take action, simply because 
they don’t know whether they should take the event seriously or not. In 
fact, the questioning of events always has direct consequences for the 
subject. In other examples, like Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 
49 (1966), events exist in a multitude. Overrun by this sheer mass of 
events, the subject struggles to decide what to do and how to respond. 
It is telling that Pynchon’s characters are often paranoid being over-
whelmed by events that challenge each other and that imply alternative 
worldviews.5 Timmer addresses this situation critically: “One of the 
problems many of the characters and narrators in the novels confront 
is that they don’t know how to choose between many options, possible 
ways of being” (42). This shows how the destabilization of the event 
also undermines the subject. In postmodern literature, the event is a 
stress-factor: it overwhelms and challenges the subject, resulting in a 
5 Joseph Tabbi writes on Pynchon in Postmodern Sublime: “Pynchon likes to present 
characters in mental states that fluctuate between the total theory of a paranoid delu-
sion and the ironical ‘mindless pleasures’ of a total relativism. The overdetermined and 
wholly private meanings in the first state of mind are dissolved in the second by an irony 
that would undermine the ground on which any stable meaning might be built. In the 
end, however, neither state receives authorial sanction, for neither one does anything 
to advance the radical freedom that clearly concerns Pynchon, however much it eludes 
his characters” (77).
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general diminishment of its state. Thus, the questioning of the event 
in postmodernism goes along with a general existential and epistemo-
logical destabilization of the subject.
In fact, postmodernism can be defined as destabilization par excellence. 
This is most obvious when it comes to the definition of postmodernism 
itself. The discussion about its definition alone seems to mirror what 
postmodernism is all about, namely a plurality of systems and ideas 
in which no one takes a lead. In a seemingly ongoing debate about 
how to define postmodernism it is part of the rhetoric to underscore 
that it is impossible to define the term, since the discourse on this 
matter is heterogenic. Sim writes that “[p]ostmodernism, like mod-
ernism before it, has produced a profusion of definitions and redef-
initions. […] Not only does what counts as ‘postmodernism’ change 
from writer to writer, but what is ‘meant’ by most other terms depends 
on who is doing the ‘meaning,’ and what they mean by ‘meaning’” 
(144), and Nünning simply states: “there is no postmodernism in the 
singular” (235). However, even though interpretations of postmod-
ernism are diverse, one aspect appears to be shared by all writers: the 
constant endeavor to question traditional truths and beliefs that are 
falsely accepted as ‘natural.’ Linda Hutcheon suggests in The Politics of 
Postmodernism:
it seems reasonable to say that the postmodern’s initial concern is to 
de-naturalize some of the dominant features of our way of life; to point 
out that those entities that we unthinkingly experience as ‘natural’ (they 
might even include capitalism, patriarchy, liberal humanism) are in fact 
‘cultural’; made by us, not given to us. Even nature, postmodernism might 
point out, doesn’t grow on trees (2).
In reference to literature, the conventions of a narrative are questioned, 
e.g. the role of the author, the reader, the nature of the event, the sub-
ject, rules of storytelling and so forth. Raymond Federman who refers 
to postmodern fiction as ‘new fiction’ explains what happens to the 
subject under these conditions: 
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the fictitious beings, will also no longer be well-made-characters who 
carry with them a fixed identity, a stable set of social and psychological 
attributes—a name, a situation, a profession, a condition, etc. The crea-
tures of the new fiction will be as changeable, as unstable, as illusory, as 
nameless, as unnamable, as fraudulent, as unpredictable as the discourse 
that makes them (12-13).
One could say that postmodern literature reveals supposedly ‘intuitive’ 
or ‘common’ frameworks and questions their validity. Lyotard terms 
these frameworks ‘metanarratives,’ or ‘grand narratives,’ which pertain 
to forms of tradition that affect different areas: social conduct, poli-
tics, ethics, religion, and also artistic expression.6 Lyotard recognizes 
these overarching frameworks as narratives rather than as truths, and 
thus underscores their constructed nature. As Hutcheon writes above, 
these frameworks are made, and “not given to us.” Lyotard argues that 
these narratives are an expression of various cultural norms, modes and 
institutions and how these spread their principles through discursive 
actions: 
Narratives […] determine criteria of competence and/or illustrate how 
they are to be applied. They thus define what has the right to be said and 
done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of 
that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what 
they do (Lyotard 23). 
Thus, metanarratives have a regulating effect: they order thought and 
determine what is possible. However, since the metanarratives of soci-
ety have failed to take care of the individual in the 20th century, lead-
6 Lyotard defines postmodernism in The Postmodern Condition as follows: “Simplify-
ing to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv). 
Zygmunt Bauman sees this similarly, explaining how the notion of rules and orders 
turned out to be illusionary in postmodernism: “Postmodernity, one may say, is mo-
dernity without illusions […] The illusions in question boil down to the belief that the 
‘ messiness’ of the human world is but a temporary and repairable state, sooner or later 
to be replaced by the orderly and systematic rule of reason. The truth in question is that 
the ‘messiness’ will stay whatever we do or know, that the little orders and ‘systems’ we 
carve out in the world are brittle, until-further-notice, and as arbitrary and in the end 
contingent as their alternatives” (32–33).
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ing, among other things, to two world wars, revealing humanity’s lim-
itations to deal with a plurality of identities, they are subsequently 
refuted by poststructuralist and postmodernist thinkers. They dispose 
of these frameworks by showing how arbitrary they are and how easily 
they could be replaced by other systems.
The critique of metanarratives results also in a destabilization of the 
subject. Zima concludes that “scepticism vis-á-vis the great meta-narra-
tives goes hand in hand with a radical critique or an outright rejection 
of the notion of subjectivity” (2003: 26). The subject, in fact, has been 
an illusion all along, as Frederic Jameson writes in Postmodernism and 
Consumer Society:
not only is the bourgeois individual a thing of the past, it is also a myth; it 
never really existed in the first place; there have never been autonomous 
subjects of that type. Rather, this construct is merely a philosophical and 
cultural mystification which sought to persuade people that they ‘had’ 
individual subjects and possessed this unique personal identity (1850).
Instead of being determined by an individual identity, the subject in 
postmodernism is shaped by various outside forces: language, dis-
course, ideology and culture.7 This insight enables the liberation of the 
subject.8 Timmer points out how the postmodern subject must be con-
7 How the subject is shaped and deformed by language is satirically and hyperbolical-
ly portrayed in White Noise. Here, a drug dealer is unable to distinguish words from 
objects, so when the protagonist tells him “‘Hail of bullets’” (DeLillo 311) he falsely 
assumes he is being shot at with a gun: “He hit the floor, began crawling toward the 
bathroom, looking back over his shoulder, childlike, miming, using principles of height-
ened design but showing real terror, brilliant cringing fear” (ibd., 311). 
8 Zima summarizes this liberation and elaborates on its philosophical underpinnings: “das 
Subjekt [ist] eine Scheineinheit, die sich bei näherem Hinsehen auflöst: entweder weil 
der gesellschaftliche und sprachliche Sinn, der Subjektivität scheinbar gewährleistet, nie 
vergegenwärtigt, nie vereinheitlicht werden kann (Deleuze, Derrida, Vattimo), oder 
weil der Einzelne ideologisch, strukturell und sprachlich überdeterminiert ist, so daß 
von einem Subjekt als autonom handelnder Instanz nicht die Rede sein kann (Althuss-
er, Foucault, Baudrillard)“ (2000: 193). He goes into detail about Althusser and notes 
that “für Athusser [ist] der Subjektbegriff der ideologische Begriff par excellence. Er 
stellt eine Affinität zwischen dem philosophischen und dem juristischen Denken fest 
[…] Kurzum, das Subjekt ist ein Untertan im Sinne von His oder Her Majesty’s subject, 
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sidered emancipated, since it has ceased to be fixed to certain expec-
tations or norms of society: “it perhaps became easier to fight for the 
right to be different; one did not need to adapt to ‘appropriate’ forms 
of living, since it could be shown that what is appropriate and nor-
mal is not written in stone, but subject to change” (37). In fact, what 
had been considered the average subject—the Western, white, male 
subject—is now challenged by the peripheries, the outsiders and (for-
merly) silenced groups. By disputing the main discourse the focus shifts 
towards the neglected and invites them to introduce counter-positions. 
This has been relevant in particular for gender as well as for post-colo-
nial studies. Judith Butler questions the notion of gendered identity in 
Gender Trouble (1990), arguing that it is not an ontological fact, but a 
construction: “Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity 
or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an 
identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space 
through a stylized repetition of acts” (140). The post-colonial writer 
Homi Bhabha also proposes a new understanding of subjectivity or 
rather of identity in The Location of Culture (1994). He introduces a 
modern ‘hybrid’ subject that is located in between different nationali-
ties and/or cultures and cannot be categorized as belonging to a certain 
group or nation (cf. 4). His hybrid subject is defined by its location on a 
threshold and thus does not adhere to common or ‘natural’ definitions 
of identity that link the subject to its ‘origin.’
Nevertheless, there has been criticism of this new-found liberty of sub-
jectivity, and it touches upon a problem in postmodern thought that is 
especially difficult for so-called ‘ethnic’ literature. Haselstein quotes on 
this matter the writer and literary critic bell hooks: “Should we not be 
suspicious of postmodern critiques of the ‘subject’ when they surface 
at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves 
coming to voice for the first time?” (“Postmodern Blackness” 2482; 
cited in Haselstein 13–14). Bradbury notes that this is also a signifi-
cant argument in feminist writing:
das sein Unterworfensein zusammen mit dem ursprünglichen Akt der Unterwerfung 
verdrängt hat, so daß es sich in der Ideologie, die es unbewußt lebt, frei und autonom 
wähnt“ (ibid., 242).
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there was little appeal to new feminist writers in the idea of a literature of 
exhaustion; the notion that all stories had been used up or the tradition 
been completed, leaving the writer with a pastiche narrative kitty, was 
hardly of great importance to writers who believed that their stories were 
yet to be told. This had a double meaning for black women writers, who 
had good reason to see a double sense of exclusion […] (22).
The notion of subjectivity in postmodern thought is clearly revolution-
ary but also proved to be too limited, and not affirmative enough in 
respect to exactly those groups on the peripheries it aimed to support. 
In this context, a general issue becomes obvious. Even though common 
concepts of subjectivity and identity were questioned and opened up 
for discussion, no one seems to have looked for a resolution. Best and 
Kellner note that “all postmodern theory lacks an adequate theory of 
agency, of an active creative self, mediated by social institutions, dis-
courses, and other people” (283).9 
This is one of the problems, I argue, that post-postmodern literature 
deals with in detail: proposing forms of subjectivity that are affirmative 
and constructive. Thus, contemporary literature deals with postmod-
ern problems, but instead of presenting an epistemological dilemma, 
it proposes alternative notions of subjectivity. These subjects are stabi-
lized and even empowered through events. One can find precisely such 
subjects in French philosophical thought since the 1980s, which has 
been concerned with moving away from poststructural philosophy. It 
is this line of thought that forms the basis of this dissertation and that 
I will give a short introduction to in the following subchapter.
9 This has also been stated by Linda Hutcheon in reference to feminism: “The many 
feminist social agendas demand a theory of agency, but such a theory is visibly lacking 
in postmodernism, caught as it is in a certain negativity that may be inherent in any 
critique of cultural dominants. It has no theory of positive action on a social level; all 
feminist positions do” (22). Zima underscores this: “Hier zeichnet sich das grundsätz-
liche Dilemma ab, das aus dem Spannungsverhältnis von Ideologie und Theorie her-
vorgeht: Die Ideologie macht die Individuen zu handlungsfähigen Subjekten, spornt 
sie aber nicht gerade zum kritischen Nachdenken an; die kritischen Theorien fördern 
dieses Nachdenken, sind aber ‚von den Gedankens Blässe angekränkelt‘ (Goethe über 
Hamlet) und verhindern tendenziell das Handeln. Niemand wird den Feministinnen 
verdenken, dieses uralte Dilemma nicht überwunden zu haben” (200: 284).
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1.3.4 The Event and the Subject in Contemporary French 
Phenomenology
The subject regains significance in current contemporary French phil-
osophical thought, in particular in the realm of phenomenology. Here, 
the subject attains stability as the result of an overpowering event. The 
event is considered to be unexpected, singular and excessive, turning a 
mere ‘being’ into a subject in the first place. This concept of the event 
has religious implications that have become interesting even to the 
most secular philosophers. 10 Gondek and Tengelyi, who have summa-
rized this development, write about how the concept of subjectivity is 
distinguished from a poststructuralist view of the subject:
Der von einem radikalisierten Strukturalismus vorschnell verkündete 
‚Tod des Subjekts‘ wird in der Neuen Phänomenologie Frankreichs 
generell nicht akzeptiert; aber natürlich wird damit das allzu selbstmäch-
tige Subjekt der neuzeitlichen Philosophie keineswegs in seine Rechte 
wieder eingesetzt. Das kommt auch darin zum Ausdruck, dass Passivi-
tät und Affektivität in den neueren Bestrebungen beinahe überall zum 
Thema werden. Es wird ein Subjekt beschrieben, dem immer schon pathi-
sche Ereignisse widerfahren, bevor es dazu kommen kann, sich auf sich zu 
besinnen und selbstmächtig auf die Welt einzuwirken (30).
In their anthology, Gondek and Tengelyi discuss multiple current phil-
osophical theories that deal with the event and the subject in various, 
sometimes even contradictory ways. However, all the philosophers 
discussed agree on one central aspect: “Die neue Phänomenologie 
10 Alain Badiou would be one of them. He writes in Saint Paul: “For me, Paul is a  poet- 
thinker of the event, as well as one who practices and states the invariant traits of what 
can be called the militant figure. He brings forth the entirely human connection, whose 
destiny fascinates me, between the general idea of a rupture, an overturning, and that 
of a thought-practice that is this rupture’s subjective materiality” (2). Referring to Paul 
implicates that Badiou’s notion of the event is one of extreme conversion that presup-
poses a subject’s dedication to the event or what Badiou calls ‘fidelity.’ ‘Being true’ to 
an event gives form to the subject in the first place. Badiou states: “I call ‘subject’ the 
bearer [le support] of a fidelity, the one who bears a process of truth. The subject, there-
fore, in no way pre-exists the process. He is absolutely nonexistent in the situation ‘be-
fore’ the event. We might say that the process of truth induces a subject” (Ethics 43).
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in Frankreich versucht, die Welt auf Sinnbestände zurückzuführen, 
ohne diese Sinnbestände von einem sinngebenden Bewusstsein herzu-
leiten” (ibid., 37). The subject is not understood as a traditional sub-
ject. Unlike Descartes’ cogito ego, the subject described by Gondek and 
Tengelyi has no mastery over the event—it is controlled by an event.
One of the leading thinkers in this area is the theologian and philos-
opher Jean-Luc Marion. Marion is considered, along with Jean-Luc 
Nancy, John D. Caputo, and Slavoj Žižek “to have broken the ‘post-
modern mould’” (Toth and Brooks 5). He develops his concept in 
demarcation to Jacques Derrida’s, who wrote a seminal book on the 
‘gift,’ a term he uses synonymously with the ‘event.’ Derrida considers 
the gift/event a phenomenon that only exists as a concept, not as a 
reality. The singularity and exceptionality of the gift is not possible in 
Derrida’s view, as he sees it corrupted by calculation and thus expec-
tation. Marion takes on Derrida’s objection to the notion of the gift/
event and meticulously shows how the gift/event is possible, neverthe-
less. He succeeds in doing this by redefining the phenomenon and con-
sequently redefining the gift and the event. In fact, he gives priority to 
the event, arguing that it operates on its own, which puts the subject in 
the back seat. Though one could claim that this is a passive conception 
of subjectivity, and therefore not so different from the resigned and 
incapable subject seen in postmodernism, Marion’s concept is highly 
optimistic, since his passive subject eventually turns into a stabilized 
and even a ‘gifted’ subject which is very different from a poststructur-
alist conception of subjectivity. For Marion subjects are empowered 
beings, once open to an event that shapes them.
But how does a subject become empowered and capacitated by an 
event? The event conditions a receptive subject. How this receptivity 
is produced will be outlined in the following subchapter, where I also 
introduce my term ‘captivation,’ which describes a state of receptivity. 
The term is based on Marion’s theory, but also on Giorgio Agamben’s 
notion of the homo sacer.
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1.4 Being Struck by the Event: Captivation
This subchapter describes a concentrated version of what will be elab-
orated on in detail in the chapter “Relating the Event to the Subject.” 
For this introduction, I wish to focus on one element that is central for 
my approach and that informs my own terminology. This is the idea of 
a receptive and therefore ‘weak’ subject that is capacitated by an event.
Marion describes a being that comes before the event, a subject that is 
not a subject yet. He calls it the receiver. The receiver is portrayed only 
in a rather vague way; it is a being that is in a waiting position but una-
ware of this. The open and receptive attitude is a condition for being 
able to perceive an event. Without this, the event would not occur. 
The receiver is a weak being in a very Christian conception. Weak-
ness is thus understood in terms of humbleness, patience and accept-
ance. The subject submits to a higher force that Marion does not call 
God, but which clearly inhabits a godlike position. This means that the 
receiver and the subject are not really neutral beings for Marion, they 
are regarded as highly positive and their turning from a receiver into 
a subject is even compared to a revelation. This overt use of Christian 
terminology makes it difficult to employ Marion’s theory for a literary 
analysis, since weakness is understood in a simplistic way. However, 
states of weakness can be rather complex and involve social and polit-
ical factors, too. Thus, the receiver’s weakness, which is a significant 
component for the concept of the event, is too restrictive and one-
sided in the way Marion conceptualizes it. There needs to be an under-
standing of weakness that does not have solely religious implications.
Weakness as an inherent part of a political structure is a key feature 
of Giorgio Agamben’s theory of the homo sacer. Downey notes that 
Agamben
is interested in lives lived on the margins of social, political, juridical, 
medical, and biological representation, not for their exceptional quali-
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ties but for their exemplary status: the manner, that is, in which they are 
both representative of the modernity and an admonitory warning to the 
ontological status of the modern political subject (120). 
Agamben’s homo sacer lives this kind of a life on the margins of soci-
ety. The homo sacer is, in a negative way, stable and fixed. He is shaped 
and even imprisoned by his circumstances, since he is locked within 
the center of the state, doomed to be excluded both from the outside 
and the inside. The reason for this is of a political nature: only because 
he can be killed without consequence can the sovereign thrive and 
the nation state exist. Even though Agamben’s work is clearly influ-
enced by Derrida, dealing throughout with issues of power and lan-
guage, the homo sacer is a shockingly determinate figure. In this area, 
Agamben clearly removes himself from a solely poststructuralist atti-
tude. This has also been noted by Mills who writes that Agamben’s 
“approach to questions of language, subjectivity and representation 
has reoriented discussion away from the deconstructive approach that 
has largely dominated in the Anglo-American context of late” (1). 
Although Agamben’s poststructuralist upbringing cannot be denied, 
he provides figurations that are very different from the looseness of 
différance. His severe view on this political subject is inspired by a con-
temporary phenomenon, namely that of the stateless refugee who has 
lost his national identity and lives the paradox of belonging but at the 
same time not belonging. Agamben calls this situation the ban. In my 
theoretical chapter I will elaborate how the ban of the homo sacer can 
be compared to the receiver’s aimless state of waiting. In fact, I intend 
to show how these two figures are two sides of the same coin. Both 
sides depict limited and restricted beings, although, one version is a 
harmless and optimistic version, whereas the other is the exact oppo-
site and refers to a violent form of restriction. To read the homo sacer’s 
weakness as receptivity certainly goes beyond Agamben’s theory, since 
he is not dealing with receptivity in any way or even allowing the homo 
sacer to experience an event. While using some of Agamben’s ideas to 
bolster my literary analysis, it must be emphasized that my interpreta-
tion of Agamben is clearly shaped by Marion’s notion of subjectivity. 
In the conclusion of my theoretical chapter, I will demonstrate that 
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Marion’s receiver and Agamben’s homo sacer present extreme forms of 
weakness, which are located at different ends of a spectrum of recep-
tive beings/subjects.
To describe this spectrum of receptivity I introduce the term ‘captiva-
tion.’ The term captivation originated in the early 16th century and is 
defined as follows: “The action of taking or holding captive; the fact 
or state of being taken or held captive; now only fig., of the attention, 
mind, fancy, affections” (OED 102). Even though the term is only used 
figuratively today, my goal is to reactivate the archaic meaning of the 
term, turning it into a portmanteau that incorporates both ‘to be held 
captive’ and ‘to be captivated by something’; one describing a forceful 
form of restriction, the other a milder one. The spectrum of captivation 
thus contains on the one hand the homo sacer, violently imprisoned, 
and on the other the receiver, who feels drawn to a captivating force. 
Thus, captivation can become apparent in different forms: it can be a 
restriction caused by environmental, political or social conditions, by 
age, lack of knowledge, ignorance, trauma, physical or psychological 
dependency, but it can also be a fascination generated by images, events 
and people. To summarize, the notion of captivation stems from an 
expansion of Marion’s concept of the receiver’s receptive state, which 
I augment by contrasting the receiver with Agamben’s homo sacer and 
by showing how each is positioned at an opposite end of a spectrum 
of weakness. 
The concept of captivation is also inspired by Eshelman’s notion of the 
‘frame.’ The frame is a constraint that is expressed in different ways: 
the frame, which must be understood as a temporal, spatial or ethical limit 
imposed on someone from without. The frame itself may be thought of 
as having a theist or sacral dimension on the one hand and anthropological 
or human on the other. The theist side of the frame impinges on, crimps, 
or temporarily cuts off the continuous passage from one state of affairs 
to another in an authoritative way. Such frames are imposed from above 
or without and cannot be easily overcome or placed in doubt. They are, 
for the most part, onerous givens that—like theist cosmologies every-
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where—subject the characters within them to severe tests of faith, cour-
age, or perseverance (98).
The frame imposes itself on the subject and limits the subject’s abilities 
to act. This concept is set in clear contrast to a postmodern understand-
ing of the frame which, following Derrida’s analysis of Kant’s ergon, is 
both inside and outside, opening the piece of work up to an uncontrol-
lable and unlimited context.11 Eshelman’s frame is, in contrast, coer-
cive and impermeable. Struggling against (or consciously manipulat-
ing) this frame becomes the subject’s way of attaining subjectivity, an 
act that Eshelman terms a “narrative performance,” which “marks the 
ability to transcend a frame in some way, usually breaking through it at 
some point and/or reversing its basic parameters” (12). This frame can 
also be projected onto the reader, and challenge him/her to transgress 
the implicit borders erected between reader and text (cf. ibid., 53ff ). 
Captivation works in a similar way, however the term reflects forms 
of constraints located between imprisonment and a kind of hypnosis 
or an intense fascination. Furthermore, the subject’s ability to ‘tran-
scend the frame’ as Eshelman puts it is in my conception only possible 
through an event. Consequently, I argue for an interplay of captivation 
and event that shapes the subject. Differently from Eshelman, I do not 
consider captivation something that can be overcome completely, but I 
am in agreement with him that captivation/frames can be ‘reworked.’ 
The subject remains bound to its captivation in some way, even though 
it might not suffer from it in the same manner as before, but finds a 
different relationship towards its captivation, and even employs it to 
advantage. 
The next subchapter will outline the areas in which this dissertation 
explores the subject’s captivation and its resulting empowerment 
through an event. The focus of the analytical chapters is meant to indi-
11 When outlining his concept of the frame Eshelman contrasts his notion with that of 
Jacques Derrida’s formulated in The Truth in Painting (1987) in which Derrida dis-
cusses Kant’s ergon. This dissertation also deals with Derrida’s treatment of the frame 
in the introduction to “Captives of the Sacred.”
1.5 Contemporary Events: Authorship, Ethics and the Sacred 27
cate how the subjects deal with their captivation, how this triggers an 
event, and how they turn into capacitated figures. The forms in which 
empowerment presents itself are also described in this section.
1.5 Contemporary Events: Authorship, Ethics 
and the Sacred
In contemporary literature, I identify three areas in which a subject 
receives an empowerment through an event. The topics authorship, 
ethics and the sacred present recurring themes in contemporary fic-
tion. They are also topics that experienced a very distinct interpreta-
tion in postmodern fiction, being questioned, destabilized or simply 
denied their validity. Because their treatment in postmodern fiction is 
so clearly defined, it seems imperative to explore precisely these topics 
to make a case for post-postmodern literature. Authorship, ethics and 
the sacred are shown to be transformed by engaging empowered and 
capable subjects that present their own interpretation of how to be an 
author, an ethical or a sacred subject. 
Authorship is probably one of the most discussed topics in postmodern 
literature and in articles on postmodernism. Roland Barthes’ “Death 
of the Author” (1977) is the seminal piece of work on this matter. 
Authorship, in the eyes of postmodern writers, has one central flaw: 
it implies a form of authority that the anti-authorial thinkers of the 
1960s take issue with. Barthes’ critique is not directed solely at authors, 
but at figures of guidance common in literature. These guiding figures 
are reintroduced in contemporary literature, however, their power to 
guide and, thus, to mislead, is represented critically. The reader takes on 
an important role in this, becoming involved in the fiction more than 
he or she probably wants to be. Referring to current American litera-
ture, the literary critic de Dulk maintains that “the aim of these works 
is not to constantly push the reader out of the story, as is often the case 
in postmodernist meta-fiction, but rather the other way around: to 
draw the reader in. They all treat fiction as a dialogue between writer 
and reader” (239). In contemporary fiction, readers are pressured 
and manipulated. They are confronted with powerful author figures 
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that try to impose their opinion or views on the readers, who must 
then decide whether they want to play along or struggle against the 
attempted domination. They are, in either case, forced to react. This 
invasion of the reader’s sphere has been discussed by Eshelman, who 
writes on Yann Martel’s Life of Pi: “[the novel] demands (and in a cer-
tain sense creates) a new type of reader who is willing to enter into the 
closed frame of the text and, at least for the time being, identify with 
its artificially rigged center before going off on his or her own” (57). 
This type of novel bases its aesthetic effect on the reader’s response, 
which is a trend in many current novels.
A related issue in this regard is ethics. When the reader is made part 
of the narrative, being forced to engage in a way that seems unnatural 
to him, the reading process takes on an ethical component. To read 
and to interpret means making an ethical judgment, or to even being 
inclined to take sides. That the selected novels purposely seek out eth-
ical concerns is evident with regard to the types of settings and plots 
that are chosen. Two of the selected novels, The Road and Oryx and 
Crake, deal with a postapocalyptic world that introduces the possibil-
ity of discussing responsibility on a large scale, namely the responsi-
bility of humanity for planet earth and the questioning of a so-called 
‘civilized’ world. Neither do the other novels shy away from asking big 
ethical questions. The History of Love portrays a family that belongs 
to the third generation of Holocaust survivors, discussing trauma and 
healing as well as forgiveness; Atonement and Ghostwritten reflect crit-
ically on the responsibility and power that accompany authorship; The 
Gathering deals with sexual abuse and the responsibility of the family; 
and The White Tiger depicts modern forms of slavery, asking how to 
distinguish self-defense from murder. The material that is of interest to 
contemporary fiction provides a testament to a certain form of sincer-
ity and earnestness that is rather uncommon in postmodern literature. 
For Nünning, who refers to current British Literature this is proof that 
ethics is one of the significant topics in contemporary fiction: “[i] f 
one wanted to come up with a sort of umbrella concept, designating 
an interest that is shared by many of the authors that I have discussed, 
it would be the return to ethical questions” (254). Other critics agree 
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with this; van Dijk and Vaessens describe, in reference to McEwan’s 
work (in particular to Saturday (2005)) how there is a “definitive grav-
itation towards the values made taboo in postmodernism” (12), which 
is a statement I would like to borrow in order to describe all the novels 
under discussion here. In fact, when discussing the novels under the 
aspects of authorship and sacredness they so frequently touch upon 
ethical questions too, that it is almost impossible not to include the 
question of ethics in every analytical chapter.
The last chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to post-postmodern 
sacredness. Sacredness, the divine and the holy are concepts that have 
been destructed or at least questioned since modernism. In postmod-
ernism, the notion of the ‘death of God’ has become a common sense 
view and the sort of security and trust that a religious sphere provides 
has not been replaced by anything else. In contemporary literature, the 
sacred sphere is not simply reintroduced. Instead, one can observe a 
transparent reconstruction and recreation of the sacred that redefines 
the term. The sacred emerges out of banal events, accidents and mis-
takes. These events turn the unknowing characters into sacred beings; 
they are adored, listened to and even prayed to. They are sacred, because 
their actions come across as inspired by a higher power, even though 
in reality these sacred characters are helpless, struggling and even des-
perate. Although these sacred subjects might only appear sacred, their 
actions are highly consequential and suggest that even though their 
power might not stem directly from a sacred source, it could—since 
things considered ‘impossible’ are made possible. This is in line with 
Nadine Böhm’s observations in her dissertation Sakrales Sehen. Strat-
egien der Sakralisierung im Kino der Jahrtausendwende, where she pre-
sents arguments concerning the sacred in contemporary film which are 
very similar to my observations on contemporary fiction. She writes 
that the protagonists are portrayed in such a manner that they appear 
to be more powerful than they really are, or that their actions are linked 
to a ‘higher power,’ which legitimizes them:
Sakralisierungen, zunächst heuristisch als Aufladung oder Assoziierung 
kultureller Güter mit religiöser Valenz definiert, stellen, so meine These, 
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eine dominante Weise der Appropriierung religiöser Diskurse im popu-
lären Film dar und werden primär auf drei Weisen funktionalisiert: erstens 
auf diegetischer und medialer Ebene dazu, Hauptfiguren über Referenzen 
zu religiösen Symbolsystemen mächtiger erscheinen zu lassen, ihr Han-
deln unter Bezug auf ‘höhere Mächte‘ als geheiligt darzustellen und damit 
zu legitimieren oder auch um dem Film selbst als Medium eine sakrale 
Qualität zuzuschreiben (12).
It will have to be shown whether this is also valid for literary configu-
rations of sacrality and how the effect of a higher power is created on 
a textual basis and what consequences this has for the subject. 
Before starting with the analyses in this dissertation, the next chapter 
will provide a detailed discussion of Marion’s and Agamben’s theories 
and describe how their ideas can be employed by interpreting an exem-
plary short story by David Mitchell. The chapter will also explain why 
it is necessary to augment Marion’s theory with Agamben’s concepts 
and how this establishes the basis for my own terminology.
2 Relating the Subject to the Event
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will outline the theoretical framework of this disser-
tation. The goal of this chapter is to come up with a concept of subjec-
tivity that is centered around an event. Thus, the following could be 
characterized as the search for a term that defines a subject that is cre-
ated as the result of an event. Some of the questions related to this pur-
suit are: how can a subject experience an event in the first place, what 
is such an event like and how can the effect of the event be expressed 
in terms of subjectivity? In exploring this subject I will be employing 
two philosophical theories that deal with very different projects: that 
of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben who investigates issues of 
politics and law, and that of the French phenomenologist and theo-
logian Jean-Luc Marion who attempts a redefinition of phenomenol-
ogy. While Marion and Agamben definitively differ thematically and 
stylistically, they do share key structures.
Marion depicts two forms of subjectivity—the weak and the strong—
yet does not treat them as antagonistic, but rather as two sides of the 
same coin, arguing that in order to become empowered it is necessary 
to be ‘weak’ at first, which clearly reflects a Christian belief system. 
According to Marion, only weak beings can be receptive enough to 
experience a transformational event which enables them to transcend 
their prior position. Agamben has a completely different project in 
mind. He analyzes the modern state and investigates how sovereignty 
in the 20th century can be considered biopolitics. Agamben’s ‘subjects’ 
are rather schematic political ‘figures.’ They are located at different ends 
of this spectrum: there is the weakest being on one end—the refugee, 
the camp inhabitant and other configurations of the weak that Agam-
ben sums up with the term homo sacer—and the most powerful—the 
sovereign—on the other end. Other than these two figures there is 
nothing; they constitute the modern biopolitical state in Agamben’s 
view. Both theories essentially gravitate around a weak being, utterly 
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determined by its circumstances, and both theories also propose a very 
potent being, likewise a product of restricting circumstances. Yet, only 
Marion provides a theory of the event, seeing it as the link between 
weak and powerful being. Whereas Marion’s subject experiences a 
transformative event due to its former restriction, Agamben’s homo 
sacer remains stuck in its position.
Agamben’s analysis of modern politics comes across as hopeless at 
times, which has provoked critics into calling his politics ‘nihilistic,’ 
neither is Marion’s theory without flaws, being almost too optimistic 
when he speaks of phenomena that empower subjects, appearing out of 
thin air. Certainly, the two theories can be (and have been in the case 
of Agamben) criticized for some of their assumptions. However, both 
theories on their own offer figurations that are very unique and innova-
tive, but also simple. The fact that they are also situated ‘after’ Decon-
struction (in Marion’s case more so than in Agamben’s) makes them 
attractive as literary instruments, and both theories lend themselves to 
such a use. In Agamben’s case, this has been evident mainly in connec-
tion with contemporary works;12 Marion is lesser known in compar-
ative literary studies. His thoughts on phenomenology are examined 
primarily by philosophers and theologians. Nonetheless, since Ma -
rion’s theory deals with event-structures—the basic element of every 
narrative—I consider his theory very applicable to literary works.
In the following I will use a story by David Mitchell to elaborate how 
both Agamben’s and Marion’s theories could be employed for a liter-
ary analysis. I will demonstrate how both theorists propose figures and 
12 See for example Oliver Ruf, ed. Ästhetik der Ausschließung. Ausnahmezustände in Ge-
schichte, Theorie, Medien und literarischen Fiktionen. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neu-
mann, 2009. The article by Christian J. Krampe (“Der Autor im Ausnahmezustand. 
Innen und Außen des Lagers in Chuck Palahniuks Haunted“. 281–299.) focuses in 
particular on the figure of the homo sacer. The other contributors deal with canoni-
cal authors like Kleist, Grabbe, Musil, Doctorow and Büchner. Agamben’s theoretical 
work has also been employed for literary analyses by De Boever who has written two 
books on this topic: Literary Sovereignties: The Contemporary Novel and the State of 
Exception. New York: Continuum, 2012 and Narrative Care: Biopolitics and the Novel. 
London: Bloomsbury, 2013, in which he discusses how the novel can be considered a 
camp.
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patterns that become very productive for such an analysis, but I will 
also show at what point these models stop being usable and where they 
inevitably would fail. It will become evident that what lies at the center 
of the problem is the question of how weakness and how empower-
ment are defined by Marion and Agamben respectively and how these 
definitions must be altered and even broadened in order to use them 
for interpreting literature. At the end of this chapter I will therefore 
propose my own terminology that takes Marion’s and Agamben’s fig-
urations of subjectivity into account, but introduces a more ‘neutral’ 
term to describe these subjects.
2.2 David Mitchell’s “An Orison of Sonmi ~ 451” : 
The Ascension of the Homo Sacer
2.2.1 The Clone as Homo Sacer-Figure
David Mitchell’s “An Orison of Sonmi ~ 451” is part of the novel Cloud 
Atlas (2004), which consists of six separate stories, each taking place 
within their own time period (ranging from the 19th century to a far 
advanced future) and featuring their own narratives and characters. 
Up until the sixth story, each story’s narrative is interrupted at a piv-
otal moment, thus generating suspense and a sense of urgency. After 
completing the sixth chapter, which is told in its entirety, the subse-
quent stories are revisited in reverse order: the fifth is finished, then the 
fourth, and so on. Although each narrative is ‘fragmented,’ the text as 
a whole is held together by various interconnections between the sto-
ries—this is crucial to one aspect of my argument, namely that dealing 
with constructed forms of ‘transcendence.’
“An Orison” is the fifth story and it takes place in an unspecific future 
in a country called ‘Nea So Copros.’ In this society, technology has 
advanced to produce clones in the millions. The clones serve as workers 
for different industrial branches. The main character, Sonmi ~ 451, is 
employed at a fast food restaurant called ‘Papa Song.’ There are mul-
tiple hints on a linguistic level that point to the fact that the world 
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in “An Orison” is organized almost exclusively around capitalism and 
efficiency. In the language of this future, many words are shortened 
and supposedly ‘unnecessary’ consonants have disappeared (instead of 
‘frightened’ it is “fritened” (“An Orison” 201), ‘night’ becomes “nite” 
(ibid., 198) and ‘light’ “lite” (ibid., 207)). In addition to this, many 
objects are only referred to by their brand names: a camera is a “nikon” 
(ibid., 202); shoes are “nikes” (ibid., 198) and a watch is a “rolex” (ibid., 
213). Considering the rather obvious economic mindset of this soci-
ety, it is significant that the everyday world of Sonmi is nevertheless 
enriched with religious vocabulary. A chip that is necessary to leave the 
restaurant—which the clones are not given—is termed “Soul” (ibid., 
189); the set of rules the clones have to adhere to are referred to as 
“Catechisms” (ibid., 196). These religiously inspired terms only serve, 
however, to cover up economic, biopolitical and profane content. The 
catechisms keep the workers in line and the absence of a “Soul” impris-
ons the clones in their underground workspace where the restaurant is 
located. It appears that these religious terms often conceal ugly truths, 
and are in some instances even proof of the moral and spiritual decline 
of Nea So Copros. The following example underlines this. At the end 
of their twelve-year servitude, the clones are usually awarded with what 
is called “Xultation” (ibid., 190) (a shortened form of ‘exultation’). 
They are promised they will be transported to their leader’s holy ship, 
so-called “Papa Song’s golden ark” (ibid., 190), located in Hawaii, 
where they are turned into consumers themselves: 
Their collars were gone […] they waved from a world beyond our lexi-
con. Boutiques, hairdressers, dineries; green seas, rose skies; wildflowers, 
rainbows, lace, ponies, cottages, footpaths, butterflies. How we marveled! 
How happy our sisters looked (ibid., 190).
This rather capitalistic version of an afterlife nevertheless contains 
common religious notions: it is a sphere that is beyond one’s reach 
where everything is supposedly better and more beautiful. However, 
during the course of the novel it is revealed that this vision is a lie, a 
sham to keep the clones in line. In reality, the clones who board the 
ship are killed and their bodies recycled. Their bodies are made into 
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nutrition (so-called “Soap” (ibid., 189)) for the next generation of 
clones.13 This means that there is never any kind of freedom for them. 
Even in death they serve an economic purpose.
Sonmi can be considered what Agamben calls a homo sacer, which was 
originally an archaic figure in Roman law:
The Sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a 
crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will 
not be condemned for homicide; in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is 
noted that ‘if someone kills the one who is sacred according to the plebi-
scite, it will not be considered homicide.’ This is why it is customary for a 
bad or impure man to be called sacred (Homo Sacer 71; Agamben quotes 
here from Pompeius Festus’ On the Significance of Words).
The homo sacer is excluded from human and sacred law at the same 
time. He suffers from a double exclusion and as a result inhabits a limi-
nal sphere, a third space. Agamben argues that ‘sacer’ does not mean he 
is a divine being: “What defines the status of homo sacer is therefore not 
the originary ambivalence of the sacredness that is assumed to belong 
to him, but rather both the particular character of the double exclu-
sion into which he is taken” (HS 82). To this double exclusion Agam-
ben later refers as ‘ban.’ 14 The ban does not simply exclude subjects as 
13 This is a reference to Soylent Green (1973), a science-fiction movie directed by Richard 
Fleischer. The movie ends with the protagonist’s horrid discovery that the food that is 
sold under the name of ‘soylent green’ is made of dead bodies. 
14 Agamben borrows this term from Jean-Luc Nancy: “Taking up Jean-Luc Nancy’s sug-
gestion, we shall give the name ban (from the old Germanic term that designates both 
exclusion from the community and the command and insignia of the sovereign) to this 
potentiality […] of the law to maintain itself in its own privation, to apply in no longer 
applying” (HS 28). Although Agamben never specifies his reference to Nancy, I be-
lieve he draws from “Abandoned Being” in which Nancy elaborates on the connection 
between abandonment and the law which goes in a similar direction that  Agamben 
proposes: “to be banished does not amount to coming under a provision of the law, but 
rather to coming under the entirety of the law. […] The law of abandonment  requires 
that the law be applied through its withdrawal” (ibid., 44) (cf. “Abandoned Being” 
43f.). Geulen describes the semantics of the German word ‘Bann’ which the term ‘ban’ 
refers to: “Im Ausdruck ‚Bann‘ hört man förmlich das Moment der Stilllegung und 
Deaktivierung (wie z.B. in der Formulierung ‚gebannt zuschauen‘)” (2005: 78).
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Agamben writes: “He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set 
outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, 
that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, 
outside and inside, become indistinguishable” (HS 28). To outline the 
figure of the homo sacer Agamben compares him to another antique 
figure, that of the devotus: in Roman times, a devotee was chosen to be 
sacrificed to the gods in order to win a battle or a war. If the devotee 
survived the battle unharmed, a colossus had to be buried in his place, 
serving as “his double, which takes the place of the missing corpse in 
a kind of funeral per imaginem” (ibid., 97). If this ritual could not be 
carried out the devotee was condemned to remain “a paradoxical being, 
who, while seeming to lead a normal life, in fact exists on a threshold 
that belongs neither to the world of the living nor to the world of the 
dead: he is a living dead man” (ibid., 99). For Agamben, the homo sacer 
is similar to a surviving devotee—except in the case of the homo sacer 
no colossus can be buried. Hence, the homo sacer lacks a releasing ritual 
or event in order to be ‘returned’ to the human sphere. 
Agamben considers the ban the foundational structure of western pol-
itics. Western politics has tried from the beginning to exclude natural 
life (zoē) from the life of the polis: “In the classical world […] simple 
natural life is excluded from the polis in the strict sense” (HS 2).15 How-
ever, this determination alone has included natural life by accident; 
natural life is included by exclusion. A relationship between political 
life and biological life has been formed, even though it is one of nega-
15 Agamben’s use of classical terms in connection with modern problems has been wide-
ly criticized and given him the reputation of working ahistorically. Lemke writes on 
Agamben’s use of the term ‘life’: “Der Gedanke einer Kontinuität zwischen einer Bio-
politik in der Antike und der Gegenwart ist jedoch wenig überzeugend. Das ‚Leben‘ 
in der Antike und in der Moderne haben kaum mehr als den Namen gemein, und zwar 
schon allein deshalb, weil ‚Leben‘ ein spezifisch moderner Begriff ist. […] Agamben 
neigt dazu, die historische Differenz zwischen Antike und Gegenwart, Mittelalter und 
Moderne zu verwischen“ (84). In this context it is also significant that Agamben ne-
glects the gender dimension of life. Deuber-Mankowsky notes that Agamben discusses 
in Homo Sacer “weder Gebürtigkeit, noch Geschlechtlichkeit, weder Sexualität, noch 
das Verhältnis der Geschlechter, weder die heterosexuelle Prägung der symbolischen 
Ordnung und politischen Kultur noch der Anteil der Frauen an der Reproduktion des 
Lebens […]. Der ganze Bereich der Frage der sexuellen Differenz ist […] aus Agambens 
Horizont verbannt” (103).
2.2 David Mitchell’s “An Orison of Sonmi ~ 451” 37
tion. Murray comments on this: “The very split or division between 
zoē and bíos produces bare life: that is, the attempt to control or man-
age ‘life’” (2011: 206).16 Bare life is an included version of ‘natural’ life 
which is, according to Agamben, produced by the “politicisation of 
life” (Murray 2011: 206), rather than being an ontological given. 17 
To ‘manage life’ means integrating it in some way into politics, e.g. by 
defining biological, natural life and by setting out rules about how to 
treat it, e.g. when does life start, can an embryo be experimented with, 
should euthanasia be allowed in cases of severe illnesses, etc.? Agamben 
sees the endeavors to ‘manage life’ as a key feature of western politics. 
With proposing the ban as a political structure, Agamben relinquishes 
the mythos of the social contract introduced by Hobbes.18 Accord-
ing to Agamben, it is not a contract that determines the relationship 
between sovereign state and the people, but the ban—the inclusion of 
natural life in the sphere of politics, or the creation of a double exclu-
sion which generates bare life.
16 Zartaloudis underscores this fact by writing that bare life is “not a proto-religious or a 
pre-juridical structure, but an originary political one” (148). Bodenburg employs the 
very fitting German term ‘Setzungsakt’ to describe the production of bare life of which 
there is no adequate English translation: “Zutreffend ist in jedem Fall, dass es sich beim 
nackten Leben nicht um eine vorsymbolische, jeglicher Ordnung vorausgehende Natur-
tatsache handelt, sondern um den Effekt eines Setzungsakts, dessen Struktur von Am-
biguität gekennzeichnet ist, weil das nackte Leben ausgesondert und in dieser Weise 
in den souveränen Machtraum eingeschlossen wird” (79).
17 Bare life is a term that is derived from Walter Benjamin’s use of the term in Zur Kritik 
der Gewalt. Benjamin‘s term “bloßes Leben” refers to the pure existence of life. Benjamin 
mentions this term only a few times and without giving any clear definition. About the 
relevance of this essay for Agamben’s work De Boever writes: “Walter Benjamin’s essay 
‘Critique of Violence’ is a foundational text for Giorgio Agamben’s study of sovereign 
power because it lays bare the link between violence and law that is so important for 
Agamben’s critical project” (2008: 82).
18 Lüdemann argues against Agamben’s corollary and claims that the introduction of 
the ban does not make it necessary to relinquish the concept of the social contract. 
Lüdemann argues for a combination of both and, thus, for a reevaluation of Hobbes’ 
social contract. She proposes to view the contract as ban: “Nicht Vertrag oder Bann 
lautet hier die Alternative, sonders es läßt sich der als Bann verstandene Vertrag hier 
dem Vertrag im Sinne eines privatrechtlichen Instruments der freien Einigung schon 
konstituierender Rechtssubjekte gegenüberstellen” (236). 
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Today, the ban’s paradoxical structure has been made accidently visible 
through the installment of human rights. Human rights, counter-intui-
tively, demonstrate the dangerous connection between life and politics 
par excellence: “Human rights, in fact, represent first of all the originary 
figure for the inscription of natural naked life in the political-juridi-
cal order of the nation state” (Means without end 20). A contempo-
rary example that illustrates the uncomfortable by-products of human 
rights is the state-less refugee. For Agamben, the source of the problem 
is the connection between human rights and citizenship: “In the sys-
tem of the nation-state, so called sacred and inalienable human rights 
are revealed to be without any protection, precisely when it is no longer 
possible to conceive of them as rights of the citizens of a state” (Means 
without end 19–20). When one is not a citizen—that is included into 
a political sphere—one loses the protection of the law, that is, one is 
abandoned by the law. The refugee is the modern sacred man, the new 
homo sacer: “When their rights are no longer the rights of the citizen, 
that is when human beings are truly sacred, in the sense that this term 
used to have in the Roman law of the archaic period: doomed to death” 
(HS 22). This also means that the modern homo sacer is not necessarily 
a criminal who is being punished by being ostracized; in fact, Kishik 
argues that this example makes clear that anyone can be turned into 
a homo sacer: “With a blink of an eye, a flick of a pen, or a press of 
a button, any ‘good citizen’ from any ‘respected’ country […] can be 
excluded from the state-run ‘protection plan’ and thus be exposed to 
random acts of violence” (18).19 As a consequence Agamben demands 
recognition of the refugee as the demarcation of a general problem and 
asks to “build our political philosophy anew starting from the one and 
only figure of the refugee” (ibid., 16). The figure of the refugee and his 
19 DeCaroli investigates other ancient Roman and Greek texts and comes to the conclu-
sion that the people who were ‘banished’ were often not punished for a crime, but for 
the pure possibility of endangering the current order and for potentially creating new 
laws: “we find banishment pronounced, not against those who have broken the law, 
but against those who upset the order upon which the law is founded” (66). Referring 
to Aristoteles DeCaroli calls them ‘gods among men,’ people that create and bring in 
new laws, superseding the old order. 
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fellow homines sacri—the camp inhabitant, the Muselmann,20 the ref-
ugee, the comatose21—are not regrettable ‘exceptions,’ but products of 
the ban, that is logical results of the sovereign state.22 Abandonment by 
20 In Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben identifies the ‘Muselmann’ as homo sacer. Here, 
Agamben underscores that not only life, but also death is not allowed to become mean-
ingful in the case of the homo sacer: “what defines Muselmänner is not so much that 
their life is no longer life (this kind of degradation holds in a certain sense for all camp 
inhabitants and is not an entirely new experience) but, rather, that their death is not 
death. This —that the death of a human being can no longer be called death (not simply 
that it does not have importance, which is not new, but that it cannot be called by the 
name ‘death’)—is the particular horror that the Muselmann brings to the camp and that 
the camp brings to the world” (70). This is clearly inspired by Hanna Arendt’s thoughts 
on this matter who writes in Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft: “[d] ie Lager 
dienen nicht nur der Ausrottung von Menschen und der Erniedrigung von Individu-
en, sondern auch dem ungeheuerlichen Experiment, unter wissenschaftlich exakten 
Bedingungen Spontanität als menschliche Verhaltensweise abzuschaffen und Men-
schen in ein Ding zu verwandeln, das unter gleichen Bedingungen sich immer gleich 
verhalten wird, also etwas, was selbst Tiere nicht sind” (694). “Erst wenn der Mensch 
aus der Welt der Lebenden so ausgelöscht ist, als ob er nie gelebt hätte, ist er wirklich 
ermordet” (ibid., 688).
21 In his chapter “Politicizing Death” (HS 160–165) Agamben considers a coma patient 
a homo sacer. He refers to the case of Karen Quinlan: “Karen Quinlan’s body had, in 
fact, entered a zone of indetermination in which the words ‘life’ and ‘death’ had lost 
their meaning, and which, at least in this sense, is not unlike the space of exception in-
habited by bare life” (ibid., 164).
22 The multitude of homines sacri in Agamben’s work has been criticized, mainly because 
it compares the experience of KZ prisoners to those of the every day world, which do 
not necessarily bear the same political relevance. Geulen terms Agamben’s sequence a 
“bizarre Reihe” and states: “Was Agamben als herrschendes Paradigma erkannt haben 
will, macht nicht Halt vor den Unterschieden, die man zwischen einem Wissenschaftler, 
der freiwillig seinen Körper zu medizinischen Untersuchungen bereitstellt, und einem 
gefoltertem KZ-Häftling gern gewahrt haben möchte“ (2005: 114). Lemke joins this 
criticism by saying: “muss sich seine Analyse den Vorwurf einer unzulässigen Triviali-
sierung gefallen lassen, wenn ihm Auschwitz als eine Art Lehrbeispiel dient, das sich 
immer wieder aufs Neue wiederhole, wenn innerhalb des Lebens Zäsuren eingerichtet 
werden“ (78). In a rather polemic fashion Werber takes on this line of argument in a 
small article with the telling title “Die Normalisierung des Ausnahmefalls. Giorgio 
Agamben sieht immer und überall Konzentrationslager.” From recognizing the con-
centration camps as an inner matrix, it does not follow that every exception from the 
law should be seen as an exact replica of a concentration camp. As Agamben suggests, 
there is a spectrum of different locations that territorialize the state of exceptions or 
which adhere to the same rules (or lack thereof ) as concentration camps. In contrast 
to these critics there is Dickinson, who tries to give an explanation as to why Agamben 
identifies so many homines sacri: “The existence of so many homines sacri today merely 
reiterates Agamben’s point that politics is little more than a continuous reenactment 
of the original ‘exclusive inclusion’ which renders humanity capable of positing itself as 
sovereign over its own animality” (73–74). I argue that Agamben so readily ignores the 
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the law is deeply embedded inside the law and, in fact, not an accident 
but a necessary element of law. Murray summarizes: “In order for the 
law to work it must create an ‘inside’—what is within the juridical and 
political process—and what is outside that space. That there is a space 
beyond the law—i.e. both beyond its protection but also beyond its 
prosecution […]—gives the inside of the law meaning” (2010: 63).23 
Thus, abandonment by the law is, in fact, the foundational structure of 
the law. Since the state takes into account the production of these help-
less figures, Agamben views modern politics as essentially biopolitics: 
“The fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of 
friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bíos, exclu-
sion/inclusion” (ibid., 8).24 Seeing bare life not as an exception, but a 
core structure in western politics, makes the exception a central fea-
ture. Thus, he, provocatively, but in line with his argument, claims that 
ethical status of subjects in order to reveal a deeper pattern. Deuber-Mankowsky writes 
on this topic: “Es geht ihm nicht um die ethische Rechtfertigung von Entscheidungen, 
sondern um die Herausarbeitung der großen, der fundamentalen Zusammenhänge, 
welche den Zwang zu Entscheidungen über Tod und Leben und zu neuen Definitio-
nen von Lebensanfängen, von unterschiedlichen Arten des Todseins, von leben- und 
sterbenswertem Leben und mit ihm die Bioethik allererst hervorgebracht haben. Es 
geht Agamben um die Durchleuchtung einer Kultur, die, so seine These, ihren inneren 
Zusammenhalt durch die Schaffung von Zonen der Indifferenz zwischen Leben und 
Tod findet“ (95–96).
23 This logic of division, declaring an outside and an inside, is more common in the realm 
of theology as Dickinson notes: “The realm of signification, or the differentiation be-
tween what is considered ‘inside’ a given political sphere and what is ‘outside,’ is the 
act act most traditionally associated with divine intentions. It has been the divine who 
most typically partitions the realms of existence (even the afterlife) into separate spaces 
for believers and unbelievers, the chosen and unchosen alike […] Now, however, this 
traditionally sacred art of division is presented (or ‘revealed’) by Agamben as a wholly 
human by-product” (67). 
24 Agamben’s interest in biopolitics stems from an engagement with Michel Foucault’s 
work. However, Deuber-Mankowsky notes that their approaches are very different: 
“Anders als Agamben versteht Foucault Biomacht dezidiert als historisches Phänomen. 
Ihre Entstehung ist gebunden an die Herausbildung der modernen Wissenschaften“ 
(112). Mills remarks on their differences: “while Foucault’s genealogy rejects the search 
for origins and instead traces the emergence of particular configurations of relations 
of force, Agamben seeks to illuminate the ‘originary’ relation of law to life” (60). Mills 
also points out that Foucault, in History of Sexuality, locates the beginning of biopol-
itics in the 17th century whereas Agamben sees the inclusion of bare life into the polis 
as foundation of politics, claiming that “biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign 
exception” (HS 6; cf. Mills 59f ). 
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the concentration camps of Nazi Germany are the “hidden matrix and 
nomos of the political sphere” (ibid., 166). The exception is for Agam-
ben the expression of a rule. Drawing on Benjamin’s famous quote, 
Agamben identifies the Nazi camps as “the space that is opened up 
when the state of exception begins to become a rule” (ibid., 168–189; 
emphasis omitted).25Agamben claims, that it is the exception, meaning 
the homo sacer and concentration camps, that makes western politics 
what it is, outlining a political system determined by figures of death .26
The ban is not only the determining structure of the homo sacer. Curi-
ously, the double exclusion is also a key characteristic of the most pow-
erful figure in a state—the sovereign. The sovereign belongs to the 
law and is excluded from it at the same time. He is, as the homo sacer, 
included by exclusion: “The paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact 
the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order” 
(ibid., 15). This makes them parallel rather than opposed figures:
Here the structural analogy between the sovereign exception and sacratio 
shows its full sense. At the two extreme limits of the order, the sovereign 
and homo sacer present two symmetrical figures that have the same struc-
ture and are correlative: the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all 
men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect 
to whom all men act as sovereigns (HS 84).27
25 Walter Benjamin writes in Über den Begriff der Geschichte (1940): “Die Tradition der 
Unterdrückten belehrt uns darüber, dass der ‘Ausnahmezustand’ [sic] in dem wir le-
ben, die Regel ist” (74).
26 Agamben’s sole focus on the homo sacer and regarding him as the key figure of western 
politics has been criticized by Lemke who recognizes this as a simplification of politics: 
“Er [Agamben] legt nahe, dass der Ausnahmezustand nicht nur der Ausgangspunkt der 
Politik, sondern ihre eigentliche Bestimmung sei. Damit würde sich Politik in der Produk-
tion von homines sacri erschöpfen—eine Produktion, die freilich insofern  unproduktiv 
genannt werden muss, als das ‚nackte Leben‘ nur produziert wird, um unterdrückt und 
getötet zu werden. […] Agamben verkennt, dass Biopolitik wesentlich politische Öko-
nomie des Lebens ist, seine Analyse bleibt im Bann der Souveränitätsmacht und blind 
für all jene Mechanismen, die unterhalb oder jenseits des Rechts operieren” (80).
27 Agamben also deepens this analogy in the chapter ‘Sovereign Body and Sacred Body’ 
where he talks about Ernst Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval 
Political Theology. An interesting reading in connection to this topic, that introduces 
gender into the discussion of sovereignty—which Agamben neglects in his own study—, 
is provided by Barbara Vinken in “Marie-Antoinette oder Das Ende der Zwei- Körper-
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In fact, they are not only parallel figures but one is dependent on the 
other as the quote above points out. Proof of this is the fact that the 
homo sacer is linked to the sovereign’s main power, namely to decide 
upon the state of exception. According to Carl Schmitt the power to 
decide is the defining characteristic of the sovereign. Agamben bases 
his understanding of the sovereign on Schmitt’s who draws from Jean 
Bodin.28 Schmitt writes on the sovereign’s power to decide: 
Die Ordnung muss hergestellt sein, damit die Rechtsordnung einen 
Sinn hat. Es muß eine normale Situation geschaffen werden, und sou-
verän ist derjenige, der definitiv darüber entscheidet, ob dieser normaler 
Zustand wirklich herrscht. Alles Recht ist ,Situationsrecht’. Der Souverän 
schafft und garantiert die Situation als Ganzes in ihrer Totalität. Er hat 
das Monopol dieser letzten Entscheidung. Darin liegt das Wesen der 
staatlichen Souveränität, die also richtigerweise nicht als Zwangs- oder 
Herrschaftsmonopol, sondern als Entscheidungsmonopol juristisch zu 
definieren ist (Politische Theologie 19). 
In a state of exception, 29 as Agamben states in reference to Hanna 
Arendt, “everything is possible” (HS 170).30 In this situation “the kill-
ing of man” is not considered “natural violence but […] sovereign vio-
lence” (ibid., 21), and thus is not considered murder. Killing is neither 
a crime nor a religious act, but a sovereign act. This means life becomes 
Lehre” in which she analyzes how Marie-Antoinette’s ‘two bodies’ are constructed and 
interpreted by her contemporaries —either for ideological or for defamatory reasons—
and how one could argue that Marie-Antoinette is even more firmly located in Chris-
tian thought (in particular in connection to love), and, thus, in political thought than 
any other male sovereign ever could be.
28 Schmitt explains in reference to Jean Bodin: “Das Entscheidende in den Ausführungen 
Bodins liegt darin, daß er die Erörterung der Beziehungen zwischen Fürst und Ständen 
auf ein einfaches Entweder-Oder bringt, und zwar dadurch daß er auf den Notfall ver-
weist. Das war das eigentliche Imponierende seiner Definition, die die Souveränität als 
unteilbare Einheit auffaßte und die Frage nach der Macht im Staat endgültig entschied. 
Seine wissenschaftliche Leistung und der Grund seines Erfolges liegen also darin, daß 
er die Dezision in den Souveränitätsbegriff hineingetragen hat“ (Politische Theologie 
15). 
29 The state of exception is, according to Agamben, determined by indistinction: “a zone 
of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with 
each other” (State of exception 23).
30 Cf. Arendt 697.
2.2 David Mitchell’s “An Orison of Sonmi ~ 451” 43
bare life in a state of exception. Without the homo sacer, the sovereign 
state would not be able to function, since it is the production of bare 
life that is its main instrument of power: “The inclusion of bare life in 
the political realm constitutes the original—if concealed—nucleus of 
sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolit-
ical body is the original activity of sovereign power” (HS 6; emphasis 
omitted).
To return to “An Orison,” Sonmi is such a homo sacer figure, bound by 
a double exclusion. Her life is bare life—neither human, nor sacred. 
She is part of the socio-political realm, but she does not have the same 
rights as others—in fact, she never really possessed any rights, since 
as a clone she is doomed to servitude by birth. In a later scene she 
is even depicted as killable life. A few doctoral candidates turn her 
into a human target. Equipped with bows and arrows, they aim for 
pieces of fruit placed on Sonmi’s head, echoing Wilhelm Tell and other 
Germanic legends that describe an apple-shot [Apfelschuss]: “Boom-
Sook [the doctoral candidate] weighted my [Sonmi’s] safety against 
his honor. He balanced the plum on my head and told me to hold very, 
very still. He counted his ten steps, turned, loaded and took aim” (“An 
Orison” 223).31 Sonmi’s outsider position inside the society of Nea So 
Copros is most obviously expressed by a spatial restriction. She is not 
allowed to leave the dome in which the fast food restaurant is located:
It was a sealed dome about eighty metres across, a dinery owned by Papa 
Song Corp. Servers spend twelve working years without venturing out-
side this space, ever. […] Instead of windows, AdVs [sic; refers to adver-
31 The apple-shot is connected to sovereignty as Koschorke points out. Koschorke explores 
how in Wilhelm Tell belonging to a state—through the concept of ‘brotherhood’—is 
coupled with the act of exclusion. To found a state demands exclusionary action, which 
is in this case applied to the character called Rösselmann. About this scene in which 
the priest Rösselmann is discussed to be excluded from their society Koschorke writes: 
“Überspitzt formuliert: es ist, als hätte Schiller Agamben gelesen. Der erste gesetzge-
berische Akt, auf den er sich die Gründer der Nation verständigen läßt, besteht in ei-
nem Bann. Das Volk als neuer Souverän, das seinerseits durch die Tyrannis in einem 
Raum der Rechtslosigkeit gestoßen war und von diesem Außen her sein Gegenrecht 
begründet, konstituiert sich durch Exklusion“ (“Brüderbund und Bann. Das Drama 
der politischen Inklusion in Schillers Tell,” 121).
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tisement] decorated the walls. Set into the eastern wall was the dinery 
elevator; the sole entrance and exit (ibid., 187).
In order to operate the elevator that leads outside, Sonmi would need a 
chip called ‘Soul.’ This chip, however, is only available to humans. This 
specific choice of word—terming this chip ‘Soul’—suggests that the 
clones are viewed as missing something essential which would make 
them human. However, this choice of words is misleading, since Sonmi 
suffers not from a metaphysical deficiency, but rather a judicial one—
as a clone, she possesses no rights. In Sonmi’s case it is apparent that 
her status has nothing to do with sacredness (as the term homo sacer 
implies); she is less than human and less than divine, she belongs to nei-
ther sphere and she has literally been ‘produced’ to inhabit the realm 
between human being and machine.
However, as the story progresses, something happens to Sonmi that 
frees her from her status as a homo sacer. An event extricates her from 
her position as meaningless clone and changes the course of her life:
First, a voice began speaking inside my head. It alarmed me greatly, until 
I learnt nobody else heard it; the voice of sentience. […] Second, my lan-
guage evolved […] Third, my own curiosity about Outside increased. […] 
Fourth, I suffered alienation (ibid., 205–206).
She experiences her birth as a conscious subject and perceives the world 
anew with awakened and attentive eyes. Later she is told that when 
she was an embryo, she had been part of an experiment which caused 
her ‘ascension’ (this is how her birth into consciousness is referred to 
in the novel). Scientists are trying to create ‘ascended’ clones—clones 
that are closer to human beings and that possess intellectual powers. 
However, in Sonmi’s case, the experiment was just a pro forma exper-
iment and not really supposed to be successful. A doctoral candidate 
steals the research of a deceased colleague to produce material for his 
own thesis and presents it as his own work (cf. ibid., 229–230). The 
experiment is part of a fake project and is only conducted out of duty, 
to complete the task and to profess it to be his work. Thus, although 
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there are intentions and motivations at hand, none is directly linked 
to the outcome. The doctoral candidate, Boom-Sook Kim, only wants 
to receive a doctoral degree. He even remains unaware of what he has 
accomplished:
[The interviewer asks] And Boom-Sook Kim stayed unaware of the 
furore his Ph.D. had triggered? [Sonmi answers] Only a fool who had 
never squeezed a pipette or handled a petri-dish in his life could have 
remained unaware, but Boom-Sook Kim was such a fool (ibid., 230; 
emphasis omitted).
Sonmi’s subjectivity is the result of a lucky accident. When Sonmi’s 
ascension is revealed, everyone tries to use her for their own pur-
poses and agendas, even planning to euthanize her. A compromise 
is made—she is allowed to educate herself at a university, but must 
remain under the state’s observation. While studying and broaden-
ing her mind, Sonmi becomes involved with an underground group 
of ‘abolitionists’ who are fervently fighting to free clones from their 
destitute lives. The government has concocted a plan of its own for 
Sonmi, however. Her ascension has been used against her. At the end 
of the story, Sonmi reveals that her whole life after her ascension, while 
true, was also scripted, a “theatrical production, set up while I was still 
a server in Papa Song’s” (ibid., 363). She has been used as a political 
puppet for the government and is supposed to serve as an example for 
the notion that no human being should trust clones: “To make every 
last pure-blood [human being] in Nea So Copros mistrustful of every 
last fabricant. […] To discredit Abolitionism. The whole conspiracy 
was a resounding success” (ibid., 364). Sonmi becomes—like Agam-
ben’s homo sacer—a servant enabling the government to enforce and 
maintain its powers. This means that the life she had led was at no time 
her own, and was instead always guided and formed by outside forces. 
Even though she is apparently drawn back into what Agamben calls the 
‘sovereign sphere’ (a sphere in which everyone can be turned into bare 
life at the sovereign’s will) I argue that Sonmi is no longer homo sac-
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er.32 In the beginning of Sonmi’s story, it is mentioned that one of her 
fellow workers was also experiencing ascension, attempted to escape, 
and, as a result, was immediately shot (cf. 200). Compared to this, it 
is remarkable how Sonmi is treated after she is arrested (for engaging 
with enemies of the state): she is put on trial in front of a judge, which 
means that she has become more than a commodity, to be recycled or 
dismembered when it is no longer useful, or even shot on sight. She has 
become more than just bare life, because she cannot be killed without 
reason. Thus, the law applies to her (instead of abandoning her) and a 
ruling must be delivered to determine her fate.
The fact that she has become more than a clone is also supported by 
other details: Before her arrest and her trial she worked actively on 
creating rights for herself and other clones. She has written what she 
calls ‘Declarations,’ a declaration of rights for clones and a rulebook 
on how to deal with ascension. This seems to go beyond the govern-
ment’s expectation. At the trial, the persecutors try to dismiss this doc-
ument, claiming it has been written by a human being and could not 
possibly be composed by a clone: “Many xpert [sic] witnesses at your 
trial denied Declarations was the work of a fabricant, ascended or oth-
erwise, and maintained it was ghosted by a pure-blood Abolitionist” 
(ibid., 362). Sonmi produces an excess that cannot be utilized in the 
government’s plan. Unfortunately for the government, her manifesto 
has developed a life of its own: 
Every school child in Nea So Copros knows my twelve ‘blasphemies’ now. 
My guards tell me there is even talk of a State-wide ‘Vigilance Day’ against 
fabricants who show signs of the Declarations. My ideas have been repro-
duces a billionfold. […] I quote Seneca’s warning to Nero: No matter how 
many of us you kill, you will never kill your successor (ibid., 365).
32 “The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without commit-
ting homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life—that is, life that may 
be killed but not sacrificed—is the life that has been captured in this sphere” (HS 83; 
emphasis omitted).
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She becomes a political figure, a revolutionary and later even a mar-
tyr (ibid., 364), even though she was intended (by the government) 
to be a warning to humanity, what would happen if clones would not 
be kept in line. A second detail underscores the threat she poses to her 
government. On her flight into freedom she has changed her face in 
order to look more human, but when the trial approaches, the govern-
ment forces her to undergo a surgery that restores her old face: “Una-
nimity [the governmental force] refaced me for my peaktime court-
room appearances. The star actress had to look the part” (ibid., 337). 
As the passage reveals, she has ceased to be an ‘authentic’ clone; this 
the government unwittingly acknowledges by forcing her to change 
her appearance.
After her death, it becomes obvious that she has not only ceased to be 
a homo sacer and turned into a political being, but has undergone an 
even bigger transformation. In the story following “An Orison,” titled 
“Sloosha’s Crossin an’ Ev’rythin’ After” which takes place in an even 
further removed future, Sonmi has become a god:
Valleysmen only had one god an’ [sic] her name it was Sonmi. […] Sonmi 
helped sick’uns [sic], fixed busted luck, an’ [sic] when a truesome [sic] 
’n’civ’lized [sic] Valleysman died she’d take his soul an’ [sic] lead it back 
into a womb somewhere in the Valleys (ibid., 255).
Clearly, Somni has transcended the political realm and entered a reli-
gious sphere. In a way, Sonmi has attained transcendence and reached a 
‘beyond,’ namely through the novel’s structure. Outside her own story 
and time, she is considered a god. Her ascension has truly shifted her 
position. She has surmounted her limitations and restrictions; a clone, 
a figure originally deemed to be socially and existentially meaningless, 
has become the origin of a new belief system. 
In that respect, her status must be considered much closer to the sover-
eign’s, not because she has become a god, but because her death reveals 
an excess. This becomes most evident when comparing homo sacer’s 
death to that of the sovereign. Both sovereign and homo sacer can-
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not die a ‘normal’ death. Homo sacer’s death means nothing and is not 
even registered, whereas the sovereign’s death means more than can 
be dealt with:
We know that the killing of homo sacer does not constitute homicide […] 
Accordingly, there is no juridico-political order […] in which the killing 
of the sovereign is classified simply as an act of homicide. Instead it con-
stitutes a special crime […] It does not matter, from our perspective, that 
the killing of homo sacer can be considered less than homicide, and the 
killing of the sovereign as more than homicide; what is essential is that in 
neither case does the killing of a man constitute an offense of homicide 
(HS 102).33
Agamben analyzes Ernst Kantorowicz’ The King’s Two Bodies: A Study 
in Mediaeval Political Theology, R. E. Gisey’s The Royal Funeral Cere-
mony in Renaissance France and Elias Bickermann’s Die römische Kai-
serapotheose. All these studies deal with the curious fact that when a 
king dies, he appears to leave behind an ‘excess.’ The king possesses 
two bodies, his natural body and what Jean Bodin has identified as 
“the perpetual nature of sovereignty, which allows the royal dignitas to 
survive the physical person of its bearer (Le Roi ne meurt jamais, ‘The 
King never dies’)” (ibid., 92). This is the reason why the king is buried 
twice, first his natural body and afterwards a wax effigy of the king. 
Kantorowicz and Gisey see this ritual influenced by Christian theol-
ogy; the body of Jesus might die, but never his holy essence. Agamben, 
however, by drawing on Bickermann, sees a distinct biopolitical foun-
dation for this ritual and furthermore a connection to the homo sacer: 
“What unites the surviving devotee, homo sacer, and the sovereign in 
one single paradigm is that in each case we find ourselves confronted 
33 Zartadoulis sums up Agamben’s analysis as follows: “The King, in this mythological 
sense, never dies and it could also be said in parallel that homo sacer, in this sense, never 
dies a ‘proper’ death (neither a mere death, a passing away, nor a homicide nor a sacri-
fice). The King can be killed physically, though he cannot be killed by a simple act of 
homicide (instead, juridically, it constitutes a special crime), but his absolute power 
never dies and cannot be sacrificed (for instance, juridically speaking the sovereign can 
only be tried under special circumstances and procedures and not through a normal 
trial)” (153).
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with a bare life that has been separated from its context and that, so 
to speak surviving its death, is for this very reason incompatible with 
the human world” (ibid., 100). Sonmi is a sovereign, because like him 
(and the homo sacer), she is in a double capture in between the human 
and the sacred sphere, but unlike the homo sacer her death reveals an 
excess that cannot be contained. 
The notion of an ascended subjectivity, having shifted from homo sacer 
to a human being, martyr, god and even sovereign figure does not fit 
into Agamben’s conceptual system. The homo sacer is a crucial element 
of the sovereign nation-state in Agamben’s view, since he believes the 
modern state is founded on these so-called ‘exceptions.’ To overcome 
the homo sacer would mean overcoming the structure of sovereignty.34 
However, Agamben never suggests how to solve this problem in politi-
cal terms. Geulen notes that he merely describes and analyzes the prob-
lem rather than providing solutions: “Rather than leading the exodus 
from sovereignty, Agamben has enlarged the terrain and shed light on 
previously unrecognized zones of political theory and practice” (2006: 
374). Other critics have read Agamben in a similar way, for example 
Weiß, who notes: “How to overcome the ‘paradigm of modernity’ and 
the ‘Camp,’ Agamben does not know. Because of Agamben’s prem-
ises it seems unlikely to identify or to find such a concrete loophole” 
(141).35 Schütz similarly sees Agamben as basically describing a dead 
end36: “once the division between status and life has inscribed itself, 
the possibility of becoming again—of teaching ourselves to become 
again—homines non sacri has shut down behind us” (128–129).37
34 Laclau comments on this: “We are not told anything about what a movement out of 
the paradox of sovereignty and ‘towards a politics freed from every ban’ [HS 59] would 
imply. But we do not need to be told: the formulation of the problem already involves 
its own answer. To be beyond any ban and any sovereignty means, simply, to be beyond 
politics” (22).
35 “Wie man dem ‚Paradigma der Moderne‘, wie man dem ‚Lager‘ entkommen könnte, 
weiß Agamben nicht. Von seinen Prämissen aus scheint es einen solchen konkreten 
Ausweg nicht geben zu können“ (transl. by N. F.).
36 A very critical view of Agamben’s theory of the homo sacer is provided by Ernesto  Laclau 
who claims Agamben’s philosophy is “[p]olitical nihilism” (22).
37 Anton Schütz regards this as an inherent problem of the nature of law: “No way leads 
back to a space without law—and therefore without abandon and bare life—back to 
the homo non sacer” (126).
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In “An Orison,” however, the government fails in keeping Sonmi 
reduced to bare life; she cannot be killed without a trial and she cannot 
be held back from entering the religious realm. The government has 
lost its grip on her, unwittingly helping her not only to reintegrate into 
spheres she was never even part of (the human and the sacred sphere), 
but unable to stop her from transcending both spheres and becoming 
an excessive subject. She is catapulted from her status as a homo sacer 
and becomes human being and god at the same time. Sonmi has not 
only left her captivity; strictly speaking, it is her very captivity as a clone 
that has allowed her to ‘dislocate’ or ‘catapult’ herself to a higher level. 
Her status as homo sacer has, in a way, ‘prepared’ her to become all that 
she later is. Every single achievement is linked to the fact that she is a 
clone. The fact that the law registers her as a subject is only meaning-
ful to a clone. Thus, even her execution can be seen as a ‘success,’ since 
before she was determined to be executed either way—without a ruling 
or even a reason. The fact that her position as a homo sacer conditions 
her later success removes her further away from Agamben’s concept. In 
fact, to hark back to one of Agamben’s examples, it is as if Sonmi is a 
surviving devotee who is offered a releasing event—similar to the bur-
ial of the colossus. Because this clearly goes beyond Agamben’s theory, 
I find it necessary to introduce a theory that deals with events of such 
a life-changing nature and which also turns a restriction into a positive 
trigger. Sonmi’s sudden turning into a subject through an unexpected 
event fits very well into Jean-Luc Marion’s theory, which will be out-
lined in the following. 
2.2.2 The Event as Gift
As a preliminary remark it is necessary to comment on Marion’s and 
Derrida’s use of the terms ‘gift,’ ‘event’ and ‘phenomenon,’ before both 
their concepts of the gift are presented in detail. For this, some of their 
principles will be delineated at this point, but they will be discussed in 
more detail throughout the chapter. 
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Marion and Derrida both deal in their theoretical texts that are rele-
vant for this dissertation with one phenomenon, namely the gift, and 
they both perceive it as an event rather than an object. The reasons 
for this are different with each of these philosophers: in Marion’s case 
this can be explained by Marion’s understanding of phenomenology 
and in Derrida’s it must be explained by his view of western metaphys-
ics in general. In phenomenology, Marion’s area of expertise, the gift 
‘happens’ to us, thus, it takes on the form of an event. One can simply 
speak of the gift being an event. Miller explains: 
in metaphysics, gifts are objects; in phenomenology, gifts are ‘occasions’ or 
‘happenings’. Here, the register of the gift shifts from thing to event. […] 
Gifts are first and foremost the event of their being given. Posterior iden-
tifications of gift-objects, givees [sic], and givers may follow with some 
justification from the event, but they are not themselves constitutive of 
that event (Miller 80). 38
In Marion’s case, this makes all phenomena events, of which the gift 
is the phenomenon par excellence. To summarize, one could say that 
Marion deals foremost with phenomena, however, he describes them 
as coming across as events, of which the prime example is the gift. Der-
rida has a slightly different approach. He considers the gift an event, 
because both are defined as singular phenomena. The singularity of 
the gift is its main feature and this is also valid for the event. However, 
this demand for singularity is not only characteristic of the gift and 
the event, but, in Derrida’s view, representative of multiple phenom-
ena that all demand some form of singularity or priority. The notion 
38 Derrida and Marion both think of the gift as an event. Marion defines the event in 
In Excess as follows: “(a) They cannot be repeated identically and reveal themselves in 
this way precisely identical to themselves alone: unrepeatability, thus irreversibility. 
(b) They cannot be accorded [se voir assigner] a unique cause or an exhaustive expla-
nation, but demand an indefinite number of them […]. (c) They cannot be foreseen, 
since their partial causes not only remain insufficient but are only discovered once the 
fact of their effect has been accomplished” (36). Similar to this, Derrida explains the 
conditions of an event in “A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event”: “One 
of the characteristics of the event is that not only does it come about as something un-
foreseeable, not only does it disrupt the ordinary course of history, but it is also abso-
lutely singular” (446).
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of singularity underlies many philosophical concepts (origin, authen-
ticity, truth) so that Derrida recognizes singularity and hierarchy as 
prevalent concepts in western thought. As a matter of fact this is also 
the main issue that Derrida has with metaphysics: Derrida denies the 
idea of such singular phenomena completely, instead he regards every 
phenomenon as conditioned by other elements.
In this dissertation, and in particular in this chapter, the terms phe-
nomenon, gift and event are used more or less synonymously, not 
because they are in fact the same thing, but rather because they share 
main structures that Marion explains in phenomenological terms and 
Derrida in context of Deconstruction. In addition, I draw on different 
publications by Marion and Derrida in which the focus is sometimes 
more on the gift, the event or the phenomenon. However, I will priv-
ilege the term ‘event,’ since this term becomes crucial for the analysis 
of the novels.
Derrida and the Gift
Derrida is critical of the idea that a singular event exists.39 This is what 
drives his critique against Marcel Mauss’s The Gift. Forms and Func-
tions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (1954). In Given Time he states: 
“For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, 
countergift, or debt” (Given Time 12). Derrida points out the calcu-
lative strategy intrinsic to every form of gift. He claims that the gift is 
not a singular phenomenon, but rather embedded in the structure of 
39 Dooley explains in reference to Marion’s project, that the idea of an unconditioned 
event goes back to Friedrich Nietzsche. See Mark Dooley. “Marion’s Ambition of Tran-
scendence.” Givenness and God. Questions of Jean-Luc Marion. Eds. Ian Leask and Eoin 
Cassidy. New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 2005. 190-198. Nietzsche notes in Der Wille 
zur Macht: “Man möchte wissen, wie die Dinge an sich beschaffen sind: aber siehe da, 
es gibt keine Dinge an sich! Gesetzt aber sogar, es gäbe ein An-sich, ein Unbedingtes, 
so könnte es eben darum nicht erkannt werden! Etwas Unbedingtes kann nicht erkan-
nt werden: sonst wäre es eben nicht unbedingt. […] Erkennen heißt‚ sich in Bedingung 
setzen zu etwas‘” (262).
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economy. For Derrida, economy is characterized by its circular, “odys-
sean” (ibid., 7) structure.40 In opposition to this, a gift has to be located 
outside this circular structure: 
It must not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case 
be exhausted, as a gift, by the process of exchange, by the movement of 
circulation of the circle in the form of return to the point of departure. 
If the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain 
aneconomic (ibid., 7).41
However, the gift cannot remain aneconomic, because it is constantly 
drawn into the circle of economy. Derrida explains how this becomes 
evident in the grammatical structure of the verb ‘to give’:
Let us suppose, then, an intention-to-give: Some ‘one’ wants or desires to 
give. Our common language or logic will cause us to hear the interlace of 
this already complex formula as incomplete. We would tend to complete 
it by saying ‘some >one<’ (A) intends-to-give B to C, some ‘one’ intends 
to give or gives ‘something’ to ‘someone other’. […] These three elements, 
identical to themselves or on a way to identification with themselves, look 
like what is presupposed by every gift event (ibid., 11).
The three elements—giver, the act of giving, and receiver of that 
gift—are vital to the structure of gift giving, and each anticipates the 
next step in the process of giving a gift. At the end of this process, the 
receiver is expected to give a gift of his own, in order to thank the giver. 
Through this expectation, the gift turns into a trade. The most basic 
condition, the gift’s threefold structure, is revealed to be exactly the one 
40 Gernaliszick claims in Kredit und Kultur: Ökonomie und Geldbegriff bei Jacques Derrida 
und in der amerikanischen Literaturtheorie der Postmoderne that economy and language 
are treated in a similar way in Derrida’s theory: “In seiner Theorie der Dekonstruktion 
setzt Jacques Derrida Schrift und Geld gleich: Schrift und Geld sind materielle Mar-
kierungen und folgen gleichen Regeln. Sprache und Kommunikation korrelieren mit 
der Geldwirtschaft. Sprachsystem und Geldwirtschaft werden von Fiktionalität und 
Konventionalität—des Sinns oder der Werte—bestimmt“ (1). 
41 Mauss would not object to the circular structure Derrida describes per se, but Mauss 
makes an effort to point out that he regards the gift a phenomena that presupposes econ-
omy, not one that stands in contradiction to it. 
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condition that makes the gift impossible from the start. Reciprocated 
with a counter gift, the gift enters the economic realm and becomes 
a mere trade object. Horner sums this up as follows: “Once there are 
‘strings attached,’ what is given is no longer a gift, but a sign of some-
thing else. Perhaps it is a bribe. Perhaps it is like a contract, binding me 
in debt once accepted” (2001: 1).
In light of these remarks, is it even possible to speak of a ‘true’ gift? 
Can the gift ever exist in phenomenological terms, or is it condemned 
to remain a concept that can never find its true expression in reality? 
Derrida argues that for a true gift to appear, the circular structure of 
economy would have to be broken, for example by making it impos-
sible for one of the three elements to be activated. The subject is one 
of the main ‘problems’ of the gift, since it invites economics in—in 
the form of expectation, calculation and return.42 Derrida concludes:
For there to be a gift, it is necessary [il faut] that the donee not give back, 
amortize, reimburse, acquit himself, enter into a contract, and that he 
never have contracted a debt. […] It is thus necessary, at the limit, that he 
not recognize the gift as gift. If he recognizes it as gift, if the gift appears to 
him as such, if the present is present to him as present, this simple recog-
nition suffices to annul the gift (ibid., 13).
Derrida proposes an impossible scenario: He posits a definition of a 
gift that conditions a subject which itself defies common understand-
ings of subjectivity. Derrida demands that the subject commonly 
considered as self, control-center, origin and master of its actions be 
reconceptualized. To be prohibited from participating in the economic 
circle, the subject must be completely unaware of its doings and not at 
all the master of its actions. This makes the subject redundant: “The 
42 Derrida’s critical stance towards the concept of the subject is a key element of this gen-
eral critique of metaphysics and what Derrida calls ‘logocentrism.’ In the interview, 
“‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject,” Derrida states that “[t]he subject is 
a fable” (264) and later points out what is relevant for this context, “the subject is also 
a principle of calculability” (ibid., 272). 
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question of the gift should therefore seek its place before any relation 
to the subject, before any conscious or unconscious relation to self of 
the subject” (Given Time 24).
Marion and the Gift 
Marion deems Derrida’s conditions for an impossible gift—that over-
turns major tenets of metaphysical thought—not a stumbling block 
but the blueprint for his notion of a possible gift.43 In order to explain 
Marion’s thoughts on the gift it is necessary to introduce Marion’s 
phenomenological project first, since this lays the foundation for the 
design of the gift. 
The phenomenon in Marion’s philosophy is regarded as something 
new and unexpected. Marion shares this view with other contempo-
rary phenomenologists since 1980, as Gondek and Tengelyi explain: 
“Wir können feststellen, dass die zeitgenössischen Phänomenologen 
in Frankreich das Phänomen als ein Ereignis bestimmen, in dem etwas 
Neues ins Bewusstsein einbricht” (39; emphasis omitted). Accord-
ingly, the phenomenon in Marion’s view has absolute priority and is 
not bound to any subject, horizon or cause.44 With this assumption, 
Marion distinctively rejects the traditional view of phenomena, formu-
lated by Immanuel Kant and later reworked and extended by Edmund 
Husserl. Marion, in fact, criticizes their views of the phenomenon, 
claiming that in Kant’s and Husserl’s body of work, phenomena “only 
attain the rank of objects; their phenomenality thus remains borrowed, 
43 Marion writes: “In effect, the so-called ‘conditions for the impossibility of the gift’ (no 
givee [sic], no giver, no given object) would become precisely the conditions for the 
possibility of its reduction to and for pure givenness by triple epokhé of the transcen-
dent conditions of the economic exchange. The objection itself would open onto the 
response: the gift is reduced to givenness and givenness to itself once the givee [sic], the 
giver and the objectivity of the gift are bracketed, thereby detaching the gift from econ-
omy and manifesting it according to givennes purified of all cause” (BG 84). Mackinlay 
adds: “Marion agrees that the impossible can never be objectively present, but argues 
that it can nevertheless be given, although only as dazzling and overwhelming excess, 
and not in a way that can be comprehended and grasped by determinate concepts” (9).
44 Horner notes: “In Marion’s view, phenomenality is ultimately determined for Hus-
serl—as for Kant—by two basic conditions of possibility for experience: a delimiting 
horizon against which the phenomenon can be contextualized, and a subject without 
whom no phenomenon can appear” (2005: 109).
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as derived from the intentionality and from the intuition that we con-
fer on them” (In Excess 30). In contrast to this, Marion attempts to 
“treat phenomena as phenomenality, without the kind of assumption 
[…] that has traditionally framed them” (Leask 183).45
The phenomenon’s appearance stems from ‘givenness’ itself. Horner 
explains that this philosophical concept refers to the given world 
around us: “If something is a given, then it is assumed, it is already 
there, or it is simply what presents itself ” (2001: 3). The fact that the 
given presents itself is crucial to Marion who writes “the origin of given-
ness remains the ‘self ’ of the phenomenon, with no other principle or 
origin besides itself ” (Being Given 20). The phenomenon becomes the 
first principle of Marion’s phenomenology; nothing precedes, defines 
or manipulates it; it comes first, without any conditions attached to 
it. With this, Marion deactivates the structure of ‘reason’ that he sees 
prevalent in metaphysical thought and a key factor of economic pro-
cesses. About the logic of reason Marion writes critically: “In principle, 
nothing has the right to exempt itself from the demand of reason. Every 
pronouncement, every action, every event, every fact, every object, and 
every being must furnish a response to the question that asks why?” 
(“Reason of the Gift” 108). In contrast to this, Marion’s proposed phe-
nomenon is “born free of sufficient reason” (ibid., 117), “without hav-
ing to render reason for itself ” (ibid., 113), unless “it is said that the 
real reason for appearing […] consists in not having a reason” (ibid., 
130). Mackinlay writes that “rather than events being dependent on 
a cause, he [Marion] presents them as phenomenological facts that 
have priority over any cause, and are even uncaused” (2005: 169). Even 
more, by eliminating causality, phenomena attain an ethical right by 
themselves as Marion elucidates when talking about the phenomenon 
45 Marion refers here to Husserl’s concept of the horizon. Husserl writes on the horizon: 
“Jeder hypothetische Ansatz des praktischen Lebens und der Erfahrungswissenschaft 
bezieht sich auf diesen wandelbaren, aber immer mitgesetzten Horizont, durch den die 
Thesis der Welt ihren wesentlichen Sinn erhält” (102). Marion summarizes Husserl’s 
concept of the horizon and its consequence on the phenomenon as follows: “Every in-
tuition, in order to give within certain de facto ‘boundaries,’ must first be inscribed de 
jure with the ‘limits’ (Grenze) of a horizon, just as no intentional aim at an object, sig-
nification, or essence can be carried out outside a horizon” (BG 185; emphasis omitted). 
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par  excellence, the gift: “The gift is never wrong, because it never does 
wrong. Never being wrong, it is always right (literally, has reason). 
Therefore, it delivers its reason at the same time as itself ” (“Reason of 
the Gift” 133).
Mackinlay points out that to privilege givenness takes away power from 
the subject: “Assigning primacy to givenness in this way means see-
ing phenomena as given rather than as in any way constituted, and 
excluding any suggestion of phenomena appearing under conditions 
imposed on them by a subject” (2010: 10). This means that Marion 
sees the role of the subject differently from how it is described by Des-
cartes or Husserl. Descartes proposes a self-installing, self-assuring 
and self-conscious subject.46 He views the subject, the ego, as center of 
human agency, providing the “ground of all knowledge” (Gschwandt-
ner 187).47 Marion criticizes the centrality of Descartes’ ego and “its 
obsession with presence and permanence” (ibid., 191) which are 
aspects that have been criticized by Derrida and other poststructur-
alist thinkers as well. Marion is also opposed to Husserl’s understand-
ing of the subject since Husserl, according to Marion, limits the phe-
nomenon by reducing it to the ‘intentional act’ of the subject. Husserl 
argues in Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologi-
schen Philosophie that every object appears only in reference to the sub-
ject who directs its attention towards it: “Sinneseinheiten setzen […] 
sinn gebendes Bewußtsein voraus” (120). For Gondek and Tengelyi the 
critique of Husserl’s notion of intention is typical of philosophers who 
belong to what they termed ‘New phenomenology in France.’ Gondek 
46 Marion has intensely studied Descartes and has written the following books on this 
topic: Descartes’ Grey Ontology: Cartesian Science and Aristotelian Thought in the Reg-
ulae. 1975. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine’s Press, 2008; Sur la théologie blanche de 
Descartes. Paris: P.U.F, 1981. On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism: The Constitution and 
the Limits of Onto-theo-logy in Cartesian Thought. 1986. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1999; Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics. 1991. Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1999; Sur la pensée passive de Descartes. Paris: P.U.F, 2013.
47 Gschwandtner in Reading Jean-Luc Marion. Exceeding Metaphysics explains how in 
Marion’s reading of Descartes his own notion of the subjectivity concept is foreshad-
owed, showing how Marion tries to find traces in Descartes’ writing that hint to a more 
passive subject or as Gschwandtner puts it, how Marion reads Descartes in a “phenom-
enological fashion” (199).
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and Tengelyi argue that these new phenomenologists attempt to find 
“einen Zugang zu den Sinnbeständen und Sinnregungen der Welt […], 
ohne diese Sinngebilde auf eine Sinngebung durch das intentionale 
Bewusstsein zurückzuführen” (23).48
In accordance to Gondek’s and Tengelyi’s description, Marion pro-
poses a subject that stands in contrast to both Descartes and Hus-
serl. The main difference being that his subject is not an active being, 
but solely a receiving one which he terms receiver. 49 The receiver is far 
less central and self-controlled than the subject in Husserl’s or Des-
cartes’ theories. The most obvious difference is that the receiver does 
not determine the object/phenomenon by looking at it, on the con-
trary, the receiver is determined by the phenomenon, since it is the phe-
nomenon that gives the receiver his or her subjectivity. At first Marion 
describes how the receiver is reduced to a ‘screen,’ to a passive material 
that becomes necessary for the phenomenon to appear:
we […] no longer decide the visibility of the phenomenon. Our initiative 
is limited to remaining ready to receive the shock of its anamorphosis 
[…] This powerlessness to stage the phenomenon, which compels us to 
await it and be vigilant, can be understood as our abandoning the decisive 
role in appearing to the phenomenon itself [emphasis added] (ibid., 132).
The receiver becomes a witness and crucial to the event, since he or she 
makes the event appear in the first place. Without the waiting receiver, 
it would not be possible for the phenomenon to appear.
The receiver […] transforms givenness into manifestation, or more exactly, 
he lets what gives itself through intuition show itself. In receiving what 
gives itself, he in turn gives it to show itself—he gives it form, its first 
form (ibid., 264).
48 Mackinlay sees this critically: “However, in many instances this dethroning seems to 
be accomplished simply by enthroning a new sovereign rather than by overturning the 
dominion of sovereignty as such” (2005: 172).
49 Mackinlay presents in Interpreting Excess the idea that the receiving subject must be 
necessarily more active than Marion outlines it to be. He argues that in order to receive 
the phenomenon there has to be some sort of hermeneutic process (cf. 2).
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Although the phenomenon operates independently, it needs the 
receiver as the form-giving element: “The response is what makes the 
call visible. […] The call must be understood, received, heard, and 
accepted; otherwise it remains vain and empty” (Gschwandtner 215). 
Thus, the receiver appears to retain some form of limited creatorship, 
as Carlson writes: “As the one who (passively, in all humility) receives, 
I am also the one who (actively, productively) reveals—and indeed 
saves or creates” (169). The power and priority of the phenomenon 
is thusly bound to the receiver. However, the receiver does not remain 
empty-handed after this process, but is, like the phenomenon, mani-
fested through this encounter. The subject receives not only a gift, but 
the ultimate gift, namely his or her subjectivity: “I receive my self from 
the call [of the gift] that gives me to myself before giving me anything 
whatsoever” (BG 269).50 The receiver is not located in a nominative 
position as this has been the case with Descartes or Husserl, instead 
he or she is bound to a dative position:
The pure and simple shock (Anstoss) of the summons identifies the I only 
by transforming it without delay into a me “to whom.” The passage from 
the nominative to the objective cases (accusative, dative) thus inverts the 
hierarchy of the metaphysical categories (ibid., 268).
Before the subject comes across the event, it is not yet a subject.  Marion 
contends that the appearance of phenomena is not constituted by a 
subject’s intention, but by what he calls ‘counter-intentionality’ or 
‘counter-experience’ (a structure that has been put forward in phe-
nomenology since the 1960s by thinkers like Merleau-Ponty, Henry, 
Lévinas and Ricoeur).51 Carlson explains this term as follows: 
50 Zima points out the ambiguity of the term ‘subject’: “Subjekt ist, etymologisch be-
trachtet, ein zweideutiges Wort, das sowohl Zugrundeliegendes (hypokeímon, subiec-
tun) als auch Unterworfenes (subiectus = untergeben) bedeutet“ (2000: 3). In Marion’s 
case the subject is clearly the latter, since his subject is a subjected being.
51 See Gondek, Hans-Dieter und László Tengelyi. Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich. 
Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011. 
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Marion’s conception [...] of the saturated phenomenon [this is how 
 Marion calls the gift and other phenomena par excellence] is based in a 
radical reversal of intentionality, inspired largely by Emmanuel Lévinas, 
according to which it is not the active, nominative subject of conscious-
ness and language who sets the conditions under which the phenomenon 
appears, but much rather the unconditional and irreducible givenness of 
the phenomenon that first gives birth to a radically passive, vocative, and 
dative “subject” (155).52
The event is, thus, not controlled by a subject, but instead imposes itself 
as a forceful effect on the subject.53 As Carlson points out, Marion is 
certainly inspired by Lévinas who likewise argues against the central-
ity of the subject and demands instead the ‘Other’ to be seen as ‘first 
principle’: “The primary phenomenon, therefore, is the emergence of 
the other, who emerges by breaking my horizon” (Peukert 159). What 
Lévinas attributes to the ‘Other’ can be related to the gift as Marion 
describes it. Both the gift in Marion’s theory and the Other in Lévi-
nas’ theory are conditional for the subject to appear.54 However, where 
Lévinas sees a transcendent power reflected in the face of the Other, 
52 A problem of traditional philosophy that Marion tries to overcome concerns alterity. 
In Husserl’s philosophy the Other is reduced to just another object that is constituted 
by the subject perceiving the Other. Mackinlay elaborates on this issue: “A unifying 
theme running through these critiques [against Husserl and Heidegger] is a concern 
for otherness (alterity) or transcendence. After Descartes identifies the ego cogito as the 
foundation for all knowledge, anything that transcends our own consciousness can be 
understood only in relation to that consciousness, which is its ground. Thus, what is 
other is no longer understood in terms of its otherness, but rather as more of the same. 
From Descartes onward, Western thought is haunted by this failure to conceive oth-
erness as alterity, reducing it to the same” (2010: 8).
53 This is also the reason why the gift/event is linked to anonymous sources as Gschwandt-
ner explains: “Until the response has happened, it [the call] remains anonymous. If I 
knew beforehand who or what was calling me (Being, God, the other, life), I would 
no longer be devoted but in control. There would be a dialogue instead of a radical 
interruption and passivity” (217). The gift/event must be anonymous, otherwise the 
reaction of the receiver would be influenced in some way and the receiver would expect 
the gift and, thus, determine the gift.
54 Lévinas writes on the figure of the ‘Other’ in Totality and Infinity: “But the other ab-
solutely other—the Other —does not limit the freedom of the same [which refers to 
the ‘I’, the ‘me’, N.F.]; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies it” (197).
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Marion insists on the givenness of the banal world.55 This is the main 
difference between the two thinkers. Marion tries to distance himself 
from a theological argument. A gift, to Marion, could be anything, 
even a common object, since Marion does not presuppose that there is 
any transcendence inherent in it. Transcendence is created by the con-
text in which these banal objects arrive at the subject—that is, without 
intention, as if from ‘nowhere.’
Next to an alteration of subjectivity, for Marion excess is a central 
aspect. It is the key to extricate the gift from the economic circle.56 An 
excessive gift cannot be reciprocated, thus it brings the three-fold struc-
ture of the gift out of balance. In addition, the concept of excess breaks 
with metaphysical assumptions, particularly that of self-identity: “This 
principle [the principle of identity] supposes that nothing can be, at 
the same moment and in the same respect, other than itself ” (“Reason 
of the Gift” 123). However, this is precisely what Ma rion is arguing for, 
55 For Lévinas, language is the stage where this confrontation between Other and self 
occurs. Lévinas notes that “discourse relates with what remains essentially transcen-
dent [the Other, N.F.]” (Totality 195). The Other ‘calls’ me into being, calls me to be 
responsible. Lévinas recognizes in language the word of God that manifests itself in 
the confrontation with the Other who he sees as a transcendent being: “The Other 
remains infinitively transcendent, infinitively foreign; his face in which his epipha-
ny is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be common 
to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our existence” 
(Totality 194). The focus on language makes Lévinas’ theory highly situative; it is an 
ever-changing process and positioning between self and Other that evokes the call of 
responsibility again and again in different variations. Although, Marion also employs 
the term ‘call,’ it contains no inherent linguistic determination, since Marion refers to 
the call of ‘givenness.’ The potentiality of the gift is not seen as a transcendent exterior, 
but in ‘givenness’ itself, in the banal world. 
56 Excess is also an aspect Derrida talks about when thinking about a possible gift, refer-
ring to excess as ‘madness’ and opposing it to reason. Reason can be understood in the 
sense of ‘reasonable, rational, logical’ or as ‘cause.’ With the blending of these two con-
notations of reason, Derrida implies that ‘madness’ is located outside the economic and 
rational realm and may be without cause. Since being ‘without cause’ is one of Derri-
da’s prerequisites of the gift, one can assume that a possible gift is necessarily one that 
is ‘mad,’ which suggest an excessiveness found for example in the ‘potlatch’ (cf. Mauss 
The Gift 8). Bernhard Waldenfels writes on this topic: “Wenn es ein Geben gibt, dass 
sich dem Tauschgesetz entzieht, so nur als ein anomales Geben, das die jeweilige Ord-
nung überschreitet. Schenken als emphatische Form wäre der Überschuß des Gebens 
über das Gegebene hinaus” (399; emphasis omitted).
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a gift becoming something other than itself, surpassing its own status as 
banal object and attaining more meaning. In fact, according to Ma rion, 
it is precisely this excess that determines the structure of the given:
That the given gives not only itself, but also a given other than itself, 
implies the opening of an uncontrollable excess, growth […] Simply put, 
here the given always and necessarily gives something other than itself, and 
thus more than itself; it proves to be uncontrollable and inexhaustible, 
irrepressible and impossible (in other words it makes possible the impos-
sible), having neither master or god [emphasis added] (BG 118).
Marion’s example for this kind of excess is fatherhood, in which the 
child itself is given the gift of life and itself presents a gift to his father. 
The child is given pure excess—something it can never reciprocate; it 
can never give back to his father what it has been given. To his father, 
however, the child is a gift, too, which “brings about a possibility […] 
whose future […] cannot be foreseen, nor deduced from causes, nor 
anticipated, but must be waited for” (“Reason of the Gift” 118). The 
seed the father gives becomes more; what is given remains not the 
same.
Marion’s excess means an excess of intuition. Following Kant, to be 
able to grasp the world, structuring concepts are needed; one has to be 
‘prepared’ for what one sees. Horner explains this in reference to Kant 
as follows: “we do not know things as they are in themselves, but only 
as they appear to us by way of the faculties of the mind” (2005: 20). In 
Kant’s view intuition remains ‘blind’ without concepts that structure it: 
“Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe blind“ 
(Kritik der reinen Vernunft B 75). Marion, however, is precisely inter-
ested in phenomena that resist this line of argument and that instead 
expose an excess of intuition that make any categorization impossible. 
Marion terms these phenomena ‘saturated.’ These saturated phenom-
ena should not be misunderstood as uncommon or special phenom-
ena. Marion underscores that these phenomena are ‘common.’ Gondek 
and Tengelyi explain: “Den zeitgenössischen Phänomenologen geht es 
eindeutig darum, aus den Vorstößen der Vorgängergeneration Konse-
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quenzen zu ziehen, die ausdrücklich die Normalform der Phänomene 
betreffen. Es werden nicht mehr nur paradoxe Phänomene, Hyper-
phänomene oder Nichtphänomene phänomenologisch erfasst und 
erörtert, sondern es wird eine Umwandlung des Phänomenbegriffs 
selbst angestrebt“ (25). Mackinlay agrees with this, writing: “satura-
tion should […] be regarded as the normal way in which all phenom-
ena appear. […] saturation should no longer be understood as a rare 
exception to ‘ordinary’ phenomenality; instead ‘poor’ and ‘common 
law’ phenomena (such as objects) should be seen as unusual exceptions 
to the norm of saturated phenomena” (2010: 216–217). Saturated 
phenomena cause a failure of comprehension:57
confronted with the saturated phenomenon, the I cannot not see it, but 
it cannot any longer gaze at it as its mere object. It has the eye to see but 
not to keep it. […] it does not see it clearly and precisely as such since its 
excess renders it irregardable and difficult to master. The intuition of the 
phenomenon is nevertheless seen, but as blurred by the too narrow aper-
ture, the too short lens, the too cramped frame, that receives it—or rather 
that cannot receive it as such (BG 215).58
The eye (or the ‘I’) is too limited to be able to process what it has seen; 
the receiving end is always lacking and proven to be inadequate in con-
trast to what is given to it. Even though Marion considers Kant’s cat-
egories limited when it comes to the relation between intuition and 
concept, he views Kant’s “aesthetic idea” as an example of a saturated 
phenomenon. Kant defines the aesthetic idea in the following fashion: 
“Unter einer ästhetischen Idee aber verstehe ich diejenige Vorstellung 
57 Marion outlines four types of saturated phenomena: event, idol, flesh and icon (cf. BG 
228–241).
58 Another example that Marion uses for this kind of excess is the first experience of lan-
guage: “The excess of intuition over intention bursts open irremediably from the point 
of my birth—and, moreover, I will speak not only by means of having [repeatedly] intu-
ited in silence, but especially after having heard others speak. Language is first listened 
to, and only then it is uttered. The origin remains to me, indeed, originally inaccessi-
ble, not by default, nevertheless, but because the first phenomenon already saturates 
all intention with intuitions. The origin, which refuses itself, does not nevertheless give 
itself in penury (Derrida), but indeed in excess, determining in this way the regime of 
all givens to come” (In Excess 44).
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der Einbildungskraft, die viel zu denken veranlaßt, ohne daß ihr doch 
irgend ein bestimmter Gedanke, d.i. Begriff, adäquat sein kann, die 
folglich keine Sprache völlig erreicht und verständlich machen kann” 
(Kritik der Urteilskraft § 49). Marion comments on this as follows:
because it [the aesthetic idea] gives ‘much,’ the aesthetic idea gives intu-
itively more than any concept can expose. […] The impossibility of the 
concept arranging this disposition comes from the fact that the intuitive 
suberabundance no longer succeeds in exposing itself in a priori rules, 
whatever they might be, but rather submerges them. Intuition is no longer 
exposed in the concept; it saturates it and renders it overexposed —invis-
ible, unreadable not by lack, but indeed by an excess of light (BG 198).
These phenomena cannot be experienced in categories like the ones 
that Kant proposed, but are appearing “counter to the conditions for 
the possibility of experience” (ibid., 215). They are “given without an 
adequate concept” (Horner 2005: 111), which explains why Marion 
also refers to them as ‘paradoxes.’59 Coming back to Marion’s demand 
that phenomena should not be determined by a horizon, Marion 
describes how saturated phenomena fill out not only one horizon but 
multiple. One example is the historical event:
the battle will demand additional horizons […] of an indefinite number: 
military horizons […], diplomatic, political, economic, ideological […], 
etc. The plurality of horizons practically forbids constituting the historical 
event into one object and demands substituting an endless hermeneutic 
in time (ibid., 229).60
The power and the excess of the event are expressed in various met-
aphors, one being ‘the improper name’: “I am called by a name that 
I am not, have not chosen, and perhaps do not want (a name ‘dif-
59 Or as Marion puts it himself: “In the kingdom of the phenomenon, the concept is not 
king, but rather the intuition, which alone has the privilege of giving” (BG 193).
60 Another example is the flesh of Christ: “it is clear that the acts of Christ, even reduced 
to writings, exceed the horizon of this world, are not of this world, demand other hori-
zons and other worlds. This principle of the plurality of worlds, or rather horizon, gov-
erns all dimension of the phenomenality of Christ’s flesh” (BG 239).
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ficult to bear’)” (BG 292). This insinuates that the subject has been 
selected and, consequently, has to accept the mission that this entails. 
Another metaphor is the term “seizure” (ibid., 268), a medical term 
which describes a neurological process that affects the whole body and 
cannot be controlled by will. Marion compares the occurrence of the 
gift also to a ‘weight’: “This pressure bears down in such a manner that 
it makes us feel not only its weight, but also the fact that we cannot in 
any way master it, that it imposes itself without our having it available 
to us—we do not trigger it any more than we suspend it” (ibid., 159). 
These comparisons all suggest the denial of a hermeneutic approach. 
The event in Marion’s conception cannot be seized, labeled and put 
aside.
The terms ‘call,’ ‘seizure’ and ‘weight’ also suggest a displacement or at 
least an imposition, as is clearly stated by Marion: “The interloqué [the 
receiver in the process of being called into duty by an event] suffers a 
call so powerful and compelling that he must surrender [s’y  rendre; 
transl.] to it, in the double sense of the French s’y rendre: being dis-
placed and submitted to it” (BG 268; emphasis omitted).61 This means 
that the subject is brought into a specific position in order to be able 
to receive the event. The displacement has visual consequences. As 
Mackinlay writes, Marion understands “all phenomena as anamor-
phic” (164). Thus, the subject’s receptivity and the process of its recog-
nition of an event are described as an anamorphosis.62 An anamor-
phosis describes a positioning of two sides that become visible to each 
other only when inhabiting the ‘right’ position. Marion’s example to 
illustrate an anamorphosis is Hans Holbein’s (the Younger) painting, 
The Two Ambassadors (1533), in which a grey speck in the centre of 
the painting is recognized as a human skull by its viewer when gazing 
at it long enough. For this to happen, the receiver has to take on an 
61 With the term ‘interloqué’ Marion describes the receiver who is in the act of receiving 
the gift. The French term could be translated with ‘baffled person.’ Thus, Marion con-
ceptualizes a subject that is overwhelmed by what is happening to him. 
62 The Oxford English Dictionary defines an anamorphosis as follows: “a distorted pro-
jection or drawing of anything, so made that when viewed from a particular point, or 
by reflection from a suitable mirror, it appears regular and properly proportioned; a 
deformation” (306).
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attentive and open, but undirected, attitude. He must—without con-
sciously knowing what he is doing—adjust his perception towards a 
spot: “not only must a gaze know how to become curious, available, 
and enacted, but above all it must know how to submit to the demands 
of the figure to be seen: find the unique point of view from which 
the second level form will appear.” (BG 124) Marion refers to this as 
“align[ing] oneself ” (ibid., 117) to the object. The receiver must be 
patient, since it might be necessary to make “numerous and frequently 
fruitless attempts” and to “admit that it would be necessary to alter 
one’s position (either in space or in thought), change one’s point of 
view” (ibid., 124). The powers of the subject are obviously restricted in 
this process. The only activity the subject presents is that of utter acces-
sibility: “It reduces him to merely watching for, freezes him in place, 
puts him in immobile availability for what might not finally come or 
indeed never begin” (ibid., 268). The excess of the gift turns the receiver 
into a subject that Marion terms the adonné, the gifted in English trans-
lation (BG 268).63 Marion offers no more insight into this new subject 
and in what way the adonné is gifted. Besides its newly earned status 
as a subject, what are its capabilities? For Marion, the gifted is simply 
defined as a figure of possibility, something emerges that has not been 
there before; through the gift it is enabled to do and become more than 
expected. To receive such an excessive gift is not necessarily a singular 
experience; according to Marion one can receive gifts multiple times: 
“l’adonné does not receive itself once and for all (at birth) but does not 
cease to receive itself anew in the event of each given” (In Excess 48).
Marion’s treatment of excessive intuition and his notion of counter-in-
tentionality separates him not only from traditional phenomenolog-
ical thought, but, according to John D. Caputo, it also distinguishes 
him from poststructuralist thinking:
63 Adonné has been translated as ‘gifted’ by Jeff Kosky in Being Given. This translation is 
problematic in Gschwandtner’s eyes: “Adonné […] means to be ‘devoted,’ ‘given over 
to,’ or even ‘addicted.’ (‘Gifted’ works neither as a translation of the French term nor 
as a description of Marion’s use of it.)” (213).
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Deconstruction turns on an intention that can never be fulfilled, on a 
gift that can never be given, where presence, intuition, and givenness are 
constantly being deferred and detained, where intention is permanently 
haunted by an ungivable givenness. That does not frustrate desire but is 
constitutive of desire’s very structure. The very idea of this intention is that 
it intends what will never be given, can never be given, its givenness being 
impossible, the impossible, which we always intend and never meet, which 
we always desire but never have. For Marion […] [f ]ulfillment is frustrated 
not because intention is cut off from intuition but because intention is 
flooded with givenness that it cannot contain or intend (78).
Whereas in poststructuralism intention fuels a desire that can never 
be realized, the phenomenon in Marion’s theory goes beyond every 
expectation and intention, providing more than can be hoped for. This 
fulfils what Marion is aiming for in this theory—it gives the phenom-
enon full priority over anything else: subject, expectation, causality 
and horizon.
Sonmi’s Event and its Excess
Sonmi’s story illustrates this relationship between the receiving end 
and the overwhelming event perfectly. The event in “An Orison” does 
not solely consist of the half-heartedly executed experiment that unex-
pectedly provides Sonmi with an inner voice. The event is also mani-
fested in the way Sonmi reacts to it and how she gives form to the event. 
In fact, Sonmi is not the only clone in Mitchell’s story that experiences 
‘ascension.’ First, her colleague, Yoona ~939, goes through this process, 
but is shot when she tries to flee the fast food restaurant. Sonmi reacts 
in a more careful way in response to her new self. At first she is only 
waiting: “What could I do but wait and endure?” (“An Orison” 206). 
Then she simply accepts and bears what happens to her: being brought 
to the university, then shuttled to a stronghold of the political under-
ground, then admitted into its membership. At the end of the story, 
she implies that she knew the whole journey was the government’s care-
fully constructed plan to manipulate her for their own purposes, yet 
she plays along nevertheless. Before her execution, she explains to an 
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attendant archivist: “I had left the doors and windows open for them, 
but my captors contrived a spectacular siege with snipers and mega-
phones” (ibid., 363). The following dialogue ensues:
[Archivist:] You are implying that you xpected [sic] the raid, Sonmi?
Once I had finished my manifesto, the next stage could only be my arrest.
What do you mean? What ‘next stage’ of what?
Of the theatrical production, set up while I was still a server in Papa 
Song’s.
Wait, wait, wait. What about…well, everything? Are you saying your 
whole…confession is composed of…scripted events? 
It’s key events, yes (ibid., 363).
[…] Two brief last questions. Do you regret the course of your life?
How can I? ‘Regret’ implies a freely chosen, but erroneous, action; free 
will plays no part in my story (ibid., 365; emphasis omitted).
Sonmi suffers the event and states that she was never given any other 
choice and that, accordingly, regret would make no sense in her case. 
She submits herself completely to what her ‘ascension’ results in, even 
to the extent of putting her own life at risk. As a consequence, she pre-
sents the event as only she can—namely by the birth of herself as an 
individual and excessive subject. 
Her subject status manifests excess in almost every aspect of her devel-
opment. She becomes a human being, author, revolutionary and even-
tually god—an excessive force.64 This becomes most evident when 
looking at how her death is treated. To kill Sonmi after she has accom-
plished so much means more than killing a common human being; it 
entails symbolic significance. However, this significance is curiously 
of political essence. Sonmi as gifted is similar to the king (or the sov-
ereign). Her life has become more than bare life, since her killing has 
64 It is noteworthy in this respect that she tells this story by speaking into a device that 
is called ‘Orison.’ Boulter notes: “‘Orison’ is an archaic word meaning prayer: Sonmi’s 
testimony […] thus functions as a prayer to the future, an appeal—and is this not what 
prayer actually is?” (135). Thus, her story is charged with sacred connotations from the 
beginning, making it take on greater dimensions.
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become more meaningful; she cannot be simply erased as her clone 
colleagues are. She leaves a remainder behind, which turns her into a 
political figure and a god to the afterworld.
2.2.3 Conclusion
As I have shown during the course of this analysis, Sonmi fits all the 
characteristics of a homo sacer, yet she is released from her imprison-
ment by an event. This event provides her with an excess that makes her 
not only a human being, but more than anyone would have expected. 
In fact, the way Sonmi turns from a weak and imprisoned being into 
someone empowered makes her similar to what Marion describes as 
the transformation from being a receiver to being gifted. The only dif-
ference lies in Sonmi’s access to political power, which is something 
that is never discussed by Marion who disregards power issues in favor 
of givenness.
Having read Sonmi as a homo sacer rather than a receiver (although she 
eventually experiences an event) anticipates my critique of Marion. 
Marion’s concept is not neutral, but highly optimistic. The example 
of Sonmi makes this very obvious. The society Sonmi lives in is deter-
mined to artificially produce ‘inferior’ beings that are doomed to servi-
tude. To perceive her later entrance into consciousness a ‘gift’ without 
taking into account that this might be rather proof that these clones 
are not as far from humanity as they were thought to be, would come 
across as naïve. Marion’s receiver is a figure that lacks context, since 
the nature of the weakness is rather vague. Weakness is interpreted 
mostly in a positive way, since the receiver is awarded with a gift that 
is characterized by being “never wrong” (“Reason of the Gift” 133). 
This is because it is precisely the weakness, according to Ma rion, that 
makes his/her reception possible in the first place, as Carlson sums 
up: ”my weakness becomes my power, my incapacity my capacity” 
(163). Clearly influenced by Christian ethics, weakness—referring to 
kindness, submission and humbleness, all represented in the figure of 
Christ—is seen as strength and not as fault. In Sonmi’s case this is 
problematic, since her weakness is the result of political and unethical 
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decisions. Her status is not an attitude; it is not self-chosen. Sonmi has 
no other choice than to simply allow what happens to her. This shows 
exemplarily how Marion’s concept of a weak subject, when applied to 
contemporary situations depicted in fiction, could be considered cyn-
ical or even inadequate. Marion’s concept is simply not free of theolog-
ical background and this makes employing his concepts as analytical 
instruments problematic. 
In the same manner, Marion’s concept of the gifted could, too, prove to 
be problematic. For Marion, the gifted is an inherently positive being 
that is the product of a revelatory event—changing the subject com-
pletely by opening his eyes. Naturally, for Marion, the question of 
whether the event might have ethically dubious consequences does 
not arise.65 However, the question remains: Does an empowered or 
transformed subject necessarily have to be read positively? Could this 
empowered subject not also be a negative phenomenon? This is an 
aspect that Marion completely neglects. This is different in Agamben’s 
case. Agamben proposes a figure whose powers are unethical (even 
though Agamben never reflects on this explicitly): the sovereign. 
Although, the sovereign and the gifted are both defined by excess and 
to some extent power (or at least the potential to become powerful), 
the sovereign’s power is based on the weakness of others and his abil-
ity to create weak beings, bare life. He is located on the opposite side 
of the gifted, since he is considered to be ‘evil’ in a sense, even though 
his evilness is produced by a political system rather than being an indi-
vidual choice. His power does not stem from his own weakness, but 
the weakness of others. In comparing the sovereign’s death to Son-
mi’s death—since both deaths become extremely meaningful and are 
not treated as ‘normal’ deaths—I pointed out how Sonmi moves away 
from her status as a homo sacer and becomes more like the sovereign. 
Nevertheless, Sonmi’s status as a sovereign never appeared in its most 
65 Horner who has written one of the central introductory works to Marion suggests 
more ambivalence in the concept of the gift than Marion, in my opinion, proposes 
himself: “A gift is most often taken to be a positive thing, but the word nevertheless 
demonstrates some instability. For example, the Latin (and Greek) dosis, which enters 
English as “dose,” bears the meanings of both ‘gift’ and ‘poison’” (2001: 9).
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extreme (or evil) form—namely the ability to declare bare life. Sonmi 
only declares herself bare life, no one else.66 Although Agamben’s fig-
ures reflect certainly current political and social situations—e.g. the 
human rights issues that are associated with the question of cloning—, 
which makes his theory very adaptable to contemporary fiction, the 
figure of the sovereign seems to be quite an extreme figure of power, as 
the homo sacer is an extreme figure of powerlessness. In the same man-
ner that Marion’s description is too positive and too religious, Agam-
ben’s concept seems to be too harsh and negative, turning the subject 
in control automatically into an ‘evil’ being which is not the case with 
Sonmi. She possesses a sense of solidarity and justice that clearly sep-
arates her from Agamben’s one-dimensional figure of the sovereign.
In sum, the spectrum of figurations of subjectivity in literature is too 
complex and too various to define them as either ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ All 
four terms, receiver, gifted, homo sacer and sovereign have been shown 
to be fitting to some extent, but eventually they are too restrictive and 
too embedded in their original contexts. The terms receiver and gifted 
would be cynical in situations in which subjects are clearly discrimi-
nated against or violently attacked, the terms homo sacer and sovereign 
might be too serious and harsh when it comes to restrictive situations 
that, however harsh, can be compared to neither the situation of a ref-
ugee or a camp inhabitant, which is the blue print for the homo sacer, 
nor to the sovereign who is declaring others bare life. In both cases, the 
terms would fail to describe the subjects adequately and would also 
blur their original meaning. What is necessary, then, is to come up 
with terms that grasp the main structures of these concepts, but that 
are more descriptive rather than prescriptive. Thus, for a literary anal-
ysis it is necessary to design a subject concept that can be assigned to 
various situations in which subjects are formed.
66 Agamben regards the capability to declare oneself as bare life as the action of a sover-
eign: “as if supreme power were, in the last analysis, nothing other than the capacity 
to constitute oneself and others as life that may be killed but not sacrificed” (101; em-
phasis omitted).
72 2 Relating the Subject to the Event
2.3 Captivation and Event
As both Marion’s and Agamben’s figurations of weakness and power 
are too extreme when it comes to employing them as instruments for 
a literary analysis, I consider it necessary to introduce my own termi-
nology that takes Marion’s and Agamben’s figures into account, but 
locates them on a spectrum of subject figurations rather than consid-
ering them exemplary. What remains central to this terminology is 
the event. I insist, with the support of the exemplary analysis in this 
chapter, on the functionality and productivity of Marion’s notion of 
the event. Thus, my definition of the event concurs with Marion’s: the 
event is so excessive that it changes a weak subject and shifts it to a new 
position, allowing it to experience transcendence. By seeing the event 
as central to the question of subjectivity I clearly distance myself from 
Agamben (who does not aim for a theory on the subject anyway) and 
side with Marion on this aspect.
What constitutes the core of both theories is a form of immobility 
linked to weakness. In both theories weak beings are produced by 
restricting and even immobilizing circumstances. Both present their 
own concepts for this process that becomes central to their theory. 
Agamben introduces the double exclusion, the ban, and Marion the 
anamorphosis. It is necessary to underscore that I am fully aware that 
Marion and Agamben treat weakness very differently. Marion believes 
weakness is only a preparation for an event that releases the subject 
from its weakness, whereas Agamben has no such concept. Agamben’s 
ban is not a preparation for something else, Agamben, in fact, sug-
gests that the homo sacer must be held captive so that its opposite, the 
sovereign, can thrive. As explained earlier, this unchangeability of the 
homo sacer is one point of Agamben’s argument where I clearly distance 
myself from him. I argue for the necessity of the event and therefore 
for the potential of change inherent in the figuration of subjectivity. 
Thus, these restrictive circumstances do not only delimit the subjects, 
but, following Marion, make them receptive to an event. The subject 
is pinned down to a location where the event will occur. Thus, it is the 
imprisonment that makes the subject experience an event. However, 
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between homo sacer’s captivity and the receiver’s, there are stark differ-
ences. Agamben describes essentially a prison cell in Guantánamo, a 
structural captivity of a political system, whereas Marion speaks more 
of an aesthetic ‘capture’ by an event. Thus, there is a spectrum of forms 
of captivity, even to the degree where it cannot be conceived as ‘cap-
tivity’ anymore. In fact, Marion’s receiver is more captivated than held 
captive, since he falls prey to an anamorphosis. To illustrate this range 
between the captive and the captivated on a terminological level I 
chose the term ‘captivation.’ The term originates in the early 16th cen-
tury and in its archaic form it denotes two things: it suggests a fascina-
tion with a thing, a person, a phenomenon or an event, but it also indi-
cates a form of captivity in its archaic meaning: “The action of taking 
or holding captive; the fact or state of being taken or held captive; now 
only fig., of the attention, mind, fancy, affections” (OED 102). Thus, 
it incorporates both forms of captivity: a mild and a violent one. For 
this reason I will install the term ‘captivation’ as a portmanteau that 
combines ‘captivity’ with ‘captivation,’ which means reactivating the 
archaic meaning of the term. The two figures, receiver and homo sacer, 
essentially delimit a range of what captivity can be like, from captiva-
tion (in the sense of captivating) to captivity. In between these figures 
there is enough room for variations, for subjects who can be exposed 
to very different forms of captivating or captive forces.
Captivation can take on different forms: intense fascination, hypnotic 
state, imprisonment by social, political or environmental conditions, 
constriction by age, lack of knowledge, ignorance, traumatisation or 
physical or psychological dependency. These captive states delimit the 
individual, restricting his or her abilities to think, plan and act. For this 
reason, captivation might not even be recognized by the characters, 
since they have come to accept their circumstances without knowing 
any differently. Sometimes, the characters submit willingly to their cap-
tivation. In these cases, the characters are rather captivated then held 
captive; they are fascinated by the power that holds them and might 
even be unaware of the fact that they are delimited. In other cases, 
however, captivation is clearly recognized as a limitation and even a 
confinement that the characters try to deal with by either struggling 
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against it or finding ways to deal with their situation. All these different 
reactions to a captivation inform the respective captivations and shape 
the subject who undergoes this captivation. In fact, it is the subjects’ 
individual and often idiosyncratic reaction to the captivation that ena-
bles them to experience events later on. It is the interaction of captiva-
tion and the subjected individual that creates an untapped potential. 
The subjects become receptive precisely because they are subjected to 
a captivation. To draw on Sonmi’s example again: Sonmi experiences 
her conscience as an event only because she was drugged into being a 
mindless being before. Without her captivation the event would have 
been banal. Thus, the term captivation describes a stage of perceptiveness 
that goes beyond Marion’s description of an aimless waiting period, 
which is rather vague, but it also goes beyond Agamben’s impenetrable 
prison cell. Instead, captivation is understood as a force that shapes and 
forms the subject, manipulates or captivates, pushing the subject into 
physically or psychologically confined spaces. Since the subjects, cor-
nered into these spaces, eventually experience an event, one could even 
argue that the event draws them to them as Marion claims, exploiting 
or controlling their captivation to draw them close. This is, however, 
a difficult argument to make when it comes to novels that tradition-
ally have individuals as the main focus and main interest, and don’t 
portray events as forces with a mind of their own. However, what can 
be said is that in some cases the proximity between a captivation and 
the appearance of an event becomes every obvious, underscoring how 
captivation is a necessary step for the subject becoming receptive and 
open to an event. Overall, captivation is a force that turns from a con-
fining into an enabling force when an event rearranges the subject’s posi-
tion towards the captivation. Thus, the former limitation turns into an 
advantage, the weakness becomes one’s power—captivation paves the 
way for an event.
It is noteworthy that captivation effects both states, the weak and the 
powerful, which indicates propinquity between the two states. The 
gifted and the sovereign can be also considered captive figures, deter-
mined by their spatial position and the ensuing power. Even though, 
they don’t suffer from their confinement, but profit from it, they 
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remain bound to their position. This can be seen in Sonmi’s case, since, 
despite her power, she is never able to escape the grip of her govern-
ment completely, but is to some extent subjected to its rules until the 
end. The complex and often counter-intuitive relationship between 
captivation and empowerment is certainly one of the main issues of 
this dissertation and will be further discussed in the analytical chapters.
What is empowerment like? Similar to a captivation, from a critical 
perspective an empowerment can be considered positive or negative. 
Again, Agamben and Marion describe figures that are positioned at 
the opposite ends of one spectrum: Agamben describes the most vio-
lent outcome, the sovereign who uses his power to subject and kill the 
weak, whereas Marion describes the most positive, a gifted being, who 
is freed from his weakened state and experiences a revelation. I will be 
considering empowerment under three aspects that are prevalent in 
contemporary novels – authorship, ethics and the sacred – and ana-
lysing how these empowered subjects relate to them. The focus will be 
on the particular kind of authors, ethical or sacred beings they are and 
how their status as empowered subjects could change the notions of 
authorship, ethics and sacredness. What is the character of empower-
ment in reference to these areas? What kind of authors, ethical beings 
or sacred figures do empowered subjects become and how does this 
reflect on these issues? By describing the empowered subjects in these 
three areas I therefore wish to illustrate how contemporary literature 
proposes a different concept of subjectivity in comparison to post-
modern literature.

3 Captives of Authorship
3.1 Introduction
At the end of Paul Auster’s City of Glass, the main protagonist and 
the book’s fictional author, Quinn, vanishes, leaving only a red note-
book behind. This plot twist enacts Roland Barthes’ theory of the 
“modern scriptor,” who is distinguished from a traditional author by 
being “born simultaneously with the text” (145) and thus does not 
exist ‘before’ the text or, as Auster’s novel suggests, without it. In post-
modern fiction, the text is more meaningful than its author. The text 
is defined in a new way and considered to be a “tissue of signs” (Bar-
thes 147). Texts relate to other texts, incorporate known motives and 
ideas, play with them and reinterpret them. The individual text is not 
original, but is instead considered to be a palimpsest: “[t]he text is a 
tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” 
(ibid., 146). Furthermore, in postmodernism it is understood that a 
text does not mainly refer to some notion of ‘reality,’ but rather to other 
texts, thus, to a textual universe. A similar argument is made in City 
of Glass when it is said about Quinn: “What interested him about the 
stories he wrote was not their relation to the world but their relation to 
other stories.”(7)67 As Matías Martínez68 has pointed out, intertextual-
ity is a crucial element of postmodern fiction and redefines the defini-
tion of authorship. He goes on to note that Barthes and Kristeva have 
therefore defined the author as the “mouthpiece of foreign discourse” 
[Sprachrohr fremder Rede] (465).69 
67 Frederic Jameson views this as part of the reading process; the reader is always informed 
by what he has read before: “we never really confront a text immediately, in all its fresh-
ness as a thing-in-itself. Rather, texts come before us as the always-already-read; we ap-
prehend them through sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or—if the text is 
brand-new—through the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those 
inherited interpretive traditions” (The political unconscious 9).
68 Cf. Matías Martínez. “Autorschaft und Intertextualität.” Rückkehr des Autors. Zur Er-
neuerung eines umstrittenen Begriffs. Eds. Fotis Jannidis, Gerhard Lauer et al. Tübingen: 
Max Niemeyer, 1999. 465–479.
69 Rimmon Kenan explains how intertextuality relates to the critique of representation: 
“Like textuality, intertextuality is frequently opposed to representation. Whereas rep-
resentation is based on a reference from words to things, intertextuality is a reference 
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The traditional author stands in the way of such an understanding 
of the text, since he or she is supposed to close or curtail the mean-
ing of a text: “[t]o give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that 
text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing” (ibid., 
147). Michel Foucault would agree with this argument. In What is 
an Author? (1969) Foucault writes that the author is a restrictive and 
limiting force that determines interpretation. For Foucault, the author 
is an “ideological figure”:
the author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the 
author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle 
by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by 
which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free 
composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we 
are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging 
of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the 
opposite fashion. One can say that the author is an ideological product, 
since we represent him as the opposite of his historically real function. 
When a historically given function is represented in a figure that inserts it, 
one has an ideological production. The author is therefore the ideological 
figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation 
of meaning (118–119).
Language and fiction are viewed as an unlimited force that should not 
be restricted, but embraced instead to the fullest, even to the extent 
of producing more meaning than the interpreter can manage. It is not 
the author who produces such myriad meanings, the overdetermina-
tion of meaning lies in the nature of the sign itself. In this scenario 
the author is reduced to a scriptor. The scriptor’s power is not to cre-
ate, but as Barthes writes, “to mix writings, to counter the ones with 
the others, in such a way as never to rest on any of them” (146). To 
underscore the text’s autonomy means to withdraw authority from the 
from words to words, or rather from texts to texts. The concept of ‘text’ is often ex-
panded to designate the whole world. The world, as a network of signs, becomes a text 
(or series of texts); intertextuality replaces representation” (12). 
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author. In Barthes’s view the concept of a traditional author figure (and 
Barthes capitalizes this term throughout his essay) invokes religious 
connotations. For Barthes, to search for what the author intended is 
similar to looking for the hidden meanings of a god. In fact, he argues 
strongly against this kind of image of the author: “We know now that 
a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning 
(the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in 
which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash” 
(146). According to Barthes, the author, as a religious figure, has to 
‘die,’ meaning he/she has to be pushed to the background in order to 
weaken his/her influence on how one should read a text. Burke com-
pares this event of the ‘death of the author’ to the ‘death of God’ in 
modernism: “The death of the author might be said to fulfill much 
the same function in our day as did the death of God for late nine-
teenth-century thought. Both deaths attest to a departure of belief in 
authority, presence, intention, omniscience and creativity” (21).
Arguing against presence, intention and omniscience is something the 
poststructuralist thinker Jacques Derrida is known for. In his philoso-
phy, one can find conclusions similar to those of Barthes and Foucault. 
One of Derrida’s main tenets is his denouncement of presence as a 
guiding principle in metaphysics: “It could be shown that all the names 
related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always 
designated an invariable presence—eidos, archē, telos, energeia, ousia, 
(essence, existence, substance, subject) alethia, transcendality, con-
sciousness, God, man, and so forth” (“Structure, Sign and Play” 279–
280). The author can be considered a center, as a place from which a 
message is ‘sent’ to the reader. This message cannot, however, possibly 
be controlled by its author. Derrida argues that every text evokes con-
texts that accompany the main text. He questions the assumption that 
a context’s meaning can be controlled, calling it a “teleological and 
ethical determination” (“Signature Event Context” 325) and claims 
that not only the text, but also the context itself cannot be fully deter-
mined (ibid., 310). A text is potentially open to being connected and 
disconnected to multiple texts, producing numerous possibilities of 
being read and understood:
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Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written […], as a small 
or large unity, can be cited, put between quotation marks; thereby it can 
break with every given context, and engender infinitively new contexts in 
an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that the mark 
is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only con-
texts without any center of absolute anchoring (“Signature Event Con-
text” 320).
A center, or an “absolute anchoring,” mentioned in the passage above 
would be equivalent to the concept of the traditional author—the man 
behind the curtain who is holding the strings. This idea of a ‘first cause’ 
is something Derrida questions, not only in this instance, but on other 
levels, too, arguing that “what is put into question is precisely the quest 
for a rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure, a principal 
responsibility” (“Différance” 6). This, of course, has theological impli-
cations that relate Derrida’s general philosophy to Barthes’ critique of 
the author. Both criticize implicit theological patterns, which Burke 
describes as follows:
The author is to his text as God, the auctor vitae, is to his world: the uni-
tary cause, source and master to whom the chain of textual effects must 
be traced, and in whom they find their genesis, meaning, goal and justifi-
cation. The author thus becomes, in Derrida’s words, the ‘transcendental 
signified’ and attains the supernal privilege of being at once the beginning 
and the end of his text (22).
The author, regarded as a God-figure, defies the postmodern concept of 
anti-hierarchy. As a result, the idea of the author as a figure of authority, 
order, and reason has become outdated in postmodern fiction. Post-
modern writers, such as Kurt Vonnegut and John Barth, try to circum-
vent this kind of authority and to find new ways of narrating that do 
not allow for or that undermine a powerful and unquestioned author. 
Rimmon-Kenan summarizes the effect as follows: “In deconstruction, 
the very notion of a narrator becomes superfluous. The text is per-
formed by language, not by a specific person, voice, or even instance” 
(14). Narratives such as City of Glass (1985), or Salman Rushdie’s Mid-
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night’s Children (1981), are two obvious examples in which the figure 
of the author itself is attacked. In Rushdie’s novel, the narrator slowly 
comes apart during his narrating process: “Please believe that I am 
falling apart. I am not speaking metaphorically […] I mean quite sim-
ply that I have begun to crack all over like an old jug […] I am literally 
disintegrating” (43).
Authorship in Contemporary Literature
In this chapter I intend to distinguish the current portrayal of author-
ship from a postmodern one by analyzing the renewed interest in pow-
erful forms of authorship in contemporary literature. The author, as a 
concept, is reinstalled, but with an awareness of postmodern doubts 
and hesitations, which explains why authorship is often discussed on 
a metafictional level. 
This chapter is divided into two parts: “Authorship by Mistake” and 
“The Captivated Reader.” Part One focuses on a return of authorship 
by accident, in which individuals turn into author figures and move 
into the center of the narrative without this being planned. Author-
ship is not a power acquired and connected to unquestionable author-
ity, but rather delivered through an event, surprising individuals and 
putting them on to a new path. The individual is only partially in 
control of his or her authorship; in general, he or she is not able to 
choose how to deal with this new power. Part Two describes how the 
reader becomes actively involved in the novels, a process that allows 
for the strengthening of authorship. The power of the author figure is 
in some cases even based upon the reader (Atonement, Ghostwritten). 
The reader is captured by the novel’s spell, the spell of narration and 
storytelling, and thus unable to break free. However, this struggle is 
necessary, since it manifests the power of the fictional author.
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3.2 Authorship by Mistake 
3.2.1 Atonement—The Child as Author
3.2.1.1 Introduction
Ian McEwan is arguably one of the most renowned contemporary Brit-
ish authors. His work Atonement was shortlisted for the Booker Prize 
in 2001 and his novel Amsterdam won the Booker Prize in 1998. His 
early work explores violence and sexual explicitness, for example, in 
Black Dogs (1992) and The Cement Garden (1978), which inspired his 
nickname ‘Ian Macabre.’ However, in particular his later works display 
an increased interest in ethics: “The moment of decision-making serves 
here as a central motif of [Ian McEwan’s] novels and lends itself to the 
investigation of the ethical questions and possible answers inherent in 
each novel” (Puschmann-Nalenz 190). It is these ethical questions that 
are central to this analysis, since they touch upon authorship and the 
responsibility that goes along with it.
Atonement reflects on the nature of authorship through its main char-
acter, Briony Tallis, whose process of becoming an author is central 
to the novel. The novel consists of three parts and an epilogue. The 
first part of the novel captures the events of a hot summer day in 1934 
when the Tallis family are expecting various guests—the so-called 
‘cousins from the north,’ and their oldest son Leon, who is visiting 
them with a fellow student, Paul Marshall. It also tells the story of Bri-
ony’s ‘crime,’ which is to falsely accuse the housekeeper’s son, Robbie, 
of rape. The second section follows Robbie’s experiences as a soldier in 
France, and the third section depicts Briony as a young adult trying to 
come to terms with her guilt. Only in the epilogue is it revealed that 
Briony herself wrote the whole narrative, from the first to the third 
section—a fact that was hidden throughout the novel. The narrator 
is not an impersonal omniscient narrator installed by McEwan, but a 
narrator established by his fictional character and author figure Briony.
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3.2.1.2 Briony Tallis—The Subject in Question
Briony is a figure who occupies a liminal space that determines her 
state as a captive subject. Her captivity is presented in a rather ‘weak’ 
or ‘natural’ form. She finds herself limited by her status as a child. Her 
liminal sphere is depicted as follows: “Briony inhabited an ill-defined 
transitional space between the nursery and adult worlds which she 
crossed and recrossed unpredictably” (McEwan 141). Kerler describes 
her as a “go-between from the world of the children to the world of 
adults” [transl. mine] (173).70 Thus, her captivation is a natural fact, a 
transitory state that she is bound to leave at some point. Briony is aware 
of her limitations and strives to gain more insight into the world; how-
ever, she believes her surroundings prevent her from doing so. Yet, it 
is precisely this restriction that opens up possibilities for her that only 
she is able to recognize.
Her liminal and captive state makes her turn toward fiction, where she 
can take on different roles. Her fascination with fiction is a key char-
acteristic of Briony, as the novel begins with her who, in anticipation 
of her brother’s coming home, prepares the performance of a play she 
has written, ‘The Trials of Arabella.’ It is telling that the novel starts 
with Briony’s artistic efforts—in fact, the first words are “[t]he play” 
(McEwan 3)—, since it draws attention to Briony’s creativity, which 
is a significant aspect of the entire novel.71 Often, Briony retreats to a 
slightly secluded area of the Tallis estate, near a small temple, in order 
to immerse herself in her dreams. The temple was once an “eye-catch-
ing feature,” but has since been neglected, and is described as having 
“no religious purpose at all” (ibid., 72). The place provides Briony with 
a space in which she can invent imaginary castles and turn ugly real-
70 The original quote reads: “Kippfigur bzw. go-between zwischen Kinder-und Erwachsenen-
welt” (173).
71 This has also been commented upon by Möller, who quotes several critics supporting 
her reading: “Interestingly, the novel starts with a description not of Briony herself, but 
of her play ‘The Trials of Arabella,’ thus on the one hand setting the tone ‘the book’s 
preoccupation with imagined lives,’ (Childs, Contemporary Novelists, 172) but also, 
even more importantly, confronting the reader with Briony’s literary imagination be-
fore he or she gets to know her as a personality; as Brian Finney put it, ‘[s]he is an au-
thor first and a girl on the verge of entering adolescence second’(Finney, 79)” (61).
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ity into shimmering fantasy. At the temple, Briony busies herself with 
beating down nettles, trying to free herself from the boundaries laid 
upon her:
Flaying the nettles was becoming a self-purification, and it was childhood 
she set about now, having no further need for it. […] Planting her feet 
firmly in the grass, she disposed of her old self year by year in thirteen 
strokes. She severed the sickly dependency of infancy and early child-
hood (ibid., 74). 
In a violent and impatient manner, Briony tries to cut the ties to her 
childhood, similarly to cutting off the umbilical cord. Her actions at 
the temple remove her further and further from reality and lead her 
into a trance; her blows are transformed into the strokes of a swimmer 
taking part in a competition: “No one in the world could do this better 
than Briony Tallis who would be representing her country next year at 
the Berlin Olympics and was certain to win the gold” (ibid., 75). She 
becomes the glowing star of an athletic competition, implying that it 
is not only childhood she wants to leave behind, but a general feeling 
of insignificance. She wants all eyes on her, in full admiration.
Briony is aware that her escape is only temporary. Outside of her imag-
ination, she is formed by banal reality.
The cost of oblivious daydreaming was always this moment of return, the 
realignment with what had been before and now seemed a little worse. 
[…] now she was back in the world, not one she could make, but the one 
that had made her, and she felt herself shrinking under the early evening 
sky [emphasis added] (ibid., 76).
The fact that her own felt insignificance is described by the term 
‘shrinking’ implies that in her imagination the reverse occurs; she 
‘grows,’ becomes more self-assured, and thrilled by the stories she 
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invents around herself.72 Her identity is defined by reality on the one 
hand, by which she feels restricted, keeping her ‘small,’ and on the other 
hand by imagination, with which she is infatuated, and which allows 
her to play a more important role in life. When her fantasies fade away 
and she finds herself in a field of nettles again, instead of in front of an 
audience that cheers her on, the narrator notes that “Briony had lost 
her godly power of creation” (ibid.). At this point, childlike imagina-
tion and godly creation are made equivalent. It is fitting that when Bri-
ony is described in this manner, she is located near a forgotten temple. 
Briony’s chosen locations throughout the novel are indications of her 
character in general and her position in the novel.73 Although the nar-
rator’s comment is articulated in a patronizing way that makes fun of 
her own self-involvement, Briony is, in fact, often compared to a god 
or framed in religious ways. Briony’s room, for example, is described 
in a very suggestive manner: “Briony’s [room] was a shrine to her con-
trolling demon: the model farm spread across a deep window ledge 
consisted of the usual animals, but all facing one way—towards their 
owner” (ibid.).74 The quote points out that Briony not only likes to 
arrange and rule over worlds, but also that the created world is ordered 
in such a way that her power is bound to become visible—she is the 
person to whom all eyes are directed. In this passage, Cavalie argues, 
“it is clear to the observant reader that the young girl’s relationship 
to order is problematic, and the use of the word ‘demon’ can even be 
72 The passage also allows for Briony to be associated with Alice in Alice in Wonderland, 
the girl who falls through a rabbit hole and wakes up in a room where she has to drink 
several potions in order to become the right size to enter a magical world.
73 The characters in Atonement are often portrayed via their surroundings: “in the first 
section of the novel, the reader thus discovers a series of habited spaces (often bed-
rooms) conveying a sense of their owners’ personalities. Then a second topography of 
the building, mapping the intimate space, may be detected. Indeed, one can see in each 
of the characters’ bedrooms a relatively straightforward correspondence between their 
characterizations and the descriptions in the rooms” (Cavalié 123).
74 In the movie adaption of Atonement, the director Joe Wright has chosen a slightly ren-
dered version of this scene for the beginning of the movie. The camera focuses on a 
dollhouse from which a train of small animal figures, grouped in pairs, emerges. When 
the train of animal pairs stops, the camera continues following an imaginary line that 
leads up to the back of Briony who is sitting at her desk, finishing up the last page of 
her play. This beginning is quite fitting, since by evoking the reference to Noah’s ark, 
Briony’s godly desire to order and structure the world is stressed before the viewer even 
meets Briony. 
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interpreted as a proleptic hint of her future ‘crime’” (126). Briony’s 
will to order is problematic because it positions her at the center of 
this order, which characterizes her actions as narcissistic and prone to 
manipulation. 
Briony’s limitations make her vulnerable to a series of misunderstand-
ings; the first being the fountain scene, a central event in the novel. 
Briony witnesses an argument between her sister Cecilia and Robbie, 
the housekeeper’s son, which takes place at a fountain located on the 
Tallis’s estate. Briony observes the events from afar, from a window of 
the Tallis home. This heightened position leads to an ambivalent inter-
pretation. On one hand, she is only a child looking out of a window—
from a nursery, even—and excluded from the scene by distance. On the 
other hand, she occupies a sovereign space, as it allows her to look from 
above onto the scene and follow the sequence of events without being 
noticed. Wells notes that this is reminiscent of a strong authorial view:
[f ]rom the opening pages where Briony’s childhood dramaturgical ambi-
tions are inscribed, there is a pronounced sense of theatricality, such that 
all of the events seem staged and are watched through various framing 
devices—window frames, skylights, mirror and so on—and often from 
a height, as if from a director’s or camera operator’s point of view (102).
Briony’s location is, however, more than a director’s position. It is syn-
chronized to her own situation in life: “Unseen, from two storeys up, 
with the benefit of unambiguous sunlight, she had privileged access 
across the years to adult behaviour, to rites and conventions she knew 
nothing about, as yet” (McEwan 39). She is an unnoticed observer, still 
excluded from the scene by the geographic distance, her youth, and 
limited knowledge.75 This is made obvious in the following passage in 
which she mistakes the scene preceding the argument for a proposal:
75 How Briony, as a “watcher from windows” (Marcus 88), relates to the modernist tra-
dition of storytelling is described by Marcus in detail (cf. Marcus 2009).
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standing by the basin’s retaining wall was her sister, and right before her 
was Robbie Turner. There was something rather formal about the way he 
stood [...] A proposal of marriage. Briony would not have been surprised. 
She herself had written a tale in which a humble woodcutter saved a prin-
cess from drowning and ended by marrying her. [...] It made perfect sense. 
Such leaps across boundaries were the stuff of daily romance (ibid., 38).
Robbie’s rather formal posture, which is caused by his nervousness and 
insecurity, insinuates a marriage proposal for Briony. O’Hara notes: 
“As with Don Quixote and his infamous windmills, Briony’s vision 
of the scene is rendered comprehensible, it’s simply a story she knows 
well, a tableau” (78). Although, the events that will follow do not seem 
to fit into this pattern: Cecilia undresses and plunges into the fountain. 
Briony, shocked, worries whether Cecilia might have been pressured 
by Robbie to do this. She can’t explain to herself the motives for Cecil-
ia’s actions: “The sequence was quite illogical—the drowning scene, 
followed by a rescue, should have preceded the marriage proposal” 
(McEwan 39). In reality, Briony is witnessing a conversation between 
Robbie and Cecilia that turns into a defiant argument when Robbie 
accidently breaks the vase Cecilia was carrying to the fountain to get 
water. As a result, a piece of the vase falls into the fountain. Since Rob-
bie doesn’t take Cecilia’s anger seriously, she undresses provocatively 
and gets into the fountain herself to retrieve the piece of vase, leaving 
Robbie puzzled. For Briony, the whole scene remains a complete mys-
tery, yet she recognizes it as an inspiration for her work, making her 
“impatient to begin writing again” (ibid., 40), thus creating order out 
of what she has witnessed.
3.2.1.3 The Letter
Later in the day, frustrated by the slow progress of the performance 
of her play, Briony escapes to her island temple, where she beats down 
nettles, as mentioned earlier. Discontented by the realization that her 
interest in fiction stems from her dissatisfaction with her ordinary life, 
she wishes for something to happen. With this in mind, Briony walks 
over a bridge that serves as the connection between her home and the 
outside world. At the center of the bridge she makes a resolution:
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she decided she would stay there and wait until something significant 
happened to her. This was the challenge she was putting to existence—
she would not stir, not for dinner, not even for her mother calling her in. 
She would simply wait on the bridge, calm and obstinate, until events, 
real events, not her own fantasies, rose to her challenge, and dispelled her 
insignificance (ibid., 77).
At that moment, Robbie arrives at the bridge and gives her a letter, ask-
ing her to pass it on to her sister Cecilia. With the letter Robbie wants 
to apologize for the argument at the fountain. Narrated from Robbie’s 
perspective, the letter scene is enriched with a peculiar atmosphere: 
Ahead of him, about a hundred yards away, was the bridge, and on it, he 
thought […] was a white shape […] It was motionless and he assumed he 
was being watched. He tried for a second or two to entertain himself with 
the idea of a ghost, but he had no belief in the supernatural […] It was a 
child, he saw now, and therefore it must be Briony […] “It’s me, Robbie,” 
[Robbie shouts] but still she did not move (ibid., 93).
At first, Robbie does not recognize Briony, but only sees a white shape, 
a ghost who is watching. From the perspective of Robbie, a rational stu-
dent who aspires to become a doctor, the idea of seeing a ghost is ridic-
ulous, something which makes this passage significant. When Robbie 
meets Briony, the disturbing quality about her is evident, since she 
behaves in an odd way. She does not talk to Robbie when he asks her 
to deliver his letter. Instead she only nods and runs away. The haunted 
feeling Robbie experiences is of an ominous portent. In fact, Robbie 
notices only seconds too late that he has given Briony the wrong ver-
sion of his letter. He has given her a sexually explicit letter describ-
ing Cecilia’s female anatomy. For Briony, who secretly opens the let-
ter, its contents are disturbing. She believes the letter must be from a 
deranged person.76 Briony thinks this revelation about Robbie’s ‘true’ 
nature serves a specific purpose: “Real life, her life now beginning, had 
sent her a villain in the form of an old family friend” (ibid., 158). The 
76 Kerler argues that the letter is a physical attack in the eyes of Briony (cf. 169).
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‘real events’ she was hoping for have finally arrived. The letter is noth-
ing but a mistake, one that was not supposed to be read by Briony—
or anyone else, for that matter. However, as Albers and Caeners point 
out, the misled and misleading letter will have an immense effect on 
Briony: “The letter-incident affects Briony’s interpretive, aesthetic, and 
ethical judgments” (717). She believes somehow to have gained access 
to the adult world and to be summoned to become an author: “There 
was nothing she could not describe” (McEwan 156). Her calling pro-
vides her with an extreme accumulation of power, which is conveyed 
topologically: “Wasn’t writing a kind of soaring, an achievable form of 
flight, of fancy, of the imagination?” (ibid., 157). In a figurative way, 
she is no longer bound to earth, to reality, but suddenly able to fly as an 
author, using the material of the real world to form her art, reshaping 
the world as a newly introduced subject.
3.2.1.4 The False Testimony
Briony becomes captivated by her own imaginative act, completely 
unaware of her misjudgment. The interpretation of the letter will 
inform Briony’s attitude toward Robbie and will add to her impaired 
view of events. Briony is convinced that Robbie is a ‘maniac’ and a 
‘monster’ (ibid., 119), or, as Jacobi sums up: “Briony thinks she learns 
that Robbie is a wicked person, and she knows—even if she has not 
read Aristotle—that wicked characters will continue to do wicked 
things” (60). She finds further ‘evidence,’ again by accident. She inter-
rupts Robbie and Cecilia in the library making love, interpreting it 
falsely as an attack on Cecilia.77 Briony has no time to recover from 
what she has witnessed in the library. Her cousins are suddenly miss-
ing, having left behind only a note that informs the family that they 
have decided to run away. The whole family is in an uproar and decides 
77 Cavalié sums up the significance of this passage as follows: “The striking image of 
Robbie and Cecilia as projected figures on the spines of books is both proleptic and 
metafictional: it announces the discovery, at the end of the novel, of Briony’s author-
ship, for the young couple is nothing but the projection of Briony’s psyche through-
out the novel. Thus, the reader is tricked into the ‘optical illusion’ as well: like Briony 
he thinks that he is observing two people in the library, when, in fact, he is only seeing 
avatars of Briony’s literary conscience—creatures engendered by the chiaroscuro of 
memory” (129).
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to scour the premises in the darkness of the approaching night. Bri-
ony also participates in the search, but decides to look for her cous-
ins by herself. Similar to a few hours before, she finds herself cross-
ing the bridge near the temple again. This time, she makes a curious 
observation:
the bush that lay directly in her path—the one she thought should be 
closer to the shore—began to break up in front of her, or double itself, or 
waver, and then fork. It was changing its shape in a complicated way [...] 
She would have stopped immediately had she not still been so completely 
bound to the notion that this was a bush and that she was witnessing some 
trick of darkness and perspective. Another second or two, another couple 
of steps, and she saw that this was not so. Then she stopped. The verti-
cal mass was a figure, a person who was now backing away from her and 
beginning to fade into the darker background of the trees. The remaining 
darker patch on the ground was also a person, changing shape again as it 
sat up and called her name (McEwan 164).
The passage describes an anamorphosis. A bush, whose position seems 
to be wrong from the start, transforms in an uncanny way, revealing 
that it cannot be a bush, but must be something else. For Briony, the 
bush remains at first a “shape” that changes in “complicated” ways, 
implying that what she sees is too much for her to grasp. She feels 
“bound to the notion that this was a bush,” meaning that she is so 
convinced by her preconception that she cannot bring herself to con-
sider that she is wrong. She eventually recognizes that what she sees 
is not a bush at all, and identifies part of the shape as a person who is 
moving away from her. The rest of the shape that stays behind when 
the other breaks away is revealed to be her cousin Lola, who is calling 
her name. Contrary to the incident at the fountain, where the reader 
was well aware of Briony’s misinterpretation, here the reader only expe-
riences Briony’s limited understanding. 
When Briony approaches, she learns that her cousin Lola has been 
raped. Although Briony was not able to see the perpetrator, she forms 
her own suspicions that are already influenced by what she has wit-
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nessed that day: The argument between Cecilia and Robbie, Robbie’s 
letter, and the ‘attack’ she has witnessed in the library. With this in 
mind, Briony assumes that Robbie carried out the rape on Lola. The 
fact that Briony does not know who has attacked Lola is hinted at, and 
even stated explicitly, at various times: “It was not simply her eyes that 
told her the truth. It was too dark for that” (ibid., 169). Nevertheless, 
she claims to have seen Robbie running away. Lola seems surprised 
by Briony’s statement, repeating several times: “‘You saw him’” (ibid., 
167). Lola’s surprise is so obvious that it questions Briony’s perception, 
in particular when Lola adds one small word: “‘You actually saw him’” 
[emphasis added] (ibid.). The interpretation from her limited point of 
view captivates Briony so much that she clings to it even when there is 
no real evidence for it. Briony is willing to turn her misinterpretation 
into truth and herself into the author of a crime. Thus, her limited 
status as a child hypnotized by fiction and fantasies ceases to restrict 
her; instead, it reveals a dangerous potentiality. Briony deals with the 
complexities of the adult world by turning towards fiction and fanta-
sies. This turns her into a captivated subject—entranced by her own 
version of the truth.
3.2.1.5 Briony—The Bride to Be
Briony’s statement to the police becomes a testament of her transfor-
mation to an author figure. When asked what she had seen that night, 
it is revealed that “she would have preferred to qualify, or complicate, 
her use of the word ‘saw.’ Less like seeing, more like knowing” (ibid., 
170). But her will to please urges her to stick to her initial story with-
out discussing her understanding of ‘saw,’ which the narrator explains:
She became anxious to please, and learned quickly that the minor quali-
fications she might have added would disrupt the process that she herself 
had set train. She was like a bride-to-be who begins to feel her sickening 
qualms as the day approaches, and dares not speak her mind because so 
many preparations have been made on her behalf. The happiness and con-
venience of so many good people would be put at risk (ibid., 169).
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The passage above focalizes through Briony’s perspective and compares 
her to a “bride-to-be,” which is a metaphor that proves to be rather 
inadequate overall: she is not part of a happy occasion, but is witness 
to the investigation of a crime. This shows that Briony is self-centered 
and more occupied with her own role than with Lola’s fate. She feels 
delighted that she has stepped out of the “ill-defined transitional space” 
(ibid., 141), and is finally treated as an adult. However, this ill-fitting 
metaphor sums up her captivation perfectly. Ellam notes that this met-
aphor underlines her state of innocence (cf. 40). Her ‘innocence’ is 
nothing else than a lack of knowledge. It is because of this lack that 
she becomes part of a process she cannot stop anymore. The ‘wedding’ 
can only be halted if she intervenes. It is too late and the preparations 
are too far advanced, as this passage suggests. Briony has to follow 
through with her statement, since she now possesses an audience that 
ought not to be disappointed: “An imposing congregation had massed 
itself around her first certainties, and now it was waiting and she could 
not disappoint it at the altar” (McEwan 170). Here, captivation clearly 
has a forceful and constricting component against which a young child 
cannot defend herself. Ironically, only because of Briony’s false testa-
ment can the later marriage between Lola and her rapist—who it turns 
out is Paul Marshall, a friend of her brother—take place. Thus, Briony 
is not only metaphorically unable to stop a wedding, but also cannot 
stop a real wedding, in fact, as a result of her testimony she even ena-
bled this union. 
When Briony attends Lola’s wedding in order to stop it, she is com-
pared to a bride yet again: “[Briony] advanced in her cape and head-
dress, like a bride of Christ, towards the altar” (ibid., 324). 78 Again, the 
image seems inappropriate, for the simple reason that at this event there 
is already a true bride, namely Lola. This suggests a rivalry between 
Lola and Briony which is also an important factor in Briony’s false 
78 Cavalié has observed that when Briony arrives at the wedding location there are al-
lusions to the day in August on several levels: “The sense of anamorphosis is further 
heightened by the fact that Briony—expecting a ‘Gothic cathedral’ [McEwan 322] not 
unlike Tallis House—finds a church ‘like a Greek temple’ [ibid., 323]—ironically the 
place where Paul and Lola’s union truly began” (131). Not only does Briony experience 
an anamorphosis again, but the wedding location looks like the crime scene. 
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testament. By protecting Lola, Briony also distracts attention from the 
actual victim. Although she struggles with this responsibility, there is 
nevertheless a sense of entitlement that she (as the narrator) sugges-
tively hints at: “Her cousin’s removal left Briony centre stage” (ibid., 
173). In this respect, Briony’s ‘help’ could be understood as motivated 
by rivalry, a reading that is supported by Müller-Wood: “Lola […] soon 
appears as a powerful competitor potentially annihilating Briony, who 
ponders ominously that the ‘advance of Lola’s dominion’ was ‘merciless 
and made self-pity irrelevant’ [McEwan 15]” (155). Briony challenges 
Lola’s ‘dominion’ by changing the story: It is not the story of Lola’s 
being raped, but Briony’s story as the key witness to a crime.
Briony even turns into a prosecutor, when she decides to show Rob-
bie’s letter to her family as evidence of his supposed ‘evil’ nature. The 
emotions that accompany her decision convey that she is not aware of 
the repercussions of her actions:
An idea of great clarity and persuasiveness came from nowhere […] ener-
gized now by a sense of doing and being good […] It was […] like that 
Christmas morning sensation of being about to give a present that was 
bound to cause delight, a joyful feeling of blameless self-love (McEwan 
176–177).
Briony believes that this is the moment she was waiting for. She is 
motivated by her will to do good, her actions inspired by the highest 
morality. However, she inadvertently manipulates what was supposed 
to be an expression of love—Robbie’s love letter—and turns it into an 
unintentional confession of his sexual ‘perversion.’ The fact that she 
tries to be the focus of attention in such a situation makes her actions 
morally questionable. Even though the letter was meant for Cecilia and 
belongs to her, Briony takes possession of it in a physical and in a meta-
phorical sense, by imposing her interpretation upon it. Instead of mak-
ing a present on Christmas morning, as the passage above describes, 
Briony is committing theft, not only stealing the letter, but actually 
‘stealing’ lives, changing them irrevocably. It is her word that shapes 
reality now: “Her words summoned awful powers from the familiar 
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and picturesque local town” [emphasis added] (ibid., 169). Reality 
becomes ruled by her conceptions. Her captivation by her own miscon-
ception, thus, gives her access to almost god-like power; she arranges 
the world around her, similarly to the vigor directed at her room, that 
made the narrator refer to her as a “demon.”
3.2.1.6 Captivating the Audience
The true extent of Briony’s authorship and thus the consequences of 
her captivation, are, however, only revealed to the reader in the epi-
logue. Her power affects the implied reader, too; in fact, she has sub-
jected him/her to her powers, without the readers noticing it. In the 
third section of the novel Briony, at nineteen, has understood how she 
had misjudged and mistreated Robbie, who shortens his prison sen-
tence by joining the Army and serving in the First World War. Haunted 
by her misconduct as a child, she contacts her sister and asks for for-
giveness from both Cecilia and Robbie. Although Briony is not for-
given, the reader is assured that Robbie’s and Cecilia’s love did not 
suffer from Briony’s actions. Even though the crime committed by 
Briony has completely altered their lives and their relationship to the 
Tallis family, her victims have survived and have stayed committed to 
each other: “Their love. Neither Briony nor the war had destroyed it” 
(ibid., 349). The novel ends with a glimpse of hope, since Briony plans 
to exonerate Robbie: “She was calm as she considered what she had to 
do. […] She knew what was required of her. Not simply a letter, but a 
new draft, an atonement, and she was ready to begin” (ibid.).
Yet, in the epilogue, the reader learns that what was described here—
the apology to her sister and to Robbie—has never actually happened.79 
She also confesses that her statement against Robbie has destroyed 
both his and Cecilia’s lives to a greater extent than she had let readers 
believe. In fact, Cecilia and Robbie were never able to see each other 
again after Robbie was arrested, since Cecilia was not allowed to visit 
Robbie in prison and both died during the war; Robbie as a soldier in 
79 Finney has pointed out that the status of the coda is unclear, since it is not signed. It 
could be a diary, an extraneous commentary, or a confession (81). 
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France and Cecilia when London was bombed. By revealing this at the 
end, Briony proves how powerful she is as an author: In a matter of sec-
onds, she turns Robbie and Cecilia into dust, disclosing their deaths. 
This manipulation is also commented on by Tönnis, who writes “[t]he 
novelist is not only ‘God’-like in ‘her absolute power of deciding out-
comes’ as Briony puts it […], but also in her power to give (fictional) 
life to characters and situations” (71). Briony considers her manipula-
tion of the truth to be a good deed: “a final act of kindness [...] to let 
my lovers live and unite them at the end. I gave them happiness, but I 
was not so self-serving as to let them forgive me” (ibid., 372). However, 
this means in effect that she has never taken any real steps to atone for 
her sins, except for writing the novel.80 
And even more, the narrator of the novel was not—as assumed—a 
non-diegetic and uninvolved narrator, but it was Briony herself who 
narrated the story: “In the epilogue, readers discover that McEwan 
has delegated the ‘authorship’ of his book to Briony, who has become 
a famous novelist” (Ingersoll 250). This is surprising, as Briony was 
the one who was judged and mocked the most by the novel’s narrator, 
her own invention. She successfully veiled her identity as an author 
through her narrator. Albers and Caeners notes that this has a shocking 
effect on the reader: “Only by ‘sealing off ’ the main plot […] can the 
destructive potential of the last chapter come to its full effect” (719). 
As the witness to a crime, Briony gave her statement to the police and, 
thus, becomes the authorial narrator of the crime, determining the 
fates of her ‘characters.’ As an adult, she repeats her initial crime: Again 
becoming the guiding figure deciding about life and death, creating 
this time a deception for the implied reader. Her weakness, being una-
ble to read reality, is the force that eventually transforms her (into an 
author), but it not only transforms her—it captivates her audience, too. 
80 Puschmann-Nalenz writes that this has also been hinted at in the novel: “An ‘unreal 
feeling’ accompanies her steps toward Balham to visit her sister. This direction is marked 
in the text as ‘the road not taken;’ it remains fantasy inside fiction, with one part of 
her self, which the implied author calls ‘the imagined or ghostly persona’ […], walking 
into the direction of Balham, the other self going back to the hospital. […] Her ‘unreal 
feeling’ […] becomes the reader’s uneasy feeling about the ‘reality’ and veracity of this 
part of the story” (195).
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In fact, this is what she demands of her audience: “looking up from the 
page for seconds at a time as she read in order to gaze into one face 
after the other, unapologetically demanding […] total attention as she 
cast her narrative spell” (McEwan 6–7). The novel becomes the man-
ifestation of her authorship and what she understands authorship to 
be—it features her at the center of the textual universe, holding the 
strings in her hand, not revealing how she operates them until the end, 
having the attention of the audience all to herself. Thus, her personal-
ity does not undergo any development or growth in this respect. This 
is insinuated on other levels, one example being that Atonement ends 
exactly where it started, with the staging of ‘The Trials of Arabella,’ 
which answers Wells question “Why does she end her account as she 
began it, in such a self-centered fashion with her triumphant career as 
a writer at center-stage?” (110). Wells goes on to note that “McEwan 
leaves his readers many clues that Briony’s remorse may be only skin 
deep” (ibid.).81
How Briony’s relationship to the reader and to her victims is affected 
by her captivation will be analyzed in detail in two different chapters, 
“The Captivated Reader” and “The Witness.”
3.2.2 The History of Love—The Invisible Author82
3.2.2.1 Introduction
The core of Nicole Krauss’s novel The History of Love (hereafter THoL) 
deals with the Holocaust and the effects it has on its survivors. The 
novel portrays representatives of the young American-Jewish genera-
tion and shows how they come into contact with the ‘old’ generation 
81 McEwan, paradoxically, sees this quite differently. He has stated in an interview that he 
recognizes true redemption in Briony and in the way her life is centered on her crime: 
“what redeems Briony in Atonement is precisely the fact that she has led an examined 
life. Her great misdeed pursues her through the years. She will not let herself forget—
and this is her atonement” ( Jon Cook 129).
82 Part of this chapter has been used for an article. Nadine Feßler. “The impossible gift in 
Nicole Krauss’s The History of Love.” Alles Mögliche. Sprechen, Denken und Schreiben des 
(Un)Möglichen. Eds. Reinhard Babel, Nadine Feßler, Sandra Fluhrer et al. München: 
Königshausen and Neuman, 2014.
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who emigrated from Europe. The different worldviews are reflected on 
a structural level, since the novel is narrated from multiple perspectives. 
One thing that turns out to be relevant to all narrative strands and that 
connects them is a manuscript called ‘The History Love.’ In fact, not 
only this particular novel, but fiction in general, is a phenomenon that 
links all of the characters to each other. Accordingly, Krauss’s book is 
about the power of fiction, the virtue of imagination and the psycho-
logical needs that are connected to them: the ability to hope and to 
imagine a better world. Krauss’s novel is thus in accordance with what 
Huber has observed in relation to contemporary fiction and its treat-
ment of fantasy and metafiction. She writes: 
All the reconstructive texts I have discussed depict this immersion as both 
a threat and a potential but in either case as the greatest power of the fic-
tive. Instead of alienation, disenchantment […] we find a consideration 
of the merits and the dangers of a willing suspension of disbelief: that 
simultaneous loss of and return to the self which Iser identifies as the 
anthropological function of the fictive. (221) 
Similar to Huber’s examples, fiction in THoL is also considered from 
two perspectives. It is viewed as a delusion on the one hand, and as a 
reconstructive structure on the other hand. Throughout the novel, the 
main characters try to get a grip on reality and manage their overactive 
imaginations. In the end, the advantages of fiction and fantasy prevail 
and fiction is to be shown as the necessary element for constructing 
identity.
The novel is part of a specific genre, so-called ‘Holocaust-fiction.’ The 
book approaches the topic of the Holocaust mainly through the main 
character’s feeling of disconnection and taps into what Jessica Lang has 
termed the ‘third generation’ of Holocaust-authors, which she defines 
as follows:
these writers mark a second transition, or another remove from the eye-
witness: the first transition from eyewitness to a recounting by the witness 
now becomes, as the Holocaust enters history, an indirect relation to the 
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original eyewitness. […] Their fiction regularly refers to and incorporates 
events from the Holocaust, but it also balances and counters these refer-
ences with other narrative strategies or counterpoints. While for first- and 
second-generation Holocaust writers the historical experience “conveys” 
a sense of immediacy and impact, the third-generation writer views these 
events as an indirect part of the narrative, one balanced by other, also 
important, histories (46).
This analysis also applies to THoL. The novel deals with the Holo-
caust in an indirect manner; focusing on its survivors, but giving only 
a selective insight into the actual experiences of WW II. Life today, 
sixty to seventy years later, is more central to the novel, as is the ques-
tion of how to live after the trauma and in what way. The focus on a 
life after the Holocaust is also evident in the choice of the other char-
acters who are young children and thus intellectually more removed 
from the experiences the generations of their grandparents had. They 
are connected to each other, however, on the issues of trauma: all the 
figures have lost someone and are struggling to deal with their grief.
The indirect approach in regard to the Holocaust is also a general 
poetic principle in the novel. Indirectness determines the way the 
characters communicate with each other; it shows how they miss their 
chances to meet each other, and under what protracted circumstances 
they eventually meet up. Krauss’s world is filled with lucky and unlucky 
accidents, all seemingly non-predictable and without cause.
3.2.2.2 The Invisibility of Leopold Gursky
The main character, Leopold Gursky, lives a lonely life in New York, 
with but one friend and no family except his cousin. His life is deter-
mined by a captive state that he calls ‘invisibility,’ which reflects his 
emotional condition. He feels effaced and not a part of the world. 
One can assume that this feeling of invisibility is a consequence of the 
experiences he had during WW II, when the Germans invaded Poland 
and his family was killed. In order to survive, it was necessary to make 
himself ‘disappear:’
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In the years that followed, the boy became a man who became invisible. In 
this way, he escaped death. […] He’d spent three and a half years hiding, 
mostly in trees, but also cracks, cellars, holes (ibid., 12).
The loss of his family, his flight and the fact that he had to remain hid-
den, constitute his entrance into adulthood. But instead of becoming 
an adult, he becomes an invisible man. When Gursky leaves Europe 
and emigrates to New York, he appears incapable of shaking off his 
invisibility, which he understands increasingly in a literal way. Gursky 
assumes that he has lost some part of himself, a part of his being: “I’d 
lost whatever the thing is that makes people indelible” (ibid., 81). The 
fact that Krauss has dedicated the novel to her grandparents with the 
note “For my grandparents who taught me the opposite of disappear-
ing” indicates that the issues of visibility are connected to a particular 
generation—survivors of the Holocaust—rather than to individuals.83 
Invisibility is linked to incomprehensible and irreversible loss and is 
in this context highly significant, since it is connected to the Jewish 
fate during WW II. 
The dedication also indicates that being visible must be preceded by 
an act, something that makes one visible. For Gursky this becomes the 
act of authorship. When Gursky’s cousin tries to take a photo of him, 
he fails: “Three times he tried to take a picture of me with the pinhole 
camera, and three times I failed to appear. [...] I’d lost whatever the 
thing is that makes people indelible” (ibid., 81). However, Gursky finds 
a way to affirm his identity. He begins taking pictures of his cousin, 
arguing that the sheer existence of such an image is proof of his own 
existence, since he is the creator of the photography. This turn towards 
authorship as a means of becoming visible and affirming one’s identity 
is significant and will become important later on in the book. Author-
ship is presented as a self-affirming gesture, a way of ensuring one’s own 
existence. However, in Krauss’s novel the way this gesture is carried out 
takes place in an indirect and mediated manner.
83 Krauss’s grandparents were persecuted by the Nazi regime due to their Jewish heritage 
and had to emigrate to America.
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3.2.2.3 Fantasies, Imagination and Authorship
Gursky becomes visible, but without his own active participation. He 
becomes an author, not by his own doing, but by giving in and almost 
giving up. He lets himself become sucked in by his own imaginary 
world, wishes and dreams, thus, he lets himself be captivated and held 
captive by his imagination. His imagination eventually guides him to 
the right place, where he can finally claim his authorship.
What Gursky is unaware of at this point is that he is a published author, 
even though he and the world are ignorant to this fact. An old friend 
of his has published a manuscript by him, being under the impression 
that Gursky had died during the war. One day, Gursky’s manuscript 
finds its way back to him. The names of the characters in the manu-
script have been changed from the original to Spanish ones. However, 
one name, Alma Mereminski, the name of his first love, has not been 
altered. Gursky’s reaction to the package indicates his astonishment:
The pages I’d written so long ago slipped from my hands and scattered on 
the floor. I thought: Who? And how? I thought: After all these – What? 
Years. I fell back into my memories. The night passed in a fog. I knelt 
down in the flour. I gathered the pages up one by one. Page ten gave me 
a paper cut. Page twenty-two a pang in the kidneys. Page four a blockage 
in the heart (ibid., 119).
His manuscript is an extension of himself. Each page causes him a dif-
ferent bodily reaction. At the same time, the manuscript possesses an 
otherworldly air which is indicated by his kneeling in front of it. He 
completely retreats into his thoughts and memories while time passes: 
“Night became day became night became day. I fell in and out of sleep” 
(ibid, 122). The package’s arrival seems rather mysterious, since there 
is no apparent sender: “There was no note. […] No return address” 
(ibid., 120). At this point in the novel the reader does not know how 
it has found its way into Gursky’s mailbox, making the reader equally 
confused and unknowing about the sender of the gift. However, before 
this mystery can be resolved another appears. Gursky receives a letter 
which reads: “Dear Leopold Gursky, it said. Please meet me at 4:00 on 
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Saturday on the benches in front of the entrance to the Central Park zoo. 
I think you know who I am” (ibid., 212). He discovers that the letter is 
signed ‘Alma,’ his former lover’s name—Alma Mereminski, who is long 
dead. He fears that he is losing his mind: “And then and there I knew 
my time had come. My hands shook so hard that the paper rattled. I 
felt my legs giving way. My head got light. So this is how they send the 
angel. With the name of the girl you always loved” (ibid., 212). Gursky 
begins questioning his own ability to distinguish reality from fiction. 
He had always been prone to fantasies and even preferred them to his 
own life. In them he can find support and solace, imagining most of 
the times to be simply recognized. Fiction means for Gursky to be able 
to believe in something (and in himself ) against all odds: “I remember 
the first time I realized I could make myself see something that wasn’t 
there. […] A huge elephant, standing alone in the square. I knew I was 
imagining it. And yet. I wanted to believe. So I tried. And I found I 
could” (ibid., 228). Now, however, Gursky thinks he might have gone 
too far, that he might have lost himself completely in his imaginary 
world. The letter must be a product of his imagination, since his former 
love, Alma, is dead: “And now, at the end of my life, I can barely tell the 
difference between what is real and what I believe. For example, this 
letter in my hand—I can feel it between my fingers. […] In my heart, 
I know my hand is empty” (ibid., 230). His creativity has turned into 
a mental health issue, turning his vivid imagination from a gift into a 
curse, into the symptoms of madness.
Although he questions the existence of the letter, he follows its invita-
tion nevertheless. He allows himself to become completely captivated 
by immersing himself in his own imaginary products. What Gursky 
does not know at this point is that ‘Alma’ is real. She is, however, not 
his dead girlfriend, but a completely different Alma—namely, Alma 
Singer, whose parents have named her after the central character of 
Gursky’s book. The meeting between Gursky and her is set up by her 
little brother, Bird, which will be explained in detail in the chapter 
“Captives of the Sacred.” At this moment, it suffices to say that Alma 
does not have the slightest idea who Gursky is.
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When Alma and Gursky finally meet, all the misunderstandings are 
eventually cleared up and Gursky is informed that he is a published 
author and that his book enjoys a loyal readership all over the world. 
The way this is revealed has anamorphotic characteristics, which is 
why I wish to give their meeting a closer reading and to describe the 
layout of these subchapters. The chapter titled “A + L” (ibid., 219) 
has a structure different from those of the previous ones. It consists of 
one-page subchapters that are dedicated to either Alma’s or Gursky’s 
thoughts right before their meeting. This antagonistic structure on a 
textual level later develops into a dialogue between Alma and Gursky, 
at times even producing only a single sentence per page. The pages, 
therefore, become a visualization of the dialogue between Gursky and 
Alma, and foreshadow the moment at which their separated voices 
(and lives) will eventually meet. Lang notes:
Toward the novel’s conclusion […] very few lines cover each page. Instead, 
the rhythm of reading achieves a sense of urgency through movement: 
both the eye and the hand are flexed as the novel rapidly comes to a close. 
There is an inescapable sense of buildup to the climax, when Alma and Leo 
finally recognize each other, one that readers participate in actively (53).
At first, Gursky and Alma’s conversation consists of single sentences 
only, each on a separate page. Gursky and Alma both mistake each 
other for someone else. Gursky believes he is encountering an angel 
(cf. Krauss 242), his dead girlfriend Alma Mereminski, while Alma 
believes that Gursky is just an ordinary man. She does not know that 
he is the author of ‘THoL,’ to which she has a special bond. Though 
they do not identify each other correctly and do not know what the 
other is talking about, each step they take nevertheless brings them 
closer. When Gursky recognizes that some of his answers confuse and 
even frighten Alma, he suddenly begins to understand:
What if the things I believed were possible were really impossible, and the 
things I believed were impossible were really not? For example. What if 
the girl sitting next to me on this bench was real? What if she was named 
Alma, after my Alma? What if my book hadn’t been lost in a flood at all? 
(ibid., 248).
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In an instant, imagination turns into reality, and things that were lost 
reappear. He recognizes that Alma is not his Alma, but a girl who bears 
his former love’s name. Thus, he is not mad and not a victim of his 
imagination, but completely sane. He also realizes that his manuscript 
has not only survived, but has even been published and read. This 
information he would never have received had he not submitted to 
his presumed madness and followed a supposedly imaginary invitation. 
From this point onward, the chapter is not divided into two voices, 
each of which inhabits a separate page. They merge again, returning to 
the traditional typographical layout. A conclusion has been reached.
In Alma, Gursky sees his love for Alma Mereminski manifested, since 
she was named after her: “I wanted to say her name aloud, it would 
have given me joy to call, because I knew that in some small way it was 
my love that named her” (ibid., 252). With this, Alma Singer becomes 
proof of his existence and his visibility. This indirect manner of giv-
ing proof to one’s existence has been foreshadowed in the novel when 
Gursky took a photograph of his cousin, and though he was not in the 
picture itself, he was the active force behind the image, which provided 
him with the validation he was looking for: “Whenever I took it [the 
photograph] out of my wallet and looked at him, I knew I was really 
looking at me” (ibid., 82). Without him, there would not have been an 
image. And without his manuscript, Alma would not have been named 
as such. Thus, Alma becomes evidence of Gursky’s authorship. Even 
more, his love (for Alma Mereminski) has transcended his authorship 
beyond its textual borders. On the brink of madness, Alma empow-
ers Gursky with the recognition he thought he would never receive. 
His manuscript has become more than the words he had written as a 
young man. Alma, his literary heir and his singular audience, becomes 
the excessive component the manuscript brings along when it returns. 
Instead of dying as an invisible man, Gursky can die with the assurance 
that he has indeed left a mark on earth. His complete submission to his 
imagination, has opened up a new world to him, and has turned him 
from being an invisible man into one who is seen for the first time, in 
fact, around whom the whole novel centers.
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3.2.2.4 Authorship, Fatherhood and the Holocaust
Authorship is also connected to fatherhood in this novel. Another 
thread in the narrative is the story of Gursky’s son, Isaac, who is at first 
unaware that Gursky is his real father, since his mother has forbid-
den Gursky any contact with him. However, through the manuscript 
Isaac finds out about his father shortly before he dies. Again it is Alma 
who can provide Gursky with this information, since she knows about 
Isaac’s story. Gursky is ecstatic about the news. The tender hope he had 
voiced before in the novel, “And now it dawned on me that it was pos-
sible there had been a brief window of time in which Isaac and I both 
lived, each aware of the other’s existence” (ibid., 211–212), has now 
become reality. Thus, at the end of the novel Gursky is recognized in 
two instances: as a father and as an author. In both cases it is a manu-
script that has enabled this discovery, making this the central element 
of the novel. Nicole Schröder underscores this positive view of fiction 
that the novel presents:
their meeting [between Alma Singer and Gursky] does not only connect 
the stories and histories of different people, their life, love, and losses, it 
is also a very tangible symbol of the impact that literature and stories can 
have on us—the manuscript has changed both characters’ lives in a very 
literal sense and has led to their meeting (168).
The fact that authorship and fatherhood are so closely intertwined 
is, of course, also a metafictional comment. The author is considered 
to be like a father whose ‘child’ is the text. Thus, it is meaningful that 
not only the ‘child,’ the manuscript, returns to Gursky like a loyal son 
who returns home, but that Gursky’s manuscript also guides his actual 
son to him and accomplishes what he himself was unable to do—to 
become visible to his son.
Authorship, in THoL, has also an ethical and cultural meaning, since 
the issues of authorship are linked to the Holocaust. At the end of the 
novel Gursky reveals to Alma that his best friend, Bruno, to whom 
he constantly talks in his narrative, was a product of his imagination. 
Bruno could be simply read as Gursky’s alter ego, as there are some 
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parallels in their lives that support this reading.84 However, Philippe 
Codde has pointed out that Bruno could also allude to a specific his-
torical figure, the Jewish artist and writer Bruno Schulz who died in 
WW II. In this context, the fact that Gursky’s manuscript is recov-
ered attains symbolic importance.85 The novel seems to suggest that 
although Jewish lineages have been violently destroyed, elements of 
Jewish culture have nevertheless been sustained, a position Codde also 
assumes, noting that “Krauss uses fiction to reverse history and pre-
serve Schulz’s voice against all odds” (684). As Gursky’s voice is pre-
served and validated by the return of his manuscript, Bruno Schulze’s 
image, as a representative of a lost generation of Jewish writers, shim-
mers through the narrative as well. Thus, Krauss underlines the point 
that there are still links between the old and the new generations that 
bridge also the cultural divide created by the Holocaust.86
It became clear that authorship in THoL is linked to cultural and eth-
ical issues such as questions of identity and subjectivity. In fact, in the 
way authorship is portrayed, it is excessive in its meaning. In light of 
how authorship is approached, the postmodern notion of the ‘death 
of the author’ appears ill-suited. Authorship has nothing to do with 
authority or ill-used power in this case. It does not imply any form of 
hierarchy. Instead, authorship is defined mainly as an instrument of 
communication: between the writer and his readers and between dif-
ferent generations, thus creating bonds against all odds.
3.2.2.5 Stumbling on Authorship
In both novels, Atonement and The History of Love, the characters expe-
rience a shift that transforms them into new subjects: they become 
authors. This transformation goes along with a shift of their position. 
84 They are both writers, appear to be childhood friends, both in love with Alma Mere-
minski, and the artistic works of both have been taken advantage of.
85 An inspiration for the novel, Codde suggests, might have been the discovery of Bru-
no Schulz’s wall paintings in 2001, which was documented by the German filmmaker 
Benjamin Geissler in Bilder finden, which shows the paintings Schulz was forced to 
make for the son of SS member Felix Landau.
86 For the relevance of the connectivity of generations in Jewish history, see also Jessica 
Lang (48), where she relates The History of Love to Ecclesiastes.
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Briony is not a naïve child anymore, one who is sitting on the sidelines, 
but is positioned at the center of the stage, and Gursky is not an invis-
ible man anymore, who has been robbed of everyone and everything; 
instead, he becomes overtly visible, not only as an author, but also as a 
father. In addition, he is read by every character in the novel, since his 
manuscript has travelled the world without him. In both cases, author-
ship is not connected to a divine overarching hierarchy in a traditional 
sense. Rather, each of the characters is revealed to be weak and human 
at their core. Their weakness stems from restrictive or even traumatic 
circumstances that limit their actions and abilities. It is this captivation 
that paves their way to authorship. Their weaknesses eventually turn 
to their advantage. Briony’s impaired view—that of a child—becomes 
the truth to an audience, and Gursky’s retreat into his imagination 
leads to meeting Alma.
Authorship is not a power acquired and mastered; rather, it takes con-
trol of its subjects, forcing them to become authors with no choice of 
refusing their fate. In The History of Love, Gursky’s awareness of his 
authorship overwhelms him in a positive way. It becomes so much to 
him that he dies in the end as if overburdened with joy. In Atonement, 
Briony’s authorship is a gift she cannot dispose of. To be an author 
becomes an obsession. She remains forever bound to tell a story in the 
way she wants it to be told, making her authorship a symptom of a 
compulsive disorder. The excess that accompanies these author figures 
suggests that this concept experiences rejuvenation and a stabilization. 
In fact, in both novels authorship is more than a simple function or 
abstract concept. In The History of Love authorship is of cultural and 
even ethical importance and also in Atonement fiction and its ethical 
dimensions play a central role. Briony distorts reality and creates a nar-
cissistic kingdom where all eyes are on her, in complete horror about 
her powers. The reader shares that horror, when her revelation at the 
end of the novel supersedes the borders between reality and fiction, 
captivating and also engaging the reader. The way authorship operates 
here has definite consequences for the reader, in fact, it changes the 
reader’s ethical stance. In the following chapter I will elaborate on this 
in a discussion of Atonement and David Mitchell’s Ghostwritten.
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3.3 The Captivated Reader
What matter who’s speaking, someone said what 
matter who’s speaking?  
 Samuel Beckett, Texts for Nothing87 
In this chapter, I will attempt to show how in two novels—David 
Mitchell’s Ghostwritten and Ian McEwan’s Atonement—the reader is 
used as an instrument to reveal events on the level of perception. This 
happens in both cases by captivating the reader, meaning that readers 
are maneuvered into a position in which their way of perceiving the 
novel is limited on purpose. However, it is precisely this limitation 
that enables the reader to experience the event that leads to a reevalua-
tion of his/her reading process. Readers are forced to look back and to 
become, in a sense, an Orpheus-like figure: They cannot suppress the 
impulse to look back, trying to see what one has missed while reading 
the book the first time, thus making them realize that they have been 
previously hypnotized, captivated by the reading process.
3.3.1 Ghostwritten—Possessed by the Author
Wer läutet die Glocken? Die Glöckner nicht. Die sind auf die 
Straße gelaufen wie alles Volk, da es so ungeheuerlich läutet. Über-
zeugt euch: die Glockenstuben sind leer.[…] Wird man sagen, 
daß niemand läutet? […] Wer also läutet die Glocken Roms? – 
Der Geist der Erzählung. […] Er ist luftig , körperlos, allgegen-
wärtig , nicht unterworfen dem Unterschied von hier und dort. 
 Thomas Mann, Der Erwählte88
87 Beckett, Samuel. “Texts for Nothing.” Samuel Beckett: The Complete Short Prose, 1929–
1989. Ed. S.E. Gontarski, New York: Grove Press, 1995, 109.
88 Thomas Mann. Der Erwählte. 1951. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1956, 8.
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3.3.1.1 Introduction
David Mitchell’s Ghostwritten begins with the description of a myste-
rious emotion that is felt multiple times in the novel by different char-
acters: “Who was blowing on the nape of my neck?” (Ghostwritten 3). 
The question is never answered or even reflected upon further. It is a 
fleeting impression that is quickly forgotten. For the reader, however, it 
serves as a textual marker. The depicted impressions speak of an effect 
that cannot be traced back to a source. It hints at the fact that there 
are things occurring in the novel that happen above or beneath the 
level of perception.
At first, it appears as if the novel provides the reader with a variety of 
voices and subjective views, stories and fates collected from all over the 
world. In nine chapters and a coda, we follow the lives of very different 
characters—amongst others a terrorist, a saxophone player, a ghost-
writer and a physicist—who are in most cases only loosely connected 
to each other and whose stories take place around the world, covering 
Europe, North America and Asia.89 As readers, we are directed on an 
epistemological quest to find out how the stories relate to each other. 
The reader notices early on that the characters are influencing each 
other’s lives more than they themselves know.90 The stories’ intercon-
nections give the impression of a world that is not as vast as one might 
imagine. It appears to suggest that we are all connected, even though 
only through minor instances and events which seem to be motivated 
by chance. The novel, as Boulter contends, insists on the connected-
ness of the world:
89 Schoene writes on the function and status of the last chapter: “The conceptual com-
positeness of Ghostwritten is signaled by its subtitle, which introduces it as ‘a novel in 
nine parts.’ What this suggests immediately is that we are supposed to read the novel’s 
concluding tenth section as a coda revisiting and complementing the novel as a whole 
rather than functioning as an independent part in its own right” (53).
90 For a study on the myriad connections between the stories, see Sarah Dillon “Chaotic 
Narrative: Complexity, Causality, Time, and Autopoiesis in David Mitchell’s Ghost-
written.” Critique 52 (2011): 135–162.
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It becomes quite clear […] that the novel wishes to plot a sense of con-
nection, suggesting ultimately that no action takes place in historical or 
geographic isolation: ultimately, the novel seems to imagine the human 
species within a kind of connected ecology (103).
This rather well-known and worn-out message does not, however, turn 
out to be the central ‘message’ of the novel. Instead, the variety and 
multiplicity of voices and fates are exposed as a fraud, at least par-
tially. Behind many of these individual impressions, there is just one 
voice—a fact that has been hidden from the reader. The effect of a 
multi-perspective novel—in the sense that a variety of subjective views 
stand equally next to each other (comparable to William Faulkner’s 
The Sound and the Fury (1929)) is an illusion, since several characters 
have been infiltrated and dominated by a supernatural character who 
is guiding their actions and thoughts. A disembodied spirit inhabits 
several characters, steering their actions. It becomes obvious why the 
novel abandons each character after only one chapter and moves on to 
the next: There is no story-related reason for this; it was only the spirit, 
or ‘noncorpum’ as it is referred to, changing its host. 
In my analysis, I intend to focus on one particular plot line—the spirit 
hiding behind other voices, and slowly becoming apparent—which is 
developed during the first five chapters of Ghostwritten.91 In these sec-
tions, a presence confronts the reader, emerging out of narratives the 
reader is already familiar with, but suddenly appearing as completely 
different and giving the familiar the appearance of the unknown. What 
the reader witnesses does not originate from an external transcend-
ent, but has always existed within the fictional world, lurking in the 
91 I would argue that the other remaining chapters follow a different logic. I regard them 
as specters and remnants of what happened in the first five chapters. The remaining 
chapters deal with a myriad of intertextual and intratextual references, and even intro-
duce a doppelganger figure to the spirit—a satellite—which is controlling earth. The 
satellite could be examined in terms of ethics, since he has to make a decision on the 
fate of the whole world. However, I believe I have stronger examples in my selection 
that illuminate the issue on ethics in a clearer way. For this reason, I decided to neglect 
the second part of Ghostwritten and to concentrate on authorship and subjectivity, 
since these issues are also examined in more depth in the novel.
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 mysteries and gaps of the novel. The reader becomes the witness of a 
subject’s transformation from invisibility into visibility, and observes 
how fleeting impressions turn into a material being. As a result, readers 
are also required to identify their own perspective as being erroneous, 
as one deceived by the story’s surface—in short, as captivation.
3.3.1.2 The Narrator in Hiding
The first five chapters of Ghostwritten are each told by a different 
first-person narrator. In each of these chapters, fragmented and mys-
terious comments arise, which cannot always be assigned to an individ-
ual character. From the third chapter onward, these comments acquire 
an increasingly personal touch and become distracting within the nar-
rative. Eventually, it is revealed that these mysterious comments were 
made by a spirit.
Ghostwritten’s third chapter, “Hong Kong,” depicts one day in the life 
of Neal Brose, during which everything seems to go wrong. He wakes 
up late, misses transportation to his workplace, climbs a mountain for 
no reason, and dies of a heart attack at the end. The narrative is filled 
with flashbacks of Neal’s life which reflect on his broken marriage, an 
affair, crimes he has committed, as well as a ghost of a female child 
that is living in his apartment. In hindsight, it is highly plausible that 
this ghost child is nothing other than the spirit itself ‘hiding’ behind 
the phenomenon. The ghost child becomes central to Neal, although 
its ontological status is never disclosed to the reader, who is left won-
dering if the ghost is a real phenomenon in the fictional world or a 
projection of Neal’s inner struggles. Everything seems to point to the 
ghost being an expression of Neal’s mental instability. Disturbed by 
peculiar events in their apartment, Neal and his wife ask for help from 
a friend, and learn that the apparition in their apartment is the ghost 
of an abandoned child. For Neal’s wife, this information is unsettling, 
since she and Neal are trying to conceive. They have not been success-
ful, which puts a strain on their marriage. To have a ghost child living 
in their apartment underlines and even mocks their lack of children. 
Thus, this paranormal phenomenon could be considered a projection 
of their frustrations.
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As indicated, the ghost also seems to be connected to Neal’s overall 
mental state. Neal is not sure what exactly the ghost child’s capabilities 
are: “Was she here, amongst us? Holding my hand? Why had I always 
assumed she stayed in the apartment all day? It’s more logical she roams 
around the place. She likes attention” (Ghostwritten 76). While Neal 
is making these assumptions, he is seconds away from missing his ferry 
to work, which is ironic, since it can be speculated that the spirit has 
caused this by governing his actions. Neal, however, is not aware of this, 
and simply cannot explain to himself why he didn’t go on board. Curi-
ously, Neal is adamant about claiming power over the ghost: “But this 
isn’t a ghost story: the ghost is in the background, where she has to be. 
If she was in the foreground she’d be a person” (ibid., 96). This passage 
anticipates the fifth chapter, “Mongolia,” where the true identity of 
the spirit is revealed—being a disembodied spirit that travels through 
multiple hosts—by stepping out of the background and crossing the 
line into the foreground of the story. Thus, Neal’s statement is a meta-
poetic clue, pointing to the novel’s hidden structure, the spirit in the 
background who is holding the strings in his hands.
When the ferry leaves, Neal feels unable to move. This is disturbing 
to him, and he begins questioning: “‘Neal? Why aren’t you getting 
on this ferry?’” (ibid., 77). He resists the thought that someone else 
is interfering: “No. It’s nothing to do with her. I know when she’s 
here, and she’s not here now. And she can’t make me do anything. I 
choose. I’m the master. That’s one of the rules” (ibid.). After the ferry 
has departed, Neal does not know what to do. He strolls around and 
climbs a nearby mountain, at the top of which a Buddhist shrine is 
located. Why he decides to go up there is never explained, and remains 
an unanswered question, since he dies on reaching the top. While 
climbing the mountain, Neal’s mind is flooded with ambivalent and 
contradictory thoughts and impressions: From “I felt fabulous. I felt 
immortal” (ibid., 102), he moves—just two pages later—to “My skin 
buzzed. My immortality was ebbing away. […] I think I had broken a 
toenail, I could feel something wet and warm in my shoe” (ibid., 104). 
In a matter of minutes, he experiences two completely different emo-
tions: From a transcendent feeling of immortality to a regression to a 
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banal pain from a broken toenail. Neal’s confused state is also assigned 
to the reader, who becomes increasingly confused by the nature of his 
observations, which seem to grow more ambivalent and unrelated to 
Neal himself. Yet, from the beginning, Neal is shown as addressing 
himself when he thinks as though he is talking to another person. This 
begins quite innocently: “Don’t get too comfortable there, Neal. One, 
two, three, up! I said ‘up!’” (ibid., 68), but his thoughts eventually turn 
toward bigger questions: “What led me here?” (ibid., 105) and “What 
life is this?” (ibid., 78). On first sight, these questions could be read as 
merely self-reflective, but they soon become more intense. They turn 
self-critical: “Who are you to tell anyone they are ill, Neal?” (ibid., 94) 
and “I don’t understand you sometimes” (ibid., 79). Shortly afterward, 
other, less ambivalent thoughts are voiced. They have to be attributed 
to another voice, since an unidentified ‘I’ pops up: “I listened to Neal’s 
heart. It sounded like a percussion grenade in a neighbouring valley” 
(ibid., 88). It is not quite clear who makes this observation. Until now, 
one has assumed that Neal is narrating the story, but perhaps this was 
a false assumption. The ‘I’ suggests that there is an additional narrator 
or character present. Thus, Neal’s narrative displays a struggle for the 
authorial voice in this story.
The ‘I’ without a subject becomes a fully-fledged character in 
 Chapter 5, “Mongolia.” In this story, the mystery around Neal’s inner 
chaos is solved when the reader witnesses a similar phenomenon. The 
reader meets Caspar, a 20-year-old Danish backpacker who is travelling 
on a train through Mongolia. The reader again notices that there is an 
unknown voice present. Yet, this time, the self-reflective comments 
turn into an autonomous voice. The person in the background finally 
steps into the foreground: “The large sky made Caspar think of the 
land where he had grown up, somewhere called Zetland. Caspar was 
feeling lonely and homesick. I felt no anticipation, just endlessness” 
(ibid., 155). Caspar is referred to by name, insinuating that he is not 
the one who is telling this part of the story. One page later Caspar is 
referred to as a ‘host:’ “Sherry’s eyes turned towards my host” (ibid., 
156). Finally a new subject enters the narrative: “Caspar was not a 
natural storyteller, so I stepped in” (ibid., 157) and “Caspar wondered 
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for a moment where his story had come from. I closed his mind and 
nudged it towards sleep” (ibid., 158). There appears to be another per-
son who is both narrating the story and intervening. He has control 
over Caspar’s bodily functions, making him fall asleep, and helping 
him out when it comes to telling stories to his friend Sherry.
Neal and Caspar, as well as the other ‘hosts’ in the previous chapters, 
can be viewed as captive figures. Their lives are subjected to a force that 
controls them, inhabiting them and taking possession of their thoughts 
and bodies. One starts questioning the characters’ actions, wondering 
whether they were truly their own. Caspar’s explanation to Sherry of 
why he decided to travel to Mongolia reinforces these doubts: “‘I was 
on my way to Laos, when this impulse just came over me. I told myself 
there was nothing here, but I couldn’t fight it. Mongolia! I’ve never 
even thought about the place. Maybe I smoked too much pot at Lake 
Dal’” (ibid., 156–157). Similar to Neal, who blames a ghost child, 
Caspar looks for an explanation for his ungrounded actions. The men-
tioned ‘impulse’ could have been the spirit forcing his will onto Caspar. 
Neal might have succumbed to a similar ‘impulse’ when he climbed up 
the mountain that led to his death.
3.3.1.3 Captivated by the Ghost of the Narrative
The spirit’s existence reflects storytelling on a figurative level. Every 
character in a novel is, in some way, always ‘manipulated’ or narrated. 
They are formed and guided puppets of the plot. In this case, what 
should be the ‘secret’ doings of an author are transferred to a ghost, 
who guides ‘his’ characters from the inside. Thomas Mann’s “Geist der 
Erzählung,” which translates as both the ‘ghost’ and ‘mind’ of the nar-
rative, is not an abstract concept here, but has become instead an actual 
character in Mitchell’s novel.92 Boulter notes:
92 Equally as fitting as Thomas Mann’s quote would be Käte Friedemann’s phrasing: “[Der 
Erzähler] symbolisiert die uns seit Kant geläufige erkenntnistheoretische Auffassung, 
daß wir die Welt nicht ergreifen, wie sie an sich ist, sondern wie sie durch das Medium 
eines betrachtenden Geistes hindurchgegangen” (26).
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This elaborate narrative neatly serves, of course, as a mise en abyme of 
Mitchell’s larger narrative practice: what is an author but a sort of non-
corpum inhabiting, directing, for a time, the mind of a character, only to 
move on to another? (109).
In Ghostwritten the readers can be considered ‘prisoners’ of the spirit, 
since they are being manipulated into a particular position: They are 
made to believe that they are the observers of many different stories 
linked to each other only by chance. They remain unaware that a dif-
ferent voice is hidden inside these chapters and have to think otherwise 
through the reading process. Thus, they draw the wrong conclusion, 
for example, by questioning Neal’s sanity. Another example for this is 
the fourth chapter, “Holy Mountain.” In this story, readers are led to 
believe, along with the female protagonist, that she is talking to a tree. 
However, the voice of the ‘tree’ has also been the ghost hiding inside 
the tree. This piece of information changes the way one sees the protag-
onist completely. Earlier, it was not entirely clear whether the woman 
was hallucinating when she heard the tree’s voice. Her dependency on 
the tree suggests a mental instability for which there are multiple rea-
sons, since she lives a rather difficult life. When it is revealed that she 
has spoken to a ‘real’ being (at least in the novel), the evaluation of her 
mental state changes.
Only in “Mongolia” does the reader belatedly recognize what has been 
there all the time—an additional voice underlying the narration. The 
spirit’s voice breaks out of the expected; it breaks out of character, 
surpassing Caspar’s mind, revealing itself as an independent ‘I.’ Neal 
provides a fitting metaphor for this process when he compares the 
arrival of the ghost child in his apartment with the increased humming 
noises of a fridge:
Her coming was the hum of a fridge. A sound you grow accustomed to 
before you hear it. I didn’t know how long cupboards had been left open, 
air-conditioners switched on, curtains twitched open, before I became 
conscious of her. […] She didn’t come in the dramatic way they do in the 
movies. Nothing was hurled across the room. Not ghosts in the machine, 
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no silly messages typed on my computer or spelt out with the fridge mag-
net letters.[…] More like a medical condition, that, while terminal, grows 
in such small increments that it is impossible to diagnose until too late. 
Little things: hidden objects (ibid., 82).
This comment is highly self-reflexive, since it mirrors the novelist’s 
own narrative technique. In the novel, the reader notices little incon-
sistencies that are disconcerting. These phenomena increase until they 
cannot be rationalized anymore, and are revealed to be the actions of 
a spirit. The increased noise of the humming fridge can be compared 
to the voice of the ghost that becomes more perceptible as the novel 
progresses, breaking through the common assumptions that the reader 
has already made. Readers experience the materialization of the author-
ghost as a sudden event that restructures their previous assumptions. 
The spirit can only attain this surprising effect by the reader’s lack of 
knowledge, by the fact the he or she has been captivated by the way 
the story has been presented so far. As in Atonement and THoL, the 
condition of experiencing an event is an utter restriction, such as mis-
information or a lack of information. The later revelation motivates 
the reader to become more involved in the narrative, fascinated by its 
effects. Differently, then, from a postmodern conceptualized involve-
ment, the reader does not construct meaning itself by linking inter-
textual clues and closing gaps, which is how, for example, the post-
modern writer and theorist Raymond Federman describes the role of 
the reader:
The writer [in postmodern fiction] will no longer be considered a prophet, 
a philosopher, or even a sociologist who predicts, teaches, or reveals abso-
lute truths, nor will he be looked upon (admiringly and romantically) as 
the omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent creator, but he will stand 
on equal footing with the reader in their efforts to make sense out of the 
language common to both of them, to give sense to the fiction of life (14).
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The contemporary readers, however, have to recognize themselves as 
not being on an equal footing with the omnipotent creator, but as 
being subjected to the narrative’s force. Readers discover that they have 
been directed by the ‘Geist der Erzählung,’ and have become capti-
vated readers.
3.3.2 Atonement—The Giant from the Mist
3.3.2.1 Introduction
As explained in the previous chapter, the protagonist Briony tells the 
story of the ‘crime’ she has committed in her youth, but only reveals 
at the end that she is actually the author of the story, hiding herself 
behind an impersonal narrator. Additionally, Briony has significantly 
changed her story. She neglects to tell her reader that because she has 
wrongly accused Robbie of rape, she has interrupted a love story that 
could never be resumed. Both her sister and Robbie die before they 
have a chance to meet again. As with Ghostwritten, the reader is also 
fooled in Atonement and restricted by his/her preconceptions. The 
reading process becomes a captivation. In comparison to Ghostwrit-
ten, however, the reader’s deception is morally problematic in Atone-
ment; the reader realizes that he has become the involuntary subject in 
a moral experiment. The implied reader’s sympathies have been used 
against him/her, with ethical implications.
3.3.2.2 The Displaced Reader
The literary critic Peter Childs states that Briony’s writing skill is both 
her gift and her curse (cf. 135). It is a curse because Briony cannot pre-
vent repeating her crime over and over again, doing with the implied 
reader what she has done with the police and her family: Betraying the 
truth. However, Briony’s manipulation captivates the reader, which 
makes the discovery of her authorship similar to a revelation—it 
becomes an event that changes the reader’s view of the story that was 
just presented, and his/her own involvement.
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An appropriate metaphor that captures Briony’s position in the novel 
and the captivating effect she has on readers is “giant from the mist.” 
This image stems from Briony’s reflection, made on the evening of that 
fateful day on which the story takes place. After accusing Robbie of 
rape, Briony is sent to her room where she sums up the day, thinking 
to herself, that the day has moved “from the innocent rehearsal of her 
play to the emergence of the giant from the mist” (McEwan 183). The 
giant refers to two people. It alludes to another misreading involving 
Robbie, who arrives at the Tallis home (on the night of the rape) car-
rying one of the twins on his back, thereby accidentally creating an 
unnerving image:
At first they saw nothing, though Briony thought she could make out the 
tread of shoes along the drive. Then everyone could hear it, and there was 
a collective murmur and shifting of weight as they caught sight of an inde-
finable shape, no more than a grayish smudge against the white, almost a 
hundred yards away (ibid., 182).
What the onlookers recognize is only a “smudge,” too far away to be 
identified. Slowly the shape comes closer, but only to confuse them 
even more:
As the shape took form the waiting group fell silent again. No one could 
quite believe what was emerging. […] No one in this age of telephones 
and motor cars could believe that giants seven or eight feet high existed 
in crowded Surrey. But here it was, an apparition as inhuman as it was 
purposeful. The thing was impossible and undeniable, and heading their 
way (ibid., 182).
What the people in the Tallis home see is supposedly a giant, a figure 
from fairytales, nightmares, or fantasies. When the shape approaches, 
the mystery is resolved, since the police and the family recognize that 
it is Robbie, carrying a child on his back (cf. 182). The image of the 
giant stepping out of the mist also applies to Briony herself: Out of 
the “innocent rehearsal of her play,” she emerges as a literary giant—a 
child who has no control over her talent, misuses her imagination, and 
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condemns an innocent man in the process. In this case, the giant refers 
to Briony’s powers as an author figure and the mist refers to the con-
fusion or deceit she invents. Using this line of argument, it is fitting 
that Cormack refers to Briony’s imagination as a “fog, something that 
obscures facts and misleads the unwary” (82). Robbie is mistaken for 
a giant because of the natural environment (fog, distance). Briony is 
perceived as a giant because of a ‘literary’ fog: specifically, that of her 
narrative (that hides her true position in the novel), which one could 
also term a “narrative spell” (McEwan 7). Similarly, as Robbie’s true 
shape is only revealed once the inspector steps closer—turning a giant 
into an ordinary man—Briony’s true shape is revealed to the reader by 
turning her from a misled child into a powerful author figure.
The fog that Briony creates is meant for the reader. The implied reader is 
constantly put in the ‘wrong’ position guided by the narrative perspec-
tive. An omniscient narrator provides different perspectives focalized 
through Briony, Cecilia, their mother and Robbie. But each perspec-
tive is revealed to be lacking, denouncing the voice of the individual, 
most obviously in Briony’s misreadings. Puschman-Nalenz notes that 
the implied reader appears to be in a privileged position compared 
to the characters, due to the fact that he or she has access to different 
perspectives:
The shifting or “variable internal focalisations” in Atonement, which dis-
cards a homogeneous narrative perspective, results for the reader in an 
intricate process of constructing the imaginary world, a process in which 
he is frequently granted the advantages of being better informed than the 
respective reflector figure, because the reader also gets to know the inside 
of the “other minds” in the story (190–191).
The external omniscient narrator, who claims some sense of overview, 
highlights the failures of each perspective. He does not shy away from 
exposing Briony’s naïve thoughts whenever possible and also imposes 
his own ideological perspective on to the narrative. This causes the 
reader to adapt a critical stance toward the young Briony, allowing 
him/herself to feel superior to her and the other characters.
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The superior position felt by the reader is, however, an illusion. Read-
ers are not superior to Briony (or other characters), but have, in fact, 
been held captive by the fog Briony created, since Briony is actually 
the author figure who installed this omniscient narrator. The different 
perspectives are all filtered through Briony’s mind. Schwalm explains 
that “[h]er [Briony’s] modernist choice is one that seeks to pretend the 
independent existence of individual minds by limiting the visibility of 
her authorial power” (178). Briony has indeed restricted her visibility 
as authorial power, as the reader is completely unaware of the narra-
tor being so involved in the story itself. Thus, the novel can be viewed 
as the portrayal of one mind hiding and veiling itself with the minds 
of others, a technique similar to the one the reader has witnessed in 
Ghostwritten. The reader does not recognize Briony as an author  figure 
for two reasons: Firstly, Atonement’s implied author has neglected to 
inform the implied reader that he or she is reading a book of a fic-
tional author, and secondly, Briony employs a narrator that does not 
comment on her true identity, instead letting readers assume it is an 
impersonal instance. The reader’s ‘weakness’ or even ‘captivity’ in this 
instance, is, thus, a somewhat harmless, yet consequential, restriction, 
which the reader remains unaware of till the end.
There is a dispute amongst literary critics about the exact moment at 
which the reader recognizes that Briony is not simply a character in the 
novel, but also the author of the narrative. Head writes: “The impli-
cation [referring to ‘clues’ the novel provides] can escape readers—or, 
indeed, reviewers—on a first reading” (165). Cormack has identified 
two moments in the novel that reveal Briony’s secret authorship before 
Briony herself does. Both instances occur in Part Three of the novel. 
As a young adult, Briony works on a story that deals with the events of 
that fateful day in 1934, entitled ‘Two Figures by a Fountain,’ which 
revolves around Robbie and Celia’s argument at the fountain. After 
finishing, Briony sends her story to a literary magazine. The editor of 
the magazine advises her to make some changes: “A young man and a 
woman by a fountain, who clearly have a great deal of unresolved feel-
ing between them, tussle over a Ming vase and break it. (More than one 
of us thought Ming rather too priceless to take outdoors? Wouldn’t 
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Sèvres or Nymphenburg suit your purpose?)” (McEwan 313). This 
detail is relevant, since the vase described in Atonement is, in fact, not 
a Ming vase, but a Meissen vase (cf. ibid., 23). This is the first clue 
that Atonement is a literary product; one could speculate that the edi-
tor’s suggestions have already been implemented into the story, which 
would make the first section of the novel the creative product of Bri-
ony. At this point, the reader might realize that the story has been 
tampered with, as Cormack writes: “we now realize that we have been 
duped. We are forced to return to the scene at the fountain—indeed 
to the whole first section—and regard it as a pastiche” (75). The end of 
the third section points in the same direction, as it ends with the signa-
ture “BT London 1999,” which implicates Briony Tallis as the author.
However, I argue, like Head and James, that these clues and others can 
only be fully absorbed when re-reading the novel. James makes the 
argument that during the first read, the reader is simply not ‘prepared’ 
to look: “Atonement and The Blind Assassin [the novel by Margaret 
Atwood] are rich with clues that can catch the reader’s attention with-
out his understanding their significance—as in a good mystery novel, 
but here the reader doesn’t even know the book he’s reading is a mys-
tery” (138). Readers are simply in the wrong position. To be able to 
perceive those clues, readers would have to inhabit another position, 
one that is cut off from the guiding hand of the external omniscient 
narrator. When readers realize where they actually stand, their percep-
tion changes completely, but also their position toward the text. The 
readers’ position is a different one from what they believed it to be, 
since they are one additional step removed from the narrative. Albers 
and Caeners comment on the damaging effect: “It [the epilogue] com-
pletely shatters the fictional world of the main narrative by drastically 
shifting the reader’s perspective” [emphasis added] (711). Mathews 
notes how the relationship to the narrator changes: “Whereas Briony’s 
narrative draws the reader into the lives of the characters through the 
omniscient perspective of a third-person narrator, the revelation of the 
story’s partiality upsets this relation of intimacy” (157). The implied 
readers are in the ‘right’ position only when it is too late, when every 
clue has already passed them by, leaving them scrambling to catch up. 
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The reader is made into a doppelganger of Briony, they are forced to 
behave in the same way Briony does, to look back to the ‘past,’ to the 
first sections of the novel, trying to solve the question where she (or 
he) went wrong. D’Angelo even contends that “the reader must go back 
and ‘reread’ everything he or she has previously encountered” (100).
The readers’ ‘lateness’ is carefully planned, because readership is signif-
icant to Briony’s actual aim: A secular confession. D’Hoker remarks 
on the problems of a secular confession: “Not surprisingly, secular 
confession is a poor match to this powerful religious discourse. Even 
though secular confession has a reader or audience, it has no authori-
ties empowered to absolve” (32). Briony deals with the same problem 
in the epilogue where she asks:
How can a novelist achieve atonement when, with her absolute power of 
deciding outcomes, she is also God? There is no one, no entity or higher 
form that she can appeal to […] There is nothing outside her. In her imag-
ination she has set the limits and the terms (McEwan 371).
Her (fictive) readership, thus, takes on the role of a father confessor. 
Yet, she does not adhere to the genre of confession, or mark the text as 
being a confession (she never asks for forgiveness, does not seek some 
kind of higher power or narrate the story from the first person). Thus, 
one can assume that she tries to hide the fact that she is even confess-
ing. Moreover, the fact that she has changed the ending makes her con-
fession a lie. Consequently, she deals with the notion of ‘atonement’ 
in a random manner. For the implied readers, the situation remains 
problematic yet. Since they were misled and discovered belatedly that 
Briony is responsible for the narrative, they had little chance of reading 
the novel as atonement. If the readers are to serve as the ‘higher power’ 
here, this status was imposed upon them, and not chosen. Their role 
was scripted, and they were only puppets in this script.
This also makes forgiveness difficult. Wells claims that the reader “can 
choose to believe that her act of atonement has been a genuine one” 
(110). For Wells, readers are able to judge for themselves, and thus, 
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able to forgive Briony. Müller-Wood makes a similar case, arguing that 
readers can choose to remain distanced toward the novel: “I suggest 
that McEwan urges the reader to actively reject the novel’s overt story 
line to explore its more unsettling implications” (158, Fn 2). I disagree 
with these claims, since the implied readers are not uninvolved observ-
ers/listeners, like a father confessor, but have been drawn into the fic-
tional universe that Briony created. Crucial information has been with-
held from the readers, which betrays the trust between readers and the 
author figure Briony. Readers have been made into captivated subjects. 
Their actions have been laid out for them. They have been forced to 
make mistakes similar to Briony’s. They have participated in a false 
reality, a misreading and, thus, have become equally guilty. Cormack 
writes how to mistake fiction for reality is a mistake the novel warns of:
Atonement’s metafiction is not there to present the reader with the inev-
itable penetration of the real with the fictive. Instead the novel serves to 
show that the two worlds are entirely distinct: there is the world of the 
real and the world of literature, and woe betide those who confuse the 
two (82).
Yet, for the reader this warning comes too late, since he or she has been 
already aligned with Briony. Seaboyer even contends that one could 
argue that the reader is victimized:
do we risk becoming ‘victims’ of the text? Of course not; since Robbie, 
and indeed Briony, are fictions, there can be no violation—and yet. The 
process of being drawn into Briony’s/McEwan’s doubled narrative is a lit-
tle like the process of being seduced by the attractions of Milton’s Satan, 
and thus, as Stanley Fish has argued, experiencing in small the seduction 
and fall of humanity (32).
This form of narrative authority that Briony represents does not 
 reinstall a traditional author-concept; instead it makes the status of 
this particular author figure extremely problematic. Briony becomes an 
evil magician casting her spell on readers, who confuse what is real with 
delusions and who become part of her tricks without wanting to be.
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3.3.3 Claimed by the Author
In contrast to Beckett’s famous quote, used by Foucault in his well 
known essay What is an Author?, here, it turns out that it does matter 
who is speaking. Contemporary novels share the critique of authorship 
as an unshakable institution, but differently from the works of Aus-
ter, Rushdie, and others. Instead of destabilizing author figures com-
pletely, making them disappear or disintegrate, they are very present 
forces to deal with. However, each author figure is an inherently flawed 
being. The spirit in Ghostwritten appears almost like a god-like narra-
tor: He is intervening and influencing, without readers even knowing 
it. However, it is only because we were deceived and the spirit hides 
itself that the spirit’s role appears to be so omnipotent. In reality, the 
narrator is no god at all, but rather a limited being. He is unable to live 
independently without a host and so has to occupy others’ minds. This 
bears similarities to the narrator in Atonement, also a ‘hidden’ narrator, 
who captivates the readers in her web in order to make them forgive 
her. At the bottom of this, however, we find a child, unable to deal with 
the complexities of reality, and later on unwilling to accept her own 
guilt. In addition, the author figures’ power is ethically problematic. 
The reader feels ‘betrayed’ by what the novel has done with him or her. 
By revealing themselves as secret puppeteers, the author figures force 
the readers to recognize themselves as puppets on strings, making them 
question their own status as readers. In Atonement and Ghostwritten, 
author figures are powerful entities the reader is tasked to struggle or 
position themselves against. The captivation of the reader, who reacts 
to this, is what makes authorship visible in the first place. Thus, the 
reader’s captivation is an active part of the creation of the novel and 
its author figures.

4 Captives of Ethics
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will examine the issue of responsibility in three nov-
els The Road, Oryx and Crake and The White Tiger. In these novels 
subjects enter into relationships that steer them towards carrying out 
responsible actions. These actions cannot, however, be considered 
to be ‘moral’ actions in every case. Nevertheless, in all cases an event 
demands responsibility from the characters through which they either 
experience a new positioning, a shift of some kind or— more violent-
ly—a displacement.
In poststructuralism, responsibility and ethics in general constitute a 
topic that is to some extent limited in how it is treated. In poststruc-
turalist thought, responsibility presupposes certain assumptions that 
are highly problematic. Ethical responsibility or moral rules imply a 
certain form of hierarchy and authority that poststructuralist thinkers 
renounce. Schwerdtfeger summarizes this with the term ‘rule ethics’ 
as follows:
Rule ethics, by defining what is right and wrong, separates people into 
(good) insiders—those who follow the rules and conventions—and (bad) 
outsiders—those who do not know or follow these rules. In fact, rule eth-
ics such as the biblical ten commandments were partly intended to distin-
guish one people from others. Toleration of otherness, therefore, was not 
an objective of this ethical concept. By not defining any rules, postmodern 
ethics does not permit the exclusion of others (22).
‘Rule ethics’ thus distinguishes between right and wrong and thus also 
between good and bad people, which is highly problematic in times 
of cultural diversion and a multifaceted life. Similar to Schwerdtfeger, 
Zygmunt Bauman explains why such an ethics is even impossible to 
come up with:
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The foolproof—universal and and unshakably founded—ethical code 
will never be found; having singed our fingers once too often, we know 
now what we did not know then, when we embarked on this journey of 
exploration: that a non-aporetic, non-ambivalent morality, an ethics that 
is universal and ‘objectively founded,’ is a practical impossibility; perhaps 
also an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms (10).
It is doubted that responsibility and ethics exist in a pure form, similar 
to the gift that was discussed previously in this dissertation. In the same 
manner, responsibility can be limited to economy and calculation. If I 
am responsible for my neighbor by helping him out, does he ‘owe’ me 
reciprocation the next time I ask? If so, then responsibility becomes 
reduced to a calculating or measuring logic that can no longer, there-
fore, be considered ‘ethical,’ since it represents an impoverished version 
of ethical behavior. This means that I give not because I choose to give, 
but because I respond to an obligation. Derrida explains this aporia 
in “Passions,” in which he speaks about the nature of friendship and 
politeness in relation to duty: 
A gesture ‘of friendship’ or ‘of politeness’ would be neither friendly nor 
polite if it were purely and simply to obey a rule. But this duty to eschew 
the rule of ritualized decorum also demands that one goes beyond the 
very language of duty. One must not be friendly or polite out of duty 
(“Passions” 8).
Derrida cleverly chose politeness as an example, because politeness 
involves an arbitrary set of rules which are not necessarily bound by 
rational logic but are, rather, based on tradition and cultural codes. To 
simply follow a system of ‘rules of politeness’ paradoxically destroys the 
idea of ‘politeness’ or ‘friendship,’ in this cultural sense, since the prin-
ciple structuring those areas is that everything has to be given freely 
without restriction or calculation. That is what constitutes the essence 
of politeness and friendship. As in the case of the gift, the moment cal-
culation enters the stage, the ethical act is corrupted. In short, follow-
ing the law out of duty towards the law would destroy what it should 
have created in the first place, and this makes one’s behavior unethical:
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It is insufficient to say that the ‘ought’ [il faut] of friendship, like that of 
politeness, must not be the order of duty. It must not ever take the form 
of a rule, and certainly not of a ritual rule. As soon as it yields to the neces-
sity of applying the generality of a prescription to a single case, the gesture 
of friendship or of politeness would itself be destroyed (“Passions” 9).
What Derrida strives for is singularity, saying in an interview that a 
judge “has to reinvent the law each time” (“The Villanova Roundta-
ble” 17). Every ethical action has to be decided upon by itself, without 
being bound to any structure that would make this action an expected 
one that adheres to given rules. Derrida states that to take over respon-
sibility or to be able to make a ‘just’ decision means to decide every 
time anew. By contrast, to apply general rules to a singular case inhibits 
moral behavior. A singular decision, however, is “in some sense ‘impos-
sible,’ as it must involve a mad leap beyond any rational calculations” 
(Reynolds 50). Ethical phenomena in Derrida’s writings all seem to 
face the same problem: they are destroyed if calculation comes into 
play. An ideal just decision as an ideal responsible act, would be located 
outside of rational logic and expectation.
One can never know if one has been responsible or not, one cannot have 
a good conscience: “I made the right decision,” “I fulfilled my responsi-
bilities,” “My debts are paid,” “This is where my (or your) responsibility 
lies,” and so on—all such statements are contrary to the essence of respon-
sibility as well as to the essence of a decision. This is why responsibility is 
infinite. It is infinite because of the finitude of the one who “decides” or 
who “takes responsibility” (“Nietzsche and the Machine” 232).
Responsibility or ethics, as Derrida thinks of it is connected to the 
same kind of excess as the gift. He compares, for example, justice to the 
gift in “Force of Law”: “a gift without exchange, without circulation, 
without recognition or gratitude, without economic circularity, with-
out calculation and without rules, without reason and without theo-
retical rationality, in the sense of regulating mastery” (254). In “The 
Villanova Roundtable” he becomes even more explicit, describing why 
both gift and justice are impossible phenomena: 
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That is the condition the gift shares with justice. A justice that could 
appear as such, that could be calculated, a calculation of what is just what 
is not just, saying what has to be given in order to be just—that is not jus-
tice. That is social security, economics. Justice and gift should go beyond 
calculation (19).
For Derrida, however, this ‘beyond’ remains impossible to attain, 
since justice is a sort of theoretical horizon: “Justice remains to come, 
it remains by coming [la justice reste à venir], it has to come [elle a à 
venir] it is to-come, the to-come [elle est à-venir], it deploys the very 
dimension of events irreducible to come” (“Force of Law” 256).
4.2 The Responsible Subject
In the novels I am discussing each character carries out a responsible 
act, often against his will or his intuition. In most cases the characters 
simply have no other choice. Responsibility in the novels discussed 
emerges through the interplay of two things: a captivation that is 
utterly restrictive—limiting the character—and an event that changes 
the position of the character, allowing him or her to go beyond their 
initial restrictions. The most positive example of an empowerment in 
this chapter is provided by The Road. Here, the father is a captive of his 
son who turns him from a suicidal killer into a hopeful being. Yet, the 
change or shift that turns a captive being into a subject is not always 
what one would consider a positive development. Often, the shift is 
revealed as being uncomfortable, either for the character himself or 
for the reader who might have identified with the captive character. 
Thus, the empowerment of a character can be problematic in a similar 
way, as has been observed in Atonement. Here, the empowerment of 
the author figure was based on the victimhood of others, among them 
the reader’s. Similar to this are Oryx and Crake and The White Tiger. In 
both novels the society the characters live in sets strong boundaries and 
does not allow a breaking out of them. Thus, the characters’ position 
in life is inevitably bound to political and societal factors. However, 
not only their captive state is informed by these circumstances, but 
also their becoming empowered subject is. In fact, the event that they 
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experience does not transport them completely beyond the borders of 
the situation they are in, but rather enables them to take on a new posi-
tion inside the system. This also means that their becoming an ethical 
subject is determined by the societal and political circumstances they 
find themselves in. Because of this, the nature of their ethical actions is 
difficult to come to terms with at times. Their ethical actions can only 
be considered ethical when taking into account the circumstances and 
the system in which these characters are situated. Ethics as presented 
here cannot serve as exemplary forms of ethical behavior, but rather as 
very narrow definitions of it. Nevertheless, in the world of the charac-
ters their actions have an ethical foundation: the characters act a par-
ticular way, because they want to do good. 
What all characters nevertheless share throughout the novels selected 
is that by experiencing a shift they become responsible and ethical 
beings in some way. The father in The Road invents ethical guidelines 
for his son who becomes an ethical being par excellence. Jimmy in Oryx 
and Crake takes an ethical stand and lives with the consequences of 
his decision. Even, Balram in The White Tiger, behaves in an ethical 
way in the end. Although he becomes a murderer, he keeps close to 
his nephew and takes care of him, providing eventually a better life 
for him.
4.2.1 The Road—The Responsibility of the Liar
4.2.1.1 Introduction
“Barren, silent, godless” (McCarthy 4), is how Cormac McCarthy 
describes a post-apocalyptic America in The Road. Nearly every critic 
who has approached The Road has written about its ethical dimension. 
Lydia Cooper states that, in respect to McCarthy’s earlier works:
The Road depicts a world even bleaker (if possible) than the world of 
Blood Meridian [1985], but the novel nevertheless privileges the haunt-
ing obligation of ethical behavior, indicating that the darkest possible 
world might not be entirely bereft of people able to believe in human 
goodness (133).
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The novel takes place several years after some sort of catastrophe that 
marked the end of life and society as we know it. It follows a father and 
son, who remain nameless, as they travel across the country, searching 
for food, shelter, and—if it can even be hoped for—some semblance of 
safety and stability. Establishing a specific timeline is difficult for most 
things in the book. The mother traveled with the man and son for a 
time, but committed suicide prior to the beginning of the narration. 
In addition, given that the boy was born soon after the cataclysm, and 
assuming that he is somewhere between eight and ten years old, one 
can gather that the story takes place about a decade after the catastro-
phe. What exactly has lead to the world becoming an uninhabitable 
place is not explained in the novel, but can be insinuated from the 
descriptions the novel provides: “The clocks stopped at 1:17. A long 
shear of light and then a series of low concussions” (McCarthy 52). 
Most critics interpret this scene as indicating a nuclear, rather than nat-
ural, disaster, such as a meteor strike. Many descriptions support this 
assumption: The sun is clouded by soot; the word ‘ash’ is often referred 
to: “soft ash blowing” (ibid., 4), “ashen daylight” (ibid., 5), “[d]ust and 
ash everywhere” (ibid., 7); the days are short and the nights dark and 
cold: “Nights dark beyond darkness and the days more gray each one 
than what had gone before”(ibid., 3); there is no animal life, nor is 
there any sign of vegetation. Machat has suggested that the novel pro-
vides little information about the catastrophe on purpose, in order to 
frame the event as ambivalent (cf. 145). Salván identifies this ambiva-
lence as a psychosomatic symptom. Considering the father as responsi-
ble in giving information about the catastrophe (to the son), she points 
out that the father’s inability to give an appropriate account of the 
event speaks for his traumatic state as a witness. As the “traumatic expe-
rience par excellence, the apocalypse around which The Road is nar-
rated must necessarily remain a blind spot in the story, never to be fully 
apprehended by characters or by readers” (149).93
93 Here, Salván also draws on Laub who speaks of a “collapse of witnessing” that goes 
along with traumatic experiences (1995: 65).
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The remaining survivors in The Road live in a “hyper-pragmatic world” 
(Graulund 66) that does not possess any cultural meaning, nor is there 
any transcendent sphere to speak of.94 The human community has been 
shattered and only a few family clans remain. These families, due to 
a dearth of other options, have apparently succumbed to cannibalism 
and barbarism: “The world soon to be largely populated by men who 
would eat your children in front of your eyes” (McCarthy 181). This 
is implied when they find the remains of an embryo in the fire: “What 
the boy had seen was a charred human infant headless and gutted and 
blackening on the spit” (ibid., 198). In a world where women choose to 
become pregnant in order to provide human food, a rebuilding of com-
munity seems unimaginable. Their lost state of belonging nowhere is 
exemplified by their namelessness: they are only referred to as ‘the man’ 
and ‘the boy,’ not even ‘father’ and ‘son.’ This has also been observed 
by Gwinner:
In general, the sense that basic identities are uncoupled from referents is 
established when they see evidence or interact with others. When they 
see the first person they encounter in the novel, an apparent victim of a 
lightening strike, the boy wonders, “Who is it?” [McCarthy 49]. The man 
replies, “I don’t know. Who is anybody?” [ibid., 49]. […] When a hostile 
‘roadcat’ asks if the man is a doctor, the man asserts that he is “not any-
thing” [ibid., 64]. Later, when another man, Ely, asks “What are you?” 
they are at a loss to tender self-identification: “They’d no way to answer 
the question” [ibid., 162] (142).
That the protagonists are in a state of limbo is underscored by the spe-
cific way language is used: “Significant is the refusal to use verbs and 
the preference of participles […] McCarthy presents situations, not the 
94 Warde points out that the loss of order can be recognized in their constant occupa-
tion with telephone books and maps, noting that “the protagonists of The Road look 
to maps and phone books (abstracted images and printed texts) as emblems of a moral 
and spatial order that is indiscernible in the anarchic post-apocalyptic world through 
which they travel” (127).
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actions that led to them. With this technique the author underlines 
how the characters find themselves powerless and unable to act con-
fronted with a nature out of balance” (Gaile 291).95 
4.2.1.2 The Captivation by the Son
The ‘end of the world’ was, ironically, for the father (and mother), 
marked by the birth of their son. This is central to the novel, even 
though it happens before the novel starts. The son exemplifies unpro-
tected and vulnerable life par excellence. When the father comments 
on his physical appearance, he notes: “He looked like something out 
of a deathcamp. Starved, exhausted, sick with fear” (ibid., 117). From 
the start it is made clear that the father’s life depends on the son’s exis-
tence. Without the son the father would not be alive, “the boy was all 
that stood between him and death” (ibid., 29). Schaub remarks: “The 
father’s foundation, from the beginning of the novel, is the son, and 
there is perhaps in this coupling of his own existence to that of his 
son’s a degree of selfishness, an unnatural reliance of the father upon 
the son” (158). They are “each the other’s world entire” (McCarthy 6), 
reconstructing a world together. This dependence on the son I iden-
tify as evidence of the father’s captivation by his son. This captivation 
has rather paradoxical effects for the father which will be elaborated 
in the following. 
Juge has pointed out that the topic of fatherhood and how it is por-
trayed in The Road is one of the aspects that makes this novel different 
from McCarthy’s other novels:
There are several answers to the question why The Road is a very pecu-
liar novel in McCarthy’s corpus. Some of those answers have to do with 
the geographical and historical setting of the novel which stands out in 
McCarthy almost perfectly divided Appalachian and Western novels. […] 
95 The original quote reads: “Besonders augenfällig ist bei der Lektüre des Romans aber 
der verbreitete Verzicht auf Verben zugunsten von Partizipien […] McCarthy stellt Situ-
ationen dar, nicht die Handlungen, die dazu führten. Mit dieser Technik unter streicht 
der Autor, dass seine Romanfiguren der aus den Fugen geratenen Welt ohnmächtig ge-
genüberstehen und aktiven Handeln nicht mehr befähigt sind” (291; transl. mine).
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I would argue that, with regards to Plato’s theory and McCarthy’s past 
novels, the theme that sets this book as a work apart is guidance, as well 
as the narrative bond between father and son that McCarthy has created. 
Many previous novels depicted father/son relations as being inexistent 
or unsatisfactory. Fathers in McCarthy fail at providing worthy exam-
ples […] Fathers of male protagonists in McCarthy’s novels stand out 
by their absence or incapacity to be educators which causes most of the 
young heroes to set out on journeys without a father and worse, without 
a guide (24).
The father in the The Road is a very strong guide and he takes his job 
seriously. For him, protecting his son is a holy mission: “My job is to 
take care of you. I was appointed to do that by God. I will kill anyone 
who touches you” (McCarthy 77). The father is even willing to use 
violence to protect his son. But violence must also be applied against 
his son if the situation demands for it: “Can you do it? When the time 
comes? […] Could you crush that beloved skull with a rock? Is there 
such a being within you of which you know nothing? Can there be?” 
(ibid., 114). In order to save his son from rape and being eaten alive, 
the father would have to kill him in a situation where they would have 
no chance of escape. His responsibility to kill both of them, however, 
is limited by the means and makes his plan even more brutal: “A sin-
gle round left in the revolver. You will not face the truth. You will not” 
(ibid., 68). He would not be able to kill both the boy and himself with 
the gun; in such an emergency the father would be forced to kill his son 
by his own hand. The father’s captivation which is basically an unbreak-
able devotion to his son, makes it easy for him to ignore all kinds of 
moral pitfalls, and turns him also into a potential killer.
However, the father’s captivation shows in other forms, too. Against 
his own will, he also provides the son with a metaphysical shelter, 
since the son demands this from him. The father has lost all hope: 
“He knew that he was placing hopes where he’d no reason to. He 
hoped it would be brighter where for all he knew the world grew 
darker daily” (ibid., 213). However, he cannot act according to his 
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true beliefs, since his son’s morality would degenerate. When he hints 
to the boy that there might not be many humans left on earth the fol-
lowing happens:
The boy looked away. […] He shook his head. I dont know what we’re 
doing, he said. The man started to answer. But he didnt. After a while he 
said: There are people. There are people and we’ll find them. You’ll see 
(ibid., 244).96
The father tries to calm the son by reassuring him they are the ‘good 
guys.’ Thus, the son is the driving force behind the father’s endeavors to 
come up with some sort of ethical belief and trust. This is most evident 
when it comes to the expression both use extensively throughout the 
novel: ‘to carry the fire.’ To ‘carry the fire’ means something along the 
lines of ‘doing good,’ ‘staying true’ and ‘keeping on going.’ Throughout 
the novel the phrase, “carrying the fire,” is employed almost like a prayer 
or nursery rhyme, and its repetitive nature seems to calm the boy down. 
One example occurs in the following passage. In this passage, the boy 
voices one of his greatest fears, namely that he and his father would be 
forced to resort to cannibalism, because of hunger and thirst:
We wouldnt ever eat anybody, would we? 
No. Of course not. 
Even if we were starving? 
[…] No matter what. 
No. No matter what.  
Because we’re the good guys. 
Yes. 
And we’re carrying the fire. 
And we’re carrying the fire. Yes (ibid., 128–129).
96 McCarthy shortens negations such as “wouldn’t”, “can’t” or “won’t.” Since this is the 
way he employs language throughout his work, I refrain in the following from com-
menting on this with ‘[sic].’
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Wielenberg notes that fire is not only important on a metaphorical 
level, its physical counterpart is needed every day by father and son: 
“Fire sustains them; it keeps them warm and cooks their food. It allows 
them to play cards and allows the man to read to the child at night. Fire 
is the foundation of civilization” (3). In The Road fire is the founda-
tion of the civilization, not only because it allows them to survive, but 
because it guides them in an ethical way, too. Yet, being ‘good’ is not an 
ethical principle that the father chooses to believe in. Most of the things 
the father tells the son lack any real foundation; they are simply rituals 
without basis: “Evoke the forms. Where you’ve nothing else construct 
ceremonies out of the air and breathe upon them” ( McCarthy 74). His 
actions are often contrary to his own convictions, and he is therefore 
referred to as an “old world thespian” (ibid., 10), who recognizes his 
life as untrue: “[e]very day is a lie” (ibid., 238). Cooper supports the 
father’s characterization as an actor: “[t]he father, poised between two 
disparate possible realities, chooses to act as though the more hopeful 
possibility is the true reality” (143). The father’s lies are a means of 
protecting the son and keeping him in good spirits. Thus, the father’s 
ethical principles are part of a “strategy rather than a belief, a recourse 
to religious language and forms in the absence of any foundation for 
them in the world” (Schaub 161). The father’s actions are the result 
of his captivation, his boundless love for his son. He carries the fire, 
because it is his obligation, not because it is his conviction.
To be credible the father has to keep his promises, adhere to his own 
provisionary rules. One example is provided early in the novel: the boy 
notices that the father gives him more food than he allows himself to 
have. Apparently they have talked about this before, and the father has 
agreed at that time on sharing equally with the boy. The boy reminds 
his father to keep his promise:
I have to watch you all the time, the boy said. 
I know. 
If you break little promises you’ll break big ones. That’s what you said. 
I know. But I wont (McCarthy 34).
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The father has to live by what he teaches and is bound to his own “cere-
monies out of the air,” becoming the breath that is supposed to fill them 
with life (ibid., 74). But the son finds himself also in a restricted posi-
tion. He feels forced to actually believe what the father tells him, even 
though he is suspicious of his father and the way he deals with truth:
There are other good guys. You said so. 
Yes. 
So where are they? 
They’re hiding. 
[…] Is that true? 
Yes. That’s true. 
But it might not be true. 
I think it’s true. 
Okay. 
You don’t believe me. 
I believe you. 
Okay. 
I always believe you. 
I dont think so. 
Yes I do. I have to (ibid., 184–185).
They are mutually dependent. The son believes the father as long as 
the father adheres to his own rules. Thus, the father has to provide the 
basis for the son’s belief by acting in an ethical way, he has to “[e]voke 
the forms” (ibid., 74). The son captivates his father: he motivates the 
father to behave in a certain way, which is shown throughout the novel 
on the simplest level—communication: “Getting the father to talk is 
like pulling teeth, again his answers are monosyllabic and as short as 
possible” (Machat 175). The son pulls ‘ethical’ teeth from his father: 
that is, makes him produce answers that guide the son in an ethical way.
These demands, however, do not simply ‘transform’ the father into 
a good person. Gwinner points out that the father’s understanding 
of ‘goodness’ is very much provisional and pragmatic, and therefore 
flawed: “Wherever they can be found, usable commodities are ‘good’ 
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because they support the good of survival” (144) and later he states 
that “the narrative makes explicit that the protagonists do perceive 
their very survival as partaking of ethical and ‘civilized’ goodness” 
(145). An example that points to the father’s moral ambivalence is 
provided by a dramatic passage in the novel. When father and son 
come across a house where humans are held as livestock in a cellar, 
the limits of the father’s ethical principles become obvious. They flee 
when they discover the human victims and close the trap door behind 
them, not allowing them to escape so that their own intrusion is not 
discovered. For Gwinner this scene raises doubt about their morality: 
“The ways in which both principal characters respond, implicitly and 
explicitly, to this episode raise questions about their identities, their 
goodness” (150). In reference to the lighter that the father drops in the 
cellar Gwinner adds: “the father’s response casts a slight ethical shadow, 
especially since the symbolic fire he carries, the lighter, is left behind 
with the damned men and women in the larder” (ibid.). I would agree 
with this, and dissent from optimistic readings proposed for instance 
by Hume who disregards the ethical ambivalence of the characters: 
“McCarthy’s father and son stay well within the law and do nothing 
that forces rethinking the rights or obligations of the individual” (121). 
Staying within the law could only apply to the fact that they make their 
own laws and that they adapt these laws to the current situation. Nev-
ertheless, the father’s priority is clearly their own survival. Everything 
else is only secondary. His ethics is limited because it is restricted to 
his son, the center of his life and its captivating force.
4.2.1.3 The Son: Embodiment of the Fire
For the son, however, the “ceremonies of the air” are real. This is evi-
dent whenever they meet other people. The son yearns for their com-
pany and treats them well even when they don’t appreciate this. When 
they meet a blind old man with whom they share their sparse meal, 
the son gives him some tinned food as a parting gift. When the man 
does not thank the son the following dialogue between the father and 
the blind man ensues:
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You should thank him you know, the man [the father] said. I wouldnt 
have given you anything.  
Maybe I should and maybe I shouldnt.  
Why wouldnt you? 
I wouldnt have given him mine. 
You dont care if it hurts his feelings? 
Will it hurt his feelings? 
No. That’s not why he did it.  
Why did he do it? 
[…] You wouldnt understand, he said. I’m not sure I do. 
Maybe he believes in God.  
I dont know what he believes in (McCarthy 173–174).
The father, rendered brutally pragmatic by the circumstances, has 
against all odds guided his son down an ethical path. Even though 
the son will not profit from giving food to the old man; even though 
they don’t really have food to spare; and even though the realities of 
this world leave no room for empathy, he still behaves in a caring way. 
Thus, he has become the opposite of his father: his ethics is unlimited 
and absolute; he has broadened the father’s concept.
The father does not remain unaffected by this. The son becomes an 
event to him. When the father is dying he begins seeing the son in a 
different way, experiencing how his own principles falter. To protect 
his son always included the possibility and the necessity of killing him, 
but the father cannot bear the thought anymore: “I cant hold my son 
dead in my arms. I thought I could but I cant” (ibid., 279). The father 
decides against killing his son in favor of what he had never shown 
before, namely, unfounded hope: “Goodness will find the little boy. 
It always has. It will again” (ibid., 281). Gwinner writes: “The man 
accepts that there is no basis for belief; he believes anyway” (146). 
This is a character trait the father never displayed before, only the son 
was hopeful against all odds. When the son wants to join his father 
in death, the father denies him this wish. Instead he employs his son’s 
favorite expression. He orders his son to continue “carrying the fire” 
(ibid., 278):
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I dont know how to.
Yes you do.
Is it real? The fire?
Yes it is.
Where is it? I dont know where it is.
Yes you do. It’s inside you. It was always there. I can see it (ibid., 278–279).
The fire is not an empty saying anymore, but a certainty. An abstract 
concept attains excessive meaning and is filled with meaning without 
grounds: “the ‘fire’ (goodness) seems able to generate heat even when 
no fuel is present” (Graulund 74). There is a fire, there is hope, even 
though nothing in the world indicates this. This line of argument has 
been followed by Wielenberg, who points out that the boy can be con-
sidered the personification of the metaphorical fire: “The man carries 
the fire only in a secondary sense: he carries the child” (9). The father’s 
words are not so much an excuse for his son, they have become a crutch 
for himself. He needs to believe in the son being the ethical fire as 
much as the son needs to believe this himself. Their positions have 
switched; it is not the son who has to believe his father, it is the father 
who has to believe in his son. The father’s former responsibility, the 
demands his son made, turn to the father’s advantage. If he chooses to 
believe in the boy, he can step away from his brutal principles and die 
with his living son as the last image, instead of his dead body. Lutrull 
sees the father’s motivation for not killing his son in a different light. 
He claims that the father has recognized the significance of the son 
for the world:
The man, who formerly loved only the boy and would not hazard the 
boy’s safety for anything, now embraces a broader charity, one that he 
seems to have learned from the boy. The man plans on leaving his son in 
the world […] because he knows that the world needs his son to continue 
carrying the fire (24).
This implies that the father has gone through some sort of transforma-
tion. I, however, would not regard the father’s actions as a charitable 
act towards humanity, but rather as a selfish act; it saves him and allows 
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him a way out of his former responsibility, that of killing his son. His 
actions are the outcome of the ‘event’ that his son has become to him. 
They are not the result of a transformation triggered by an epistemo-
logical insight, but the result of the father’s captivation that he was una-
ble to shake off. The son constantly demands of the father to be good 
and to do good, even though the world hinders this. By agreeing to 
these false acts, agreeing to follow what for him are only white lies, the 
father becomes captivated by his own provisionary attempts. For the 
father, the lie about the ‘good guys’ has become reality, his son is not 
only a good guy, but the “best guy” (McCarthy 279). Thus, the father 
becomes the ethical being his son wishes him to be, experiencing at the 
end even transcendence by recognizing in his son a phenomenon that 
he thought had been lost to the world: goodness.
4.2.2 Oryx and Crake—The Responsibility of the 
Unknowing
4.2.2.1 Introduction
Margaret Atwood is a revered Canadian author whose most well-
known novel is The Handmaids Tale (1985), which is, similar to Oryx 
and Crake, a dystopian novel that raises questions about the cultural 
and scientific practices of our contemporary world. It deals in partic-
ular with feminist issues, a topic that pervades Atwood’s oeuvre and 
that has made her a familiar figure in literary feminist circles. Oryx 
and Crake, the first part of a trilogy, is set in a highly advanced tech-
nological society in the near future. Although the exact time frame 
of the novel is rather vague, most critics have come to the conclusion 
that the novel takes place around 2025 (cf. Sheckles 144). The novel 
portrays a world in which ethical concerns for human life have been 
mostly discarded, making room for various genetic experiments. This 
careless treatment of human lives determines the ethical code of this 
society and has great influence on how the individual interacts with its 
surroundings. In the present time of the novel, a biological catastrophe 
has wiped out humanity and has made the protagonist, Jimmy, the sole 
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human survivor in a post-apocalyptic world.97 Jimmy’s story is narrated 
retrospectively and tells of how he became an unwitting participant in 
the annihilation of humanity. This chapter deals mostly with the world 
before the catastrophe, whereas the chapter “Captives of the Sacred” 
concentrates more on the aftermath.
4.2.2.2 The Inside and the Outside: The Compounds and the 
‘Pleeblands’
The fictional world of Oryx and Crake bears a strong structural resem-
blance to Agamben’s description of the sovereign state. There is an 
inside and an outside and this division is politically as well as socially 
significant. In fact, the people on the inside base their power on the 
‘inferior’ beings on the outside. This division pervades every aspect of 
life and determines the life of the main protagonist, too, whose moral 
stance towards the world is shaped by this organizing structure.
Before the catastrophe the world consists of two realms. The inside is 
comprised of the ‘compounds,’ small, gated communities with highly 
advanced genetic engineering that have been created by large phar-
maceutical companies. These communities function like miniature 
villages for their employees, furnished with schools and hospitals. 
They are shut off from the outside, which is referred to as ‘pleeblands,’ 
appearing to reference ‘plebs’ as Sutherland and Swan suggested (cf. 
225). The pleeblands are rife with disease and illness, and are often 
depicted as chaotic and primitive. It is striking that in Atwood’s novel 
the world is portrayed only from the perspective of the people who live 
inside the compounds. The others, the ones living outside, have simply 
no voice in the novel, and no possibility of conveying their own per-
spective on the situation.98 This insular perspective mirrors Jimmy’s, 
the protagonist’s, experiences, as for the most part he is unaware of the 
97 At the end of the novel it is suggested that Jimmy’s presumption of being the only survi-
vor is wrong. As a matter of fact, Atwood’s following novels, The Year of the Flood (2009) 
and Madd Addam (2013) that are part of the trilogy and take place in the same world, 
depict multiple survivors.
98 The complimentary view is provided by Atwood’s successive novel The Year of the Flood 
which deals with the people living in the pleeblands, and in general with people who 
live outside the privileged society. 
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world outside the gates. However, it also indicates the general igno-
rance of the people ‘inside,’ who simply do not reflect on the outside, 
because this would question their own way of living.
The pleeblands and the compounds appear to be solely antagonistic 
worlds, but in fact, the inside bases its power on the outside. The out-
side, Jimmy is told, is dangerous because it is a breeding ground for dis-
eases, perversion and terrorists. However, the pleeblands appear to be 
quite close to a contemporary experience: “endless billboards and neon 
signs and stretches of buildings, tall and short; endless dingy-looking 
streets, countless vehicles of all kinds, some of them with clouds of 
smoke coming out the back” (ibid., 33). The description engenders a 
certain alienation from the exterior world, with automobiles referred 
to as “vehicles” that have “clouds of smoke coming out the back.” Con-
sidered to be inferior, the inhabitants of the pleeblands are deliberately 
exposed to danger, vulgarity, obscenity and death. Their sphere is used 
as a waste dump for everything that deviates from the norm. Sheckels 
writes that the “pleeblands, in fact, represent the pleasures (good and 
bad) that have been suppressed in the compounds but that are still 
longed for” (145). The pleeblands provide a flourishing sex industry 
and function in secret as an experimental ground for new medications: 
“‘Pay them a few dollars, they don’t even know what they’re taking. 
Sex clinics, of course—they’re happy to help. Whorehouses. Prisons. 
And from the ranks of the desperate, as usual’” (Atwood 357). Later, 
it is even speculated that viruses are spread on purpose throughout 
the pleeblands so that the firms located safely in the compounds can 
sell them their expensive antidotes (cf. ibid., 256).99 The sick and the 
weak are the people that the compounds feed on. They profit from 
them economically by using them as their human guinea pigs and by 
creating a market for medicine against diseases they themselves spread.
99 Schmeink regards the pharmaceutical firms the target of Atwood’s critique: “Ich den-
ke jedoch, dass Atwoods Kritik sich nicht gegen die Wissenschaft verkörpert in Crake 
richtet, sondern vielmehr gegen die Konzerne, die die Wissenschaft lenken. Sie sind es, 
die den Schulunterricht bestimmen, der Genetik keine Ethik als Gegengewicht liefern 
und so durch biopolitische Macht Einfluss auf das soziale Gefüge der Welt nehmen” 
(289).
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This disregard for human life also exists inside the compounds. In fact, 
one could say that the destruction of the sanctity of human life starts 
there. Jimmy’s father works as a geneticist for the company, ‘Organ-
Inc.’ He and other scientists are creating animals that can grow human 
organs, to be used for organ transplants. Not only do they succeed in 
merging animal and human DNA, they have gone even further and 
developed animals whose organs are designed to re-grow. This means 
these animals can be ‘reaped’ of their organs like plants are reaped of 
their fruit. In addition, there is the option of implanting these animals 
with human cell material from the particular donors who would then 
have access to ‘customized’ organs. These grotesque animal hybrids, 
referred to as “pigoons” (ibid., 31) (a mixture of pig and raccoon), live 
a reduced life. Their lives are solely dedicated to experimentation then 
death—and not a conventional death in accordance with some natu-
ral order: either they die because they are still unstable experimental 
creations, or they die when they have fulfilled their purpose, being 
harvested for organs. That these creations are ethically abhorrent is 
reflected in a dark joke the employees make. Since the pigoons are still 
in their testing phase and therefore unstable creatures, countless bod-
ies have to be disposed of after they die. This, the joke goes, coincides 
with the fact that the cafeteria occasionally features a glut of mystery 
meat. These cannibalistic undertones reflect a worrisome aspect of this 
particular form of genetic manipulation. The process of protecting and 
prolonging life inadvertently leads to a human breeding process, which 
reduces human cell material to mere meat, free from any metaphysical 
concept or degree of sacredness. The animal-human hybrids result in 
human life becoming a part of the experimental structure. Human life 
is therefore made equal to animal life, which is to say life that can be 
killed, life which carries no capacity for transcendence.
Jimmy’s father, a fervent believer in the compound system, chooses a 
telling metaphor when describing the relation between the compounds 
and the pleeblands. This metaphor relates to the biopolitical structures 
existing between in- and outside:
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Long ago, in the days of knights and dragons, the kings and dukes had 
lived in castles, with high walls and drawbridges and slots on the ramparts 
so you could pour hot pitch on your enemies […] and the Compounds 
were the same idea. Castles were for keeping you and your buddies nice 
and safe inside, and for keeping everybody else outside (ibid., 34).
This image referring to the Middle Ages evokes a specific view of soci-
ety, namely a desire for reclusion that is coupled with a regressive yearn-
ing for the past. However, whereas the father seems to yearn for a ‘sim-
pler’ time, the compounds in Oryx and Crake both fulfill and negate 
this yearning. On the surface, the compound is similar to a recent past: 
a world similar to that in which “Jimmy’s father was a kid” (ibid., 34); 
and a more distant past, reminiscent of the medieval period described 
above. What is actually going on behind the façade, however, is not a 
simplification, a return to the past, but the development of futuristic 
procedures which demonstrate an increasing disregard for ethical con-
cerns. The image of the kings and dukes is both appropriate and inap-
propriate: Jimmy and his family inhabit a privileged space that closes 
them off from the ‘plebs,’ but their privilege does not stem from their 
being members of an aristocratic family or royal blood line. In fact, it is 
their bio-political power—their ability to turn sacred life into expend-
able life without question, qualm or consideration of consequence—
that ensures them their spot on the safe inside. It is therefore not their 
own blood, but the blood of others (that they shed) that makes them 
into the kings and dukes of their world. Their power is firmly grounded 
on the bodies of others.
That the compound system is ethically problematic is shown through 
Jimmy’s mother. She was once employed by OrganInc, one of the firms 
inside the compounds, but she quit for ethical reasons. She presents 
another view on the compounds, choosing words like “artificial” and 
“theme park” (ibid., 34) to describe them. In the mother’s opinion, the 
compounds’ security not only protects them from the outside, but also 
keeps them locked inside (cf. 67). She is concerned about the experi-
ments with human genetic material that have been made in the com-
pounds, telling her husband, a geneticist, “‘[y]ou’re interfering with 
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the building blocks of life. It’s immoral. It’s…sacrilegious’” (ibid., 67). 
She eventually flees from the compounds. After her escape, the gov-
ernmental structure of the compounds is exposed to Jimmy: he and his 
father are questioned by the compounds’ security guards. Their house 
is searched and they are monitored for the rest of their lives, which 
proves that the mother was right when she described the compounds as 
prisons (cf. ibid., 63). It shows that to be on the inside does not protect 
one from being excluded. If rules are not obeyed, or lines are crossed, 
the people inside are expendable, too.
Jimmy seems to be acceptant of society’s logic. When his mother is 
later on denounced as a traitor and terrorist, he simply complies. He is 
scared to become an outsider and submits himself to his circumstances. 
In fact, Jimmy’s earliest memory is linked to the fear of becoming an 
outsider. The event he recalls is innocently referred to as “bonfire” and 
denotes the incineration of animals that have fallen sick because of a 
virus that has found its way into the community. The virus (suppos-
edly smuggled inside by a terrorist group) is representative of the dan-
gerous outside, and anything that has made contact with it must be 
destroyed. When Jimmy’s father explains to him that the animals had 
to be burnt because they were sick, the young Jimmy fears he himself 
could be killed soon, since he recently had a cold. The fear of being 
seen as an irregularity and turned into a captive is evident early on: 
“He could see his hair on fire, not just a strand or two on a saucer, but 
all of it, still attached to his head. He didn’t want to be put in a heap 
with the cows and pigs. He began to cry” (ibid., 24). The division 
between in-and outside creates captive figures automatically and on 
both sides. The situation of these individuals, test subjects in different 
forms, comes very close to that of Agamben’s homo sacer: they are of 
less value than others, their lives can be played with, and the powerful 
base their power on these captives.
4.2.2.3 Jimmy’s Captivation by Oryx and Crake
An event changes Jimmy’s attitude towards the supposedly ‘natu-
ral’ division between in-and outside. As teenagers, while browsing 
through the internet, Jimmy and his best friend Crake come across 
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a pornographic site that features children performing sexual acts for 
older men. A girl, later named Oryx, is one of the children, with whom 
Jimmy feels an instant connection. From the beginning, Oryx appears 
different to him: “She was just another little girl on a porno site. None 
of those little girls had ever seemed real to Jimmy—they’d always struck 
him as digital clones—but for some reason Oryx was three-dimen-
sional from the start” (ibid., 108). He feels entranced by her and enters 
into a virtual meeting of gazes:
Oryx paused in her activities. […] Then she looked over her shoulder and 
right into the eyes of the viewer—right into Jimmy’s eyes, into the secret 
person inside him. I see you, that look said. I see you watching. I know you. 
I know what you want. […] Jimmy felt burned by this look—eating into, 
as if by acid. […] for the first time he’d felt that what they’d been doing 
was wrong. Before, it had always been entertainment, or else far beyond 
his control, but now he felt culpable (ibid., 109–110).
In this passage, Oryx has her back turned to the viewer at first, then 
suddenly turns around and locks eyes with whoever is watching her. 
She focuses on the viewer, as if she has discovered a familiar face and 
appears to engage in a direct contact. The passage insinuates that a 
private message has been delivered to Jimmy via this contact, a mes-
sage that can only be received by Jimmy who feels exposed, claiming 
she has recognized his “secret person,” his innermost being. Her gaze 
effects pain and also triggers a moral response in Jimmy, resulting in 
him questioning his ethical principles. For the first time, he questions 
his own irresponsible behavior (vis-à-vis the pornographic and violent 
websites). Jimmy feels called to responsibility by Oryx and is made self-
aware, for the first time, of his own participation in the exploitation 
of others.100 The encounter with Oryx, similar to the bonfire, reveals 
100 Lévinas writes on the gaze of the Other in Totality and Infinity (1969): “This gaze 
that supplicates and demands, that can supplicate only because it demands, deprived 
of everything because entitled to everything, and which one recognizes in giving (as 
one ‘puts the things in question in giving’)—this gaze is precisely the epiphany of the 
face as a face. The nakedness of the face is destituteness. To recognize the Other is to 
recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other is to give. But it is to give to the master, to 
the lord, to him whom one approaches as ‘You’[Vous] in a dimension of height” (75).
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something that is new to him, namely a different view of the outsid-
ers and ‘inferior’ beings in his world. Oryx’s life is completely alien to 
Jimmy, since her life is defined by constant observation by strangers, 
depriving her totally of a private sphere. By contrast, Jimmy has always 
been safely locked inside the gates of the community, a place where 
most people can’t even see inside, let alone enter. Instead of dismissing 
Oryx as inferior, as his community would, Jimmy feels responsible for 
her—a feeling he is unfamiliar with. From then on, he carries a screen-
shot of her gaze with him (cf. ibid., 110).
As an adult Jimmy comes across the real Oryx unexpectedly when he 
starts working for his friend Crake, who has become a successful sci-
entist in the meantime. Meeting Oryx for the first time after so many 
years is a shocking moment for Jimmy: “Gazing into those eyes, Jimmy 
had a moment of pure bliss, pure terror […] How could a person be 
caught that way, in an instant, by a glance, the lift of an eyebrow, the 
curve of an arm? But he was” (ibid., 370–371). Although she is Crake’s 
girlfriend, Jimmy and Oryx also get involved with each other and begin 
an affair. Jimmy suspects early on that Oryx means danger to him: 
“He wanted to touch Oryx, worship her, open her up like a beauti-
fully wrapped package, even though he suspected that there was some-
thing—some harmful snake or homemade bomb or lethal powder—
concealed within” (ibid., 374–375). Oryx is depicted as a Trojan horse, 
a gift that seems too good to be true and could be dangerous when 
opened. Ultimately, Jimmy’s suspicions prove well-founded. Oryx is a 
pawn in a game of chess that Crake has devised in order to fulfill his 
mad plans for a new world. Crake has ‘activated’ Jimmy’s role in these 
plans by bringing Oryx into the game—he uses Jimmy’s feelings for 
her, forcing Jimmy to become his accomplice.
Crake is an exemplary character in the novel. He appears to be able to 
ignore the boundaries of the system, or rather, he is the only one who 
is located both in-and outside as Grayson Cooke notes:
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Crake is a kind of bioterrorist of the inside, a pharmakeus who leads all 
who follow him into opposition with themselves. He works within the 
system of the corporates, but maintains an unpredictable streak of calcu-
lating anarchy that allows him to be both inside and outside, poison and 
cure at the same time (114–115).
Crake works in an elite compound where he is one of the leading sci-
entists. The experiments Crake deals with go even further than those 
in OrganInc. Crake and his employees have created new species of 
animals that are able to reproduce naturally, which turns these sci-
entists by definition into creators, leading Korte to designate Crake 
“a self-appointed lord of creation” (Fundamentalism at the End 161). 
Crake has also developed a new species of man, an ameliorated version, 
so to speak, of humans, later called ‘Crakers.’ The Crakers’ abilities go 
beyond human ones, with their character traits completely manipu-
lated so that they have become peace-loving, even ‘innocent’ beings.
What had been altered was nothing less than the ancient primate brain. 
Gone were its destructive features, the features responsible for the world’s 
current illnesses. For instance, racism […] had been eliminated in the 
model group, merely by switching the bonding mechanism: the Paradice 
people [the Crakers] simply did not register skin colour. Hierarchy could 
not exist among them, because they lacked the neural complexes that 
would have created it. Since they were neither hunters nor agricultur-
alists hungry for land, there was no territoriality: the king-of-the-castle 
hard-wiring that had plagued humanity had, in them, been unwired. They 
ate nothing but leaves and grass and roots and a berry or two […] their 
sexuality was not a constant torment to them, not a cloud of turbulent 
hormones: they came into heat at regular intervals, as did most mammals 
other than man. […] They would have no need to invent any harmful 
symbolisms, such as kingdoms, icons, gods, or money (ibid., 366–367). 
The Crakers, although supposedly superior beings, are purely biopo-
litical beings: strongly controlled, both from the inside and the out-
side, by genetic manipulation and by the way they are educated and 
raised. Crake’s project has led literary critics to recognize him as “a mad 
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scientist who plays god” (Korte, Fundamentalism and the End 161), 
see him as a character reminiscent of Shelley’s Frankenstein (Korte 
Women’s Views of Last Men 158), or H.G. Well’s Dr. Moreau (How-
ells 2006: 164). DiMarco remarks on this issue: “Once thought to be 
a quality of the divine—to create a person outside of natural birth—it 
now becomes known and measured by man” (2005: 184).101 This new 
species is developed in order to sell them to childless couples who can 
‘order’ special features for their children. This is coupled with the pro-
duction of a supposed sexual stimulant, “BlyssPluss” (Atwood 354), 
which, however, unknown to the future buyers, will lead to sterility 
if taken. This is a ploy, since it makes artificial reproduction necessary 
and, thus, creates a demand for the Crakers. Jimmy has been hired by 
Crake to develop marketing strategies for “BlyssPluss.” In secret, how-
ever, Crake wants to replace all of humanity with the Crakers, whom 
he thinks are ‘better’ than the original human beings and less flawed. 
This is why the BlyssPluss pills contain a virus that kills everyone on 
the planet, except Jimmy, who is supposed to become a guardian to 
the Crakers. Jimmy is not aware of Crake’s plan for him and remains 
so until it is too late.
4.2.2.4 Enforced Guardianship
One day Jimmy is asked to come to the Paradice complex since Crake 
is absent and Jimmy has been named second in command by him. It 
appears a virus has broken out and is spreading throughout the world. 
Readers will learn later that the virus was developed by Crake and then 
distributed through the BlyssPluss pills. Besides Crake, only Oryx and 
Jimmy have been immunized (without their knowledge) to the virus. 
101 Only one critic, Schmeink, considers Crake’s actions as a rebellious and even ethical act 
against the current capitalistic regime: “In seinem mildtätigen Akt unterläuft Crake die 
Vision des Konzerns und verhindert so das kapitalistische Utopia, in dem jede mensch-
liche Reproduktion zum vermarkteten Produkt mutiert ist. Er verweigert Empire die 
Kontrolle des Biopolitischen und löst damit die Biomasse—inklusive des Menschen—
aus dem festem Griff der Konzernmacht. Sein kreativer Akt wird zur Neuschreibung 
der Zukunft, sein Gegenentwurf zur Herausforderung des hegemonialen status quo 
und seine Schöpfung zum Hoffnungsträger für eine bessere Welt, die das fehlerhafte 
Modell—uns—ausschließt” (290). I would not read Crake’s action in such a positive 
way. Since Jimmy is our main figure of identification, I believe the outrageousness of 
Crake’s plan is rather underscored by showing how negatively it affects Jimmy. 
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When Crake returns, Jimmy has locked everyone else out of the secure 
dome and has changed the code. Crake is carrying Oryx in his arms 
and, after admitting his crimes to Jimmy, demands to be let in. When 
Jimmy agrees and allows him to come inside 
Jimmy took out his spraygun. Then he punched in the code. He stood 
back and to the side. All the hairs on his arms were standing up. We under-
stand more than we know. The door swung open. […] As Jimmy watched, 
frozen with disbelief, Crake let Oryx fall backwards, over his left arm. He 
looked at Jimmy, a direct look, unsmiling. “I’m counting on you,” he said. 
Then he slit her throat. Jimmy shot him (ibid., 393–394).
The way this passage is written frames this incident in a practical logic 
that suggests that every action is a simple reaction to what has hap-
pened before. There is no reflective tone inserted. The action, “[t]hen 
he slit her throat,” occurs without any description of Jimmy’s thoughts 
or his reaction to it. It is followed by another succinctly described 
action, “Jimmy shot him.” There is no screaming, no exclamation of 
horror; only action and reaction. Reality for Jimmy in this moment is 
pared down to an elementary mode: there is no time to think, reflect, 
or temporize. He simply acts. Crake’s last words, that Crake is “count-
ing” on Jimmy, could refer to two things: one is that Crakes counts 
on Jimmy to take care of the Crakers as Jimmy once promised him. 
The other is that Crake counted on Jimmy to kill him all along, help-
ing Crake with his suicide. This would mean that Crake has manipu-
lated Jimmy by taking advantage of his feelings for Oryx. What Jimmy 
might label later on as a passionate act of love is thus actually a calcu-
lated event. Jimmy “recognizes that he is enacting a script Crake has 
written for him” (Snyder 481) therefore, he turns into a human lab 
rat whose actions have been calculated in advance. Nevertheless, this 
does not discount this event as being eventful—even if only in the 
eyes of Jimmy.
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Crake’s plan has been successful: humanity is erased, he has been killed 
and only one human is left to take care of the Crakers until they have 
adapted to their new circumstances. Because Jimmy has turned from 
privileged prince into the last surviving human being, he has no other 
choice than to take care of the Crakers. They are all that is left to him.
I could leave them behind, he thought. Just leave them. Let them fend 
for themselves. They aren’t my business. But he couldn’t do that, because 
although the Crakers weren’t his business, they were now his responsi-
bility. Who else did they have? Who else did he have, for that matter? 
(ibid., 416).
Wolter claims at that point that “[o]nly through human agency and a 
sense of responsibility is Crake’s greatest experiment, in effect, saved. 
Individual action and personal and social responsibility ultimately 
play the decisive role” (269). However, Wolter appears to assume that 
Jimmy acted this way on his own accord, whereas I would argue that 
Crake’s manipulation denies every choice on Jimmy’s part. Jimmy is 
rather, as Wisker puts it, “cornered into responsibility” (150). He 
becomes an unwilling supporter of Crake’s mad plan for a new way of 
life on earth. Although he is against everything that Crake has done, 
he acts out his role in this game. Forced to by the circumstances he 
becomes the Crakers’ “reluctant rescuer” (Howells 2005: 179). The 
murder becomes the event that changes Jimmy. He is forced from then 
on to take care of the Crakers and to become their guardian.
However, the event also revealed his captivation by Crake for the first 
time. It reveals that the relationship between the two friends is actually 
one between scientist and guinea pig. Thus, their relationship mirrors 
the power dynamic that is so central to the novel and the portrayed 
society. Crake is a mad scientist who has turned the world into an 
experiment and everyone inside into captive test subjects locked in a 
new state of nature. The plan that Crake has clandestinely concocted 
unfolds in an eerily deterministic fashion that allows the ‘pair of dice’ 
(Sutherland and Swan 233) in ‘Paradice’ (the name of the Crakers’ 
habitat and the name of the scientific project) to be read in relation to 
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one of the most notable quotes in 20th century science: Albert Ein-
stein’s “Gott würfelt nicht.”102 This was Einstein’s way of rebutting the 
hypothesis that the universe might be ruled by pure chance. Crake’s 
role in the novel is similar to that of a god who introduces a design that 
likewise seems to exclude chance. Although this God doesn’t throw 
dice either, he does play chess. At their regular chess games Crake talks 
about his beliefs:
 “All it takes,” said Crake, “is the elimination of one generation. One gen-
eration of anything. Beetles, trees, microbes, scientists, speakers of French, 
whatever. Break the link in time between one generation and the next, 
and it’s game over forever.” “Speaking of games,” said Jimmy, “it’s your 
move” (Atwood 270).
It is crucial that Crake’s matter-of-fact comment is framed by a game 
of chess. DiMarco states that one has to understand “game theory as 
integral to deciphering a deeper understanding of the plot” (2005: 
185). The irony here is that Jimmy’s life is part of a game of chess that 
Crake has created behind his back. Therefore, this passage becomes a 
meta-comment on Jimmy and Crake’s relationship. Whereas Crake 
outlines his ideas to Jimmy, Jimmy shows no interest in them and does 
not take them very seriously. Instead, he urges Crake to make his next 
move in their game. Whereas Jimmy is focused on what is in front 
of him, Crake sees beyond this game and aims for the greater play.103 
Crake is obviously intellectually superior to Jimmy and can be com-
pared to Agamben’s sovereign in this matter, in particular because he 
102 See Albert Einstein’s letter to Max Born dated December 4th 1926 in Albert Einstein 
und Max Born: Briefwechsel, 1916–1955. 1969. München: Langenmüller, 2005.
103 Crake understands early on how to become a strong player in the world. In The Year of 
the Flood Crake appears a few times as a child. One of the main protagonists, Ren, tells 
of her conversations with him: “He’d talk about other things too. One day, he said that 
what you had to do in any adversarial situation was to kill the king, as in chess. I said 
people didn’t have kings any more. He said he meant the centre of power, but today 
it wouldn’t be a single person, it would be the technological connections. I said, you 
mean like coding and splicing, and he said, “Something like that” (228).
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plays with lives and decides who lives and who dies.104 However, the 
sovereign cannot build his empire on his own, he needs an antagonis-
tic figure like the homo sacer. I would argue that Jimmy takes on this 
role, here. Crake can only become (as Machat puts it) the “executioner 
of the human race” (92) because Jimmy is made to be an “unwitting 
accomplice,” according to Synder (481). However, Jimmy is not Agam-
ben’s homo sacer to the letter, because he actually experiences a shift in 
his status as a subject: after killing Crake and being left with the Crak-
ers he is not the same as before. He has become a responsible subject, 
even though his actions have hurt himself the most, he continues tak-
ing care of others.
It appears that a subject’s empowerment and thus its ethical choices 
are severely limited by the society and the political structure they are 
part of. Jimmy is only allowed to become ‘ethical’ inside the parameters 
of Crake’s plan. So, even though he kills Crake and in a way defends 
Oryx emotionally, this is an expected outcome for Crake. Becoming an 
ethical being means becoming a captive being at the same time. Thus, 
this novel demonstrates most effectively how empowerment and cap-
tivation are unavoidably linked to each other. Atwood’s book points 
to the fact that the captive state can never really be left behind alto-
gether, but informs the empowerment of the subject. In a way, one has 
seen this also in previous examples. Briony in Atonement is admittedly 
a powerful author figure, however, she remains forever bound to the 
flaws that make up her authorship.
104 Agamben, in fact, sees the modern scientist as sovereign figure. For this argument 
 Agamben draws on the role of physicians during the Holocaust who violated the Hip-
pocratic oath: “The fact is that the National Socialist Reich marks the point at which 
the integration of medicine and politics, which is one of the essential characteristics 
of modern biopolitics, began to assume its final form. This implies that the sovereign 
decision on bare life comes to be displaced from strictly political motivations and ar-
eas to a more ambiguous terrain in which the physician and the sovereign seem to ex-
change roles” (HS 143).
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Eventually, Jimmy is able to go beyond what is expected of him on 
other levels. In the chapter “Captives of the Sacred” I will take a closer 
look at his guardianship. Although it appears at first that Crake’s plan 
has worked, there are also side-effects to his plan that make more out 
of Jimmy than Crake ever envisioned him to be, namely a sacred figure.
4.2.3 The White Tiger —The Responsibility of the 
Murderer
4.2.3.1 Introduction
Aravind Adiga is an Indian-Australian author whose first novel The 
White Tiger won the Booker Prize in 2008. Adiga’s novel offers a gen-
eral critique of the capitalistic system in the Third World, drawing 
attention in particular to its labor conditions. The tone of the novel, 
however, is very humorous, ironic and light, and borrows elements 
from the picaresque novel, which indicates that the novel is not meant 
to be taken too seriously, or even to be treated as a first-hand witness 
account of the situation in India today.
The White Tiger is an epistolary novel consisting of seven letters that 
the main protagonist Balram Halwai writes to the Chinese Prime Min-
ister. In these letters Balram tells of his life and his success as an “entre-
preneur” (4), which is a euphemism for killing his boss and stealing a 
large sum of money from him. Adiga’s picaresque novel clearly mocks 
and satirizes the traditional Bildungsroman. Balram is not an individ-
ual who evolves and progresses in life, learning about his environment 
until he decides to become an active part in society. Rather, Balram is a 
morally ambivalent servant who has only two choices in life: to remain 
a poor servant or to climb up the ladder by turning into a corrupt 
criminal like everyone else. Balram’s turning point, his change from 
a captive into an enabled subject, is of a criminal nature. He becomes 
an authorial figure, turning others into his captives, which presents 
a rather simple change in status that defines change only in terms of 
power. The powerless being turns into the same corrupt powerful type 
that Balram has encountered all through his life. This is in line with 
the ‘rules’ of the picaresque novel, in which the protagonist develops 
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from “a relative innocent […] into a picaro because the world he meets 
is roguish” (Miller 56). Because of this inspiration by the picaresque 
tradition, The White Tiger is the one example in this dissertation in 
which the protagonist comes close to Agamben’s ‘empowered’ figure, 
that of the sovereign. For this reason the novel possesses a rather sin-
gular position in this chapter on ethics, since even though its charac-
ter becomes somewhat ethical in his behavior, this is mostly fueled by 
power-hunger. Nevertheless, since his power is based on structures that 
have an ethical grounding, I argue that this novel is worth looking at, 
even if it points out the limitations of how a subject can be enabled 
in ethical terms.
4.2.3.2 Consumers and Consumed
The life of the main protagonist, Balram Halwai, is predetermined by 
assuming responsibility early on. As a youth he is pulled out of school 
in order to work for the people from whom his family has lent money: 
“the Storck [a powerful person in Balram’s district] has called in his 
loan. […] So they had to hand me [Balram] over too” (Adiga 36). He 
painfully experiences the impact economic demands have on his young 
life and how they intrude upon him personally. Balram occupies a par-
adoxical position in his family: although he is a crucial member in 
his family as one of its providers, his life is treated carelessly: he must 
ensure his family’s economic security, even though this might harm his 
education and physical health. Multani writes critically about this situ-
ation: “The family, in Adiga’s representation of contemporary India is 
shown as grasping, greedy, and functioning on motives of profit rather 
than by bonds of love or fidelity” (1042).
The power structures in The White Tiger are simple: the weak are asso-
ciated with meat and exist to be consumed, whereas the powerful are 
the consumers. Routinely, the men in Balram’s family leave for a couple 
of months in order to work in the cities. Their return to their families is 
not celebrated as one might expect, but depicted like a feeding scene:
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A month before the rains, the men came back from Dhanbad and Delhi 
and Calcutta, leaner, darker, angrier, but with money in their pockets. The 
women were waiting for them. They hid behind the door, and as soon as 
the men walked in, they pounced like wildcats on a slab of flesh. There 
was fighting and wailing and shrieking (Adiga 26).
The men’s bodies are compared to “slab[s] of flesh,” whereas the women 
have become like wild animals fighting for food, ripping the money 
out of the men’s hands. The return of the men is insignificant, except 
for the money they bring with them. They are welcomed neither by 
their wives nor their children; they are attacked and consumed instead. 
Fittingly, the matriarch of Balram’s family is named ‘Kusum’ which 
phonetically comes very close to the word ‘consume.’ Located at the 
centre of the family, she eats up the fruits of other people’s work and 
makes sure she is well provided for. That this economic frame must be 
considered an imprisonment which slowly devours its inhabitants is 
conveyed by showing how the bodies of the poor are victimized by this 
logic. Balram’s father is described as follows:
My father’s spine was a knotted rope, the kind women use in villages to 
pull water from wells; the clavicle curved around his neck in high relief, 
like a dog’s collar; cuts and nicks and scars, like little whip marks in his 
flesh, ran down his chest and waist, reaching down below his hipbones 
into his buttocks (ibid., 26–27).
The description of the father’s body employs economic terms and com-
parisons. His spine is compared to the rope of a water well and his 
clavicles are said to be reminiscent of a dog’s collar. These images and 
comparisons highlight his body’s purely functional use, like a beast of 
burden for economic gain. The canine comparison degrades the father 
even further: he is more or less an animal working for the family rather 
than being a part of it. When Balram, who has started working as a 
chauffeur, returns to his home village, he learns that his brother Kis-
han has taken on the role of the family’s provider. Yet, Kishan has not 
only taken on his father’s role, his body has also turned into that of his 
father: “Kishan had changed. He was thinner, and darker—his neck 
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tendons were sticking out in high relief above the deep clavicles. He 
had become, all of a sudden, my father” (ibid., 85). The family dinner 
becomes a cannibalistic offering to Balram who knows that the food is 
provided by his brother’s hard work: “There was red, curried bone and 
flesh in front of me—and it seemed to me that they had served me flesh 
from Kishan’s own body on that plate” (ibid.). This image disturbs Bal-
ram, who refuses to eat what is on his plate and to join the consump-
tion of the weak. Balram recognizes what happens to all the men in his 
family: under the pressure of the responsibility for their family they 
are diminished, emaciated, devoured in body and in spirit—wasted. 
The structure of the Indian family is only a reflection of Indian society 
as portrayed in the novel. The central underlying semi-political struc-
ture in India is identified by Balram as the ‘Rooster Coop,’ which is also 
divided between consumer and consumed: “Here in India we have no 
dictatorship. No secret police. That’s because we have the coop” (ibid., 
175). In general, the social class Balram belongs to is considered live-
stock. The coop keeps the servants in place:
The greatest thing to come out of this country in the ten thousand years 
of its history is the Rooster Coop. Go to Old Delhi, behind the Jama 
Masjid, and look at the way they keep chickens there in the market. Hun-
dreds of pale hens and brightly coloured roosters, stuffed tightly into wire-
mesh cages, packed as tightly as worms in a belly, pecking each other and 
shitting each other, jostling just for breathing space; the whole cage giv-
ing off a horrible stench—the stench of terrified, feathered flesh. On the 
wooden desk above this coop sits a grinning young butcher, showing off 
the flesh and organs of a recently chopped-up chicken, still oleaginous 
with a coating of dark blood. The roosters in the coop smell the blood 
from above. They see the organs of their brothers lying around them. 
They know they’re next. Yet they do not rebel. They do not try to get out 
of the coop (ibid., 173).
There is only one fate for anyone who leaves the coop—death. As a 
consequence every rooster stays calmly inside the coop, immobilized 
by fear. The passage above works to a great extent with visual imagery 
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and olfactory impressions, bringing the Rooster Coop to life. The 
descriptions evoke other images and associations that characterize the 
space of the rooster as a death-zone. The “feathered flesh” that refers 
to the roosters is reminiscent of a punishment in the Middle Ages, 
when people were literally feathered in order to mark them as outsid-
ers. The image of the servants being packed as “tightly as worms in a 
belly” recalls rotten cadavers, infected and overtaken by worms that 
slowly eat away the flesh. In these crammed circumstances even can-
nibalism is possible, implied by the disclosure that the roosters peck 
each other. In fact, the Rooster Coop’s inhabitants turn on their own: 
“The Rooster Coop was doing its work. Servants have to keep other 
servants from becoming innovators, experimenters, or entrepreneurs. 
[…] The coop is guarded from the inside” (ibid., 193–194). Thus, from 
the outside and the inside this state of immobility and fear is created. 
Above these gruesome conditions is only the butcher, who is depicted 
as being young, grinning and arrogant. He even seems to enjoy scar-
ing the roosters by pulling their insides out and spreading the organs 
throughout the coop. In this very blunt image, the butcher is the only 
alternative to the Rooster Coop.
Balram belongs clearly to those in society who are consumed, and lim-
ited to live inside the Rooster Coop. He moves to the city and starts 
working as a chauffeur for a rich Indian family. Yet, he remains bound 
by his family and their expectations and demands. He is never allowed 
to keep his earnings for himself, but is pressured to send money home 
to his family, which he at some point stops doing. The grandmother 
begins sending her letters directly to Balram’s masters in order to gain 
control. Balram sees himself trapped: “I did not want to obey Kusum 
[his grandmother]. She was blackmailing me” (ibid., 192). His eco-
nomic debt also merges into a juridical obligation. While working for 
his master Ashok, Balram succeeds in becoming his confidant and is 
even considered part of his family. But Balram’s slow and tentative 
inclusion into his master’s family brings with it uncomfortable con-
sequences. One night, he drives his master and his master’s girlfriend 
home, both intoxicated and in a rather careless mood. On an impulse 
Pinky Madam, Ashok’s girlfriend, decides to switch seats with Bal-
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ram and drive the car by herself. The switch is not consensual and 
Balram feels that his wishes have been disregarded. Shortly after the 
switch, Pinky Madam causes an accident by running over something 
lying on the street. Not sure what exactly they have hit—a dog or a 
beggar child—and in complete shock, Ashok asks Balram to drive 
them back home. The next day Balram is called from his servant’s quar-
ters. Ashok’s brother, called the ‘Mongoose,’ an unexpected visitor to 
Ashok’s home, welcomes him with the following words: “Sit, sit, make 
yourself comfortable, Balram. You are part of the family” (ibid., 165). 
This phrase is repeated several times. It will be shown that to belong 
to the family means to take on yet another burden. In the presence of 
the family lawyer Balram is given a typed-up confession that impli-
cates Balram in the accident. It is explained to him that he should, as 
a precaution, take the blame for the accident. Balram is shocked by 
this development. Even his grandmother, the matriarch of the fam-
ily, has already given her consent: “‘She says she’s so proud of you for 
doing this. She’s agreed to be a witness to the confession as well. That’s 
her thumbprint on the page, Balram. Just below the spot where you’re 
going to sign’” (ibid., 168). The grandmother convicts him in the name 
of his family, and leaves him no way out of this situation. Her body—
via the thumb—has spoken against Balram and has obligated his body. 
He has no other choice but to be the “perfect servant” (ibid., 169). If he 
rebels against his master’s decision, the safety of his family is in danger; 
they would be harmed or even killed (cf. 176). Later, in his quarters, 
he reflects on his situation:
For a whole day I was down there in my dingy room, my legs pulled up 
to my chest, sitting inside that mosquito net, too frightened to leave the 
room. No one asked me to drive the car. No one came down to see me. My 
life had been written away. I was to go to jail for a killing I had not done. 
I was in terror, and yet not once did the thought of running away cross 
my mind. Not once did the thought, I’ll tell the judge the truth, cross my 
mind. I was trapped (ibid., 177).
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Retreating into the position of an embryo—mimicking the physique 
of the smallest possible member in a family—Balram realizes his own 
inability to act freely, to make his own choices. Even the law operates 
with a capitalistic logic, condemning him to be of less value than the 
truly guilty. His general debt to his family has become a debt before 
the law. In the end, Balram is spared from going to jail, since there 
are no witnesses to the accident and the police have been bribed. But 
the events have left their imprint on Balram. He feels increasingly ill-
treated by his master and his family and recognizes his hopeless state. 
He feels trapped in a state of constant obligation; being a captive to 
his circumstances, his family and his master. Thus, his captivation is a 
social reality, the hard facts of his life.
4.2.3.3 Under Attack by Events
Balram’s captivation—carrying his family on his back and owing a debt 
he can never pay off—reaches its most extreme form, when another 
burden to carry appears, personified by his nephew. On this arrival, the 
nephew intrudes into Balram’s last refuge, his private sphere. Balram 
lives in a room apart from the main dormitories. Although this room is 
infested by insects, it nevertheless has one small advantage: it is located 
outside the reach of the electric bell that summons the servants: “One 
disadvantage was that the electric bell did not penetrate this room—
but that was a kind of advantage, too, I discovered in time” (ibid., 132). 
This means, he lives not only apart from his fellow servants, but also 
removed, to some extent, from the ‘call’ of his master, which implies 
that Balram yearns for more control over his life. He makes the best of 
his room and furnishes it with a mosquito net that allows him to exert 
control over unwanted houseguests:
Some of the cockroaches landed on top of the net; from inside, I could see 
their dark bodies against its white weave. I folded in the fibre of the net 
and crushed one of them. The other cockroaches took no notice of this; 
they kept landing on the net—and getting crushed (ibid., 131).
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His room is clearly the only place where Balram is in control, since it 
offers him a setting which is a miniature version of the Rooster Coop, 
only in this case Balram takes on the role of the butcher. When Bal-
ram returns to his room one day, a stranger is waiting who introduces 
himself as his nephew Dharam. The fact that his nephew is already 
waiting for him in his personal space reveals that Balram possesses no 
real privacy, anyone can intrude into his home.105 The nephew’s arrival 
is framed as a disruptive event that is structured by unwillingly per-
formed actions on both sides. When Balram meets his nephew, both 
react in utter shock:
A boy was waiting for me near my bed, holding a letter between his teeth 
as he adjusted the buttons of his pants. He turned around when he heard 
me; the letter flew out of his mouth and to the ground. The wrench fell 
out of my hand at the same time (ibid., 261).
Balram lets go of the wrench, the instrument with which he was plan-
ning to kill Ashok. That his nephew comes in between his murder 
plans underlines the nephew’s control function. The nephew, surprised 
by the sound, turns around quickly, causing the letter to fall out of his 
mouth, implying both the inability to speak out of shock, but also 
the inadvertent confession/slip of words. Balram and his nephew have 
become subject to their own instinctual behavior, unable to control 
their reactions. The handover has failed: the boy has turned his back 
to his uncle and instead of delivering the letter by hand, he loses it. The 
message he is supposed to deliver visually and literally tumbles out of 
his mouth. The boy then explains to Balram that he was sent to him by 
his grandmother to be taken care of. In addition to this, in the letter, 
the grandmother threatens to report Balram to his master if he does 
not start to send money back home again. She also announces that she 
has found a suitable woman for Balram and is preparing his marriage. 
This would bind Balram further to his family and the village there. The 
105 Agamben refers to this as leading the life of an “absolute private person” (Means without 
end 122), namely one whose private affairs are completely determined by their ability 
to be open to exposure at all times. Agamben refers here to the Jewish people during 
WWII whose life and fate had been reduced to being Jewish alone.
162 4 Captives of Ethics
nephew is a constant reminder of his duty to his family: not only is 
Balram supposed to take Dharam everywhere he goes and to take care 
of him, the nephew also brings letters of future obligations with him. 
In this light it is only fitting that the nephew’s name ‘Dharam’ alludes 
to ‘Dharma.’ In Hinduism this describes a duty or obligation. Than-
nippara summarizes the meaning of the term as follows: “Sitte, Recht 
und Gesetz, die Wahrheit, die ethischen und religiösen Verpflichtun-
gen, Moral und Religion“ (Lexikon der Religionen 122). 
For Balram the news the nephew brings him is the last straw, over-
whelmed by how his captivation is increasingly intensified, he starts 
hitting his nephew, unable to control himself. This is evidence of Bal-
ram’s helpless state; he has only violence to retreat to, acting as if he 
is experiencing a seizure. Balram reacts differently from before to his 
intensified imprisonment: instead of curling up like an embryo, he hits 
back, even though he misses the real target (his family, his master). This 
change of attitude makes the meeting between Balram and Dharam 
an event, since Balram’s reaction to his nephew’s arriving is surprising 
and out of character. Even though Balram’s reaction is primitive and 
only mimics the power relations he grew up with it marks a significant 
point in his life.
It appears as if Balram has been broken down finally and has accepted 
his unconditional servitude. To show his submission to the new cir-
cumstances and appreciation for his new apprentice in front of his 
master, Balram takes his nephew to the zoo. In this context, it is signif-
icant that the zoo is a home for captives and that it exposes animals as 
captives, the artificial habitat only underscoring their out-of-placeness. 
Berger writes how the zoo in its original form is considered to be part 
of the sovereign’s realm:
When they were founded—the London Zoo in 1828, the Jardin de Plan-
tes in 1793, the Berlin Zoo in 1844, they brought considerable prestige 
to the national capitals. The prestige was not so different from that which 
had accrued to the private royal menageries. These menageries, along with 
gold plate, architecture, orchestras, players, furnishings, dwarfs, acrobats, 
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uniforms, horses, art and food, had been demonstrations of the emperor’s 
or king’s power and wealth. Likewise in the 19th century, public zoos were 
an endorsement of modern colonial power. The capturing of the animals 
was a symbolic representation of the conquest of all distant and exotic 
lands. “Explorers” proved their patriotism by sending home a tiger or an 
elephant. The gift of an exotic animal to the metropolitan zoo became a 
token in subservient diplomatic relations (19).
Even, today, without the aristocratic background, power is still demon-
strated in a zoo simply by keeping the animals in cages and turning 
natural predators into pets that can be looked at. The zoo is thus still 
a space that exhibits power relations and shows how abilities can be 
forcefully limited by spatial delineations. This division of power is 
transferred to the level of perception. The zoo implies a certain hier-
archy between the one who looks and the one who is looked at. The 
animals are turned into objects by the onlookers, as Berger notes: 
A zoo is a place where as many species and varieties of animal as possible 
are collected in order that they can be seen, observed, studied. In princi-
ple, each cage is a frame round the animal inside it. Visitors visit the zoo 
to look at animals. They proceed from cage to cage, not unlike visitors in 
an art gallery who stop in front of one painting, and then move on to the 
next or the one after next (21).
The zoo is compared to an art gallery, in which the cages serve as 
frames. This reduces the animals to images with no independent life 
of their own, to mere objects. Balram likewise uses the zoo to present 
his own thoughts, employing the animals as stand-ins or examples, 
rather than seeing them for what they are. To him, the animals illus-
trate the social structure in India: “The lion and the lioness were apart 
from each other and not talking, like a true city couple” (Adiga 276) 
and he bases his philosophy on the zoo’s structure: “Let animals live 
like animals; let humans live like humans” (ibid., 276). However, as 
Berger points out, if one sees animals merely as objects, as art works in 
frames, this is because the visitor’s view is distorted: 
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Yet in the zoo the view is always wrong. Like an image out of focus. One 
is so accustomed to this that one scarcely notices it any more; or, rather, 
the apology habitually anticipates the disappointment, so that the latter 
is not felt. And the apology runs like this: What do you expect? It’s not a 
dead object you have to come to look at, it’s alive. It’s leading its own life. 
Why should this coincide with its being properly visible? Yet the reason-
ing of this apology is inadequate. The truth is more startling. However you 
look at these animals, even if the animal is up against the bars, less than a 
foot from you, looking outwards in the public direction, you are looking 
at something that has been rendered absolutely marginal; and all the con-
centration you can muster will never be enough to centralise it (21–22).
Berger’s intention in this passage is to point out the marginalization of 
the animals that is produced by the zoo’s arrangement. The viewer him-
self turns into a colonist, denying the animals the status of equivalent 
subjects by staring at them uninhibitedly. I would like to focus here 
on the way Berger describes perception. He says the “view is always 
wrong,” meaning that there is no accurate perspective directed at the 
animal that would preclude its marginalization. The image is necessar-
ily “out of focus,” because it is not an image at all, but a living being, 
not frozen in time, but breathing and changeable. Thus, for Balram the 
image will come ‘into focus,’ when suddenly, one animal in the zoo, a 
white tiger, looks back at Balram. This experience overwhelms him 
completely, causing him to faint: 
The tiger’s eyes met my eyes, like my master’s eyes have met mine so often 
in the mirror of the car. All at once, the tiger vanished. A tingling went 
from the base of my spine into my groin. My knees began to shake; I felt 
light […] The ground beneath me was shaking. Something was digging its 
way towards me; and then claws tore out of mud and dug into my flesh 
and pulled me down into the dark earth (Adiga 277).
This scene appears to be a mystical experience, an impression that is 
intensified by Balram’s never explaining what, exactly, has happened to 
him during this moment. It is only suggested that some sort of connec-
tion has been made through the exchange of glances and that Balram 
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can only react to this by surrendering his body. The scene shows how 
a view that is out of focus comes into focus suddenly when Balram’s 
gaze is returned, resulting in Balram being captivated by the hypnotic 
spell of the tiger. Since the novel’s title refers to a white tiger, this event 
is of central meaning in the novel. Balram’s nickname as a child had 
been ‘white tiger,’ but it was used quite humorously, since the nick-
name was rather unsuitable. He is everything but a white tiger, which 
implicates power, being instead prey to the predators who determine 
his life. The fact that Balram is now hypnotized by a white tiger signals 
to the reader that a change must be at hand. Furthermore, the scene 
implies a specific reading of Balram’s own situation, one that is sup-
ported throughout the novel, namely that Balram’s situation in life, 
and in particular at this boss’s house, can be understood as an inhuman 
imprisonment, since the gaze that he shares with the locked up ani-
mal in the zoo indicates a companionship between the two. The scene 
hints to the reader that a break-out is at hand and, as I would argue, 
even legitimizes such an action, since it identifies Balram’s situation as 
comparable to the imprisonment of an animal. Thus, the scene makes 
the reader accept a particular ethical standpoint towards Balram’s cap-
tivity: the reader condemns Balram’s captivity and feels empathy for 
his plan to break out.
As a consequence of this experience Balram cuts all ties with his fam-
ily. He orders his nephew to start writing a letter home, chronicling 
everything that happened at the zoo that day. But soon he takes over 
his nephew’s letter by dictating its content, making the letter a message 
from him rather than his nephew. He describes how he fainted under 
the firm eyes of the tiger and how he, while recovering, was heard by 
the other people around him, mumbling: “‘I’m sorry […] I can’t live 
the rest of my life in a cage, Granny. I’m so sorry’” (ibid., 278; empha-
sis omitted). He then advises his nephew to send the letter at a spe-
cific time and not earlier. The letter resembles an issue of a decree, a 
statement of sovereignty, declaring one’s freedom from the dominant 
power. Balram essentially severs contact with his family through the 
letter, and by issuing it at a specific time, he makes sure that they will 
be unable to warn his master and to suffer the consequences thereof. It 
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is clear at this point that a change has occurred. Not one, but actually 
two events, shortly following each other, determine Balram anew.106 
Both times he is physically affected by what happens to him in either 
becoming violent or fainting out of exasperation.
4.2.3.4 The Consumption of the Master
The nephew plays an important role in Balram’s grasp for power. His 
submission enables Balram’s empowerment, in a similar manner as the 
homo sacer constitutes the power of the sovereign. After dictating the 
letter, he forces his nephew to kneel in front of him, with his head fac-
ing the other direction:
I put my hands on his shoulders; slowly I turned him around so he faced 
away from me. I dropped a rupee coin on the ground. “Bend down and 
pick that up.” He did so, and I watched. Dharam combed his hair just like 
Mr Ashok did—with a parting down the middle; when you stood up over 
him, there was clear white line down his scalp, leading up to the spot on 
the crown where the strands of a man’s hairline radiate from (ibid., 279).
With a fatherly gesture he turns his nephew’s body away from him and 
orders his nephew to pick up a coin, an action he makes him repeat sev-
eral times. The scene is highly charged with aristocratic semantics. Not 
only does he invoke regal associations by forcing his nephew to kneel 
(yet, facing the ‘wrong’ direction), he also uses a significant object for 
his nephew to pick up, namely, a coin. The coin is of great symbolic 
importance in The White Tiger. A similar passage to the kneeling scene 
106 The short sequence of events is a typical picaresque element: “A picaresque device closely 
related to the episodic plot is the piling of event on event in strikingly short compass. 
Such rapid action secquences are very frequent in the picaresque novel and have the 
effect of dazzling both reader and picaro with the accumulated chaos of life’s action” 
(Miller 21). However, even though The White Tiger might seem at times like a typical 
picaresque novel there are many differences that make the novel more a combination of 
Bildungsroman and picaresque novel. The plot is not episodic, the rhythm of the novel 
is not chaotic, the character does not experience ups-and-downs of fortune. Instead, 
the plot is linear, tells of a young boy who travels from the village to the city, who is 
mentored, learns about love and who is increasingly in charge of his actions, making 
his own fortune. I argue that only in the end of the novel does the pattern turn from a 
Bildungsroman into a picaro novel.
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has been narrated before. In the previous example, it was the ‘Mon-
goose,’ Ashok’s brother, who ordered Balram to pick up a supposedly 
lost rupee in the car: “‘Get down on your knees. Look for it on the floor 
of the car’” (ibid., 139). Because Balram cannot retrieve it and doubts 
the Mongoose has even lost a coin in the car, he substitutes it with one 
of his own coins to satisfy the Mongoose: “There was a childish delight 
on his dark master’s face. He put the rupee coin in his hand and sucked 
his teeth, as if it were the best thing that had happened to him all day” 
(ibid., 139). A highly abusive act—forcing his chauffeur to go down 
on his knees and search for a coin that might not even be there—is 
turned into an act of invention by the victim. Balram’s act pleases the 
Mongoose, yet the Mongoose is unaware that he is being paid to leave 
Balram alone. The coin symbol—the lowest payment possible—is of 
importance for the book and often linked to power throughout the 
novel. Preceding the scene of the lost rupee is a scene in which Balram 
is giving out alms to a beggar when their car, referred to as ‘egg,’ stops 
at a red light:
One beggar was carrying another on this shoulders and going from car 
to car. […] Without thinking much about it, I [Balram] cracked open 
the egg. Rolling down the glass, I held out a rupee—the fellow with the 
deformed legs took it and saluted me; I rolled the window up and resealed 
the egg (ibid., 241).
His masters’ reaction indicates that the act is considered rebellious: 
“The talking in the backseat stopped at once. ‘Who the hell told you 
to do that?’” (ibid.). Balram, by giving the beggar the rupee coin, has 
assumed a position that he’s not entitled to. Although the donation 
might be seen as a self-less act, it is also an arrogant act, since he takes 
on the role of a gratuitous giver in front of his wealthy masters. In the 
passage above that describes Balram and his nephew kneeling before 
him, Balram has elevated himself above his nephew, forcing him to 
“make money” for him, thus, turning himself into his nephew’s supe-
rior. The significance of this act is revealed later on when Balram kills 
Ashok by making Ashok kneel in front of him. To the knowing reader, 
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then, the scene with the nephew predicts his later act of murder. He 
uses his nephew as an effigy of his master, employing him as a sort of 
sparring partner.
The murder scene shows that Balram has used his nephew as a stand-in 
for his boss, connecting the most powerful man in his life with the 
weakest by maneuvering them into the same position of submission. 
On a street crossing in the middle of nowhere, he lures his boss out of 
the car under the pretense of a flat tire. Looking for the damage, Ashok 
bends down and Balram encounters a familiar view:
Down below me, his head was just a black ball—and in the blackness, I 
saw a thin white line of scalp between the neatly parted hair, leading like a 
painted line on a highway to the spot on the crown of his skull—the spot 
from which a man’s hair radiates out (ibid., 283–284).
As if to demonstrate his altered state he takes on a pose that makes him 
the master and forces his boss into a kneeling servant. By threatening 
his life his boss becomes an inferior being to Balram. His victimhood 
is familiar to Balram:
Putting my foot on the back of the crawling thing [Ashok], I flatten it to 
the ground […] I undid the collar button and rubbed my hand over its 
clavicles to mark out the spot. When I was a boy […] I used to play with 
my father’s body, the junction of the neck and the chest, the place where 
all the tendons and veins stick out in high relief, was my favourite spot. 
When I touched this pot, the pit of my father’s neck, I controlled him—I 
could make him stop breathing with the pressure of a finger (ibid., 285).
The ‘thing’ exhibits bodily similarities to that of the ultimate sufferer 
in Balram’s life—his father, who he has seen disassembled in front of 
his eyes, slowly being picked apart by his family, wasted away by hard 
physical work, and left in a hospital hallway to die. Now his boss dis-
plays the same bodily characteristics. Goh views this as proof of death 
being the “proverbial great leveler” (349), and sees this scene as under-
scoring the portrayed closeness between master and servant:
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Strangely enough, he [Ashok] also takes on the marked bodily character-
istic of the Indian servant: just before Balram issues the coup de grace, he 
runs his fingers over Ashok’s “clavicles to make out the spot,” and in that 
instant is reminded of his father’s TB-consumed body, “the junction of 
the neck and the chest, the place where all the tendons and veins stick 
out in high relief ” [Adiga 245]. Death, the proverbial great leveler, also 
reinforces the essential link between master and servant in the Indian 
economy, the bodies similarly marked by the socio-economic system in 
India, underneath the inequalities of wealth (349).
I, however, interpret the display of Ashok’s body differently. Balram is 
imposing an authorial view onto his subject, making him the inferior 
being of the two. He does not seek for equality, but puts himself above 
Ashok. When killing his master, Balram refers to him as “thing,” then 
later as the “Storck’s son,” both of which question his master’s author-
ity. By replacing Ashok’s name with substitutes, Balram anticipates 
a change of power commensurate with the change of names. In fact, 
Ashok’s name has been taken from him and will be transferred—as a 
symbol of power—to Balram who will later change his own name to 
‘Ashok’ (cf. Adiga 302). 
The way Ashok is killed is significant, since it seems to insinuate an 
animalistic and thus ‘rightful’ killing, as is common in nature. Having 
coerced his master into a vulnerable position Balram uses a broken 
glass bottle to smash his head. Curiously, Balram’s weapon of choice 
appears to be “[l]ong and cruel and clawlike” (ibid., 273), which indi-
cates that Balram considers himself an animal at this moment. The 
depiction of the event supports this reading: “I rammed the bottle 
down. The glass ate his bone” (ibid., 284). His weapon metamorphoses 
into an animal. However, in light of Balram’s own captivation, which 
he explains with the image of the Rooster Coop, it is more produc-
tive to look at the killing in the context of the act of consumption 
alone. It is noteworthy that Balram turns from a consumed and captive 
being into a consumer himself. In fact, when describing his master’s last 
moments, his actions are compared to that of a butcher, one of the sym-
bols of consumption in the novel: “[t]he blood was draining from the 
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neck quite fast—I believe that is the way Muslims kill their chickens” 
(ibid., 285). Comparing his master to a chicken is highly relevant for 
someone who sees himself trapped and limited by the Rooster Coop. 
Balram has obviously changed positions: Instead of being eviscerated, 
his own organs strewn over his fellow roosters, he stands outside and 
above, holding the knife, gladly doing the work of the butcher. Yet, 
he becomes even more than a butcher, more even than a simple con-
sumer, in fact, almost a god devouring a sacrifice. When he kills his 
master it is said: “The Storck’s son [Ashok] opened his eyes—just as I 
pierced his neck—and his lifeblood spurted into my eyes. I was blind. 
I was a free man” (ibid., 285). Ashok’s power is symbolically trans-
ferred to Balram. In a comic reversal, this passage serves not only as a 
metaphoric description of a power surge, but is also, in fact, a literal 
description: the blood has actually touched Balram’s face as the fol-
lowing sentence shows: “When I got the blood out of my eyes, it was all 
over for Mr Ashok” [emphasis added] (ibid., 285). Balram has, indeed, 
been momentarily blinded by Ashok’s blood. This passage echoes the 
oft-exchanged glances between Balram and Ashok through the rear-
view mirror during Balram’s employment. When killing his master, the 
gaze takes on a material, almost banal dimension. The blood spurting 
into his eyes makes Balram literally consume Ashok.
This killing scene sheds light on Balram’s former nickname, which is 
‘the white tiger.’ The nickname is not simply a reference to a predator. 
The name refers to a being that “is the rarest of animals—the creature 
that comes along only once in a generation” (ibid., 35). This descrip-
tion of the white tiger is interesting, because of its ethical implications. 
Since this nickname stems from Balram’s childhood and is mentioned 
at a point in the novel when its genre could be still categorized as a 
modern Bildungsroman, the nickname could be understood as a prom-
ise or foreshadowing. Exceptionality is thus meant in a positive way. 
In this reading one could hope for a better life for Balram that will be 
different from his family’s. It is thus fairly surprising to see how excep-
tionality actually refers later on to violence. Exceptionality becomes an 
inhuman and immoral character trait and Balram’s nickname a cynical 
description of a murderer.
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In the end, Balram and Ashok’s roles have been reversed. This is rather 
shocking to the reader, since Balram has portrayed himself as a victim 
fighting for his right to freedom and equality. However, this is a typical 
development for a picaresque novel:
If the world is tricky, peopled by tricksters, the picaro must either give up 
his personality to join the trickery or else perish. The picaro always joins. 
But, and this must be underscored, the pattern of education into rogu-
ery by the world reflects on the world more than on the picaro. It is the 
world that is picaresque; the picaro only typifies that world in his dramatic 
change from innocent to trickster (Miller 56).
Balram claims early on that he has become a better man through this 
experience and speaks throughout the novel of his ‘enlightenment’: “I 
am in the Light now” (ibid., 313). Yet, he seems to have misunderstood 
the main premise of enlightenment, namely that it is a metaphor. He 
takes it literally by buying multiple chandeliers that he hangs in every 
room of his house (cf. 117f ). Thus, his ‘enlightenment’ is comically 
expressed and shows that it has not resulted in any significant men-
tal development. Mendes writes that “[j]udging from the title of the 
novel, the reader might reasonably expect to encounter a tale about a 
rare and exotic character” (276), but the reader meets a banal character, 
greedy and only looking for his own profit, being exceptional only in 
the measures that he will take in order to guarantee his success in life.
4.2.3.5 The New Master
The novel highlights a rather unconventional understanding of respon-
sibility. One cannot deny that Balram takes care of his nephew—he 
does not leave him behind when he flees after the murder, he sends 
him to school and provides for him financially—however, to take on 
responsibility is here clearly associated with biopolitical actions. When 
Balram takes care of Dharam he essentially takes possession of Dha-
ram’s life and makes it subject to his realm. When Balram flees from 
prosecution he reflects on what would happen to his nephew if he 
leaves him behind: “If I left him [Dharam] there now, the police would 
certainly arrest him as an accomplice. They would throw him into jail 
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with a bunch of wild men—and you know what happens to little boys 
when they get put into dens like that, sir” (ibid. 286). As a result he 
decides to take his nephew with him. This is a completely unnecessary 
and even an ethical act that surprises the reader. There is no ‘need’ to 
save his nephew, he could leave him to the wolves as he has done with 
the rest of his family. Does this mean that Balram is showing signs of 
responsibility here? I argue that his responsible actions are based on 
selfish reasons in the same manner that the father in The Road allowed 
his son to survive for selfish reasons. Balram rescues his nephew and 
provides for him, because without him he would not be able to ensure 
his own position as a captor. As long as he can hold someone else cap-
tive, he remains in a position of power. As long as Dharam submits to 
his role as a captive to his uncle, he is safe. This describes the symmet-
rical power-relations one also finds in Agamben’s concept of the homo 
sacer and the sovereign. They keep each other in check and it is strongly 
implied that they are basically the same person, since they share the 
same spatial characteristics of being doubly excluded, the only differ-
ence being that they are situated at different sides of the spectrum. 
The following quotation in The White Tiger reflects this dependency 
between inferior and superior: 
One day, I know, Dharam, this boy who is drinking my milk and eating my 
ice cream in big bowls, will ask me, Couldn’t you have spared my mother? 
Couldn’t you have written to her telling her to escape in time? And then 
I’ll have to come up with an answer—or kill him, I suppose (ibid., 316).
Balram acts responsible as long as his nephew adheres to his rules, 
should he cease to do so, Balram will be ready to destroy his life. This 
essentially describes Balram’s former situation. As long as he would 
have agreed to go to prison for his master, he and his family would 
have been ‘taken care of ’ and as long as he would have sent his pay 
checks home to his family they would refrain from making trouble 
for him by calling up his master. The structures remain the same; he 
treats Dharam as he was treated himself by his masters. He recreates his 
own imprisonment and subjects his nephew to the same constraints he 
had to experience. Thus, Balram’s empowerment lies in the ability to 
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put shackles onto others. In this way Balram’s status as an empowered 
and changed subject is closely related to Agamben’s sovereign. Balram 
needs someone else as a counterpart to establish his own power and 
this need for someone else results in quasi-responsible actions. The 
fact that Balram reproduces his relationship with his boss implies the 
possibility of a theoretically endless repetition. If the nephew kills Bal-
ram, he could find himself in the same situation as Balram, having the 
ability to create inferiors, but also being endangered by their existence. 
The mindless repetition of a flawed system relates The White Tiger to 
Agamben’s thoughts on the western political system. In both texts, 
power stems from creating inferiors and the existence of these is both 
the constitution for power and the mistake one cannot get rid of. The 
white tiger, as nature’s anomaly, becomes then the exception that has 
ceased to be one.
The White Tiger supposedly lends its ear to the weak and the excluded 
and gives a voice to a character living at the bottom of society. This 
responds clearly to a postmodern ethics later adapted by postcolonial 
writing. Yet, contrary to one’s expectations, the ensuing story of attain-
ing freedom becomes a horrifying description of a murder. By taking 
on the name of his former master, Balram insinuates that he has not 
found a new and individual position in society, but simply taken over 
another’s. Thus, he aims for the center of power instead of remain-
ing at the peripheries. This goes against every conception of postmod-
ern subjectivity and suggests that after the year 2000, the postcolonial 
subject does not come to terms with the space of the in-between that 
the marginalized inhabit and that Homi Bhabha famously outlined. 
Bhabha argues in Locations of Culture (1994) for a ‘hybrid’ subject (cf. 
4) that is located in between and cannot be categorized as belonging 
to a certain group or nation, but that is positioned on a threshold. To 
illustrate this he chose an artwork by Renée Green, Sites of Genealogy 
(Out of Site, The Institute of Contemporary Art, Long Island City, 
New York) in which she draws attention to the spaces in a museum 
other than the gallery space, for example the boiler room or the stair-
well. Bhabha highlights these liminal spaces, writing that 
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[t]he stairwell as liminal space, in-between the designations of identity 
becomes the process of symbolic interaction, the connective tissue that 
constructs the difference between upper and lower, black and white. […] 
This interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the possi-
bility of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed 
or imposed hierarchy (Locations of Culture 4).
Balram yearns to break out, but he does not search for another realm 
in which he can live an independent life. Instead, he desires to conquer 
the spaces that are inhabited by the powerful, thereby confirming and 
endorsing a hierarchical structure rather than subverting it. This under-
lines the argument of my whole thesis, namely that the subjectivity pre-
sented in contemporary literature, although representing an experience 
of stabilization and empowerment, should not be mistaken for mak-
ing a naïve argument for human improvement. The novels discussed 
here do not proclaim the general betterment of the human being, but 
rather permit a momentary and limited repositioning that create newly 
strengthened individual beings. In accordance with this, the change in 
power in The White Tiger, although disruptive, never breaks with the 
logic of the portrayed Indian society. Balram never leaves his captive 
state, the event only rearranges his own position inside the prison he is 
in. Thus, even though he might not be a rooster anymore and threat-
ened with being butchered, the white tiger is kept in a cage, held cap-
tive by societal power structures, unable to break free. Thus, in this case 
the transcendence that the subject experiences is more limited than in 
my other examples, reflecting the gruesome political world of Agam-
ben where there is simply no true ‘outside’ that is not in some way con-
nected and even subjected to a powerful source located on the inside.
4.2.4 Conclusion: Prisoners of Responsibility
It is noteworthy that in the novels discussed the event is in each case 
a person. To the father his son becomes an event, to Jimmy the girl 
Oryx is an event, and to Balram his nephew is the event that eventually 
changes his life. At a first glance one might assume that it is because the 
characters feel a special bond to these persons and thus develop a sense 
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of responsibility towards these people. Yet, a closer look reveals that it 
is not so much love, friendship or loyalty that sparks their responsibil-
ity, but far more banal motives. The father in The Road needs his son, 
because his company keeps him from committing suicide. Thus, the 
father’s actions are also a means to an end. In Oryx and Crake Jimmy’s 
murder is—although a confession of love to Oryx—also an impulsive 
and instinctual act. He is simply not able to free himself from Oryx’s 
spell, even if that makes him a murderer. In The White Tiger Balram 
takes care of his nephew only as long as he profits from this. He has 
no qualms about murdering him if the time were to come when his 
nephew endangers his position of power. Thus, the characters become 
responsible beings not so much in a reflective way and because they 
have made a careful decision, they become responsible instead in a very 
literal way—they are forced to respond in whichever form they can.
The White Tiger and Oryx and Crake also revealed a strong political or 
even ideological component of both captivation and empowerment. In 
the two novels the characters are strongly determined by the inherent 
system. Any kind of shift can only take place inside this system. Thus, 
empowerment in ethical terms is dependent on the rules of the system, 
which makes a general description of the ‘ethics’ of a responsible sub-
ject extremely difficult. The characters’ ethics are strongly determined 
by the laws of the system they belong to and might seem counterintu-
itive to anyone outside the system. Both novels also strongly suggest 
that responsibility for another person is automatically linked to issues 
of power and politics. In particular, The White Tiger demonstrates that 
responsibility means also to have power over someone, even if that 
power is never played out. In doing this, the novel indicates that an 
ethical subject is not necessarily selfless, but can be extremely powerful 
and violent, because it has responsibility for others.
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4.3 The Witness 
4.3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I examine another aspect of ethics that is also closely 
related to responsibility, namely the figure of the witness. In the two 
novels discussed here, Atonement and The Gathering, characters wit-
ness victims of crimes and injustices. However, these witnesses inhabit 
a difficult moral position towards their subjects. Atonement’s Briony 
attempts to become a witness on behalf of her own victim, namely a 
man that she imprisoned. The Gathering’s Veronica becomes a witness 
on behalf of her brother who is mistreated by his family, including her-
self, and also abused, which she fails to recognize. Even though, these 
characters appear rather inadequate for their tasks they succeed in their 
efforts. In the end the witnesses do more than merely give accounts of 
what has happened, they give accounts of themselves. They reveal their 
own involvement, their own guilt and their own failings. As captives 
of their duty, they reveal their true relation to their subjects. Thus, it is 
also their testimonies that become events, since they fashion not only 
their victims, but themselves.
4.3.2 Atonement—The Selfish Witness
4.3.2.1 Introduction
As explained in the chapter on authorship Atonement’s protagonist 
Briony, who is also a fictional author, writes a novel called ‘Atonement,’ 
that is meant as a apology to her sister and Robbie Turner. Her actions 
as a child—mistaking fiction for reality—have destroyed both her sis-
ter’s and Robbie’s life irreparably. However, in writing the novel Briony 
tampers with the truth yet again by inventing an alternative ending in 
which her sister and Robbie are unharmed by Briony’s mistakes. She 
also neglects to inform the reader that she—and not an impersonal 
narrator—is telling the story, attempting to influence the reader’s per-
ception of her. This alone makes her endeavor ethically difficult. 
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In this chapter I will be looking more closely at Briony’s role as a 
witness and analyzing the ethical consequences of her actions. The 
underlying assumption here is that in writing the novel Briony gives 
more of an account of her captivation than of her atonement for her 
sins. Her novel underscores that she still, even after all that has hap-
pened, remains captivated by the power of fiction and acts accordingly, 
defending fiction to her last breath regardless of her victims.
4.3.2.2 Atoning through Fiction
The main difficulty is that Briony’s atonement through writing a novel 
is an ethical problem in itself. She achieved her authorship by victim-
izing Robbie, how can she then apologize by using that same power? 
Ellam summarizes this dilemma as follows: “Without the tension 
caused by accusing Robbie, there would be no sin to atone for and, 
in turn, no novel” (37). Writing a novel to atone is rather inadequate 
in light of the fact that fiction helped cause Briony’s mistake and led 
to Robbie’s imprisonment. Briony tries to counter this argument by 
making a case for the ethical value of fiction. From all the characters 
at her service, she chooses Robbie to make her argument. As Briony’s 
literary figure, Robbie is coerced into portraying fiction as an ethical 
instrument:
For this was the point, surely: he would be a better doctor for hav-
ing read literature. What deep readings his modified sensibility might 
make of human suffering, of the self-destructive folly or sheer bad luck 
that drive men towards ill-health! Birth, death, and frailty in between. 
Rise and fall—this was the doctor’s business, and it was literature’s too 
( McEwan 93).
It is suggested that Robbie’s abilities as a medical doctor improve 
through fiction. He is made familiar with the emotional processes of a 
human being and thus more sensible to his patients’ needs. According 
to this logic, Briony also should have been more attentive and knowl-
edgeable about the world, having read fiction from a young age. That 
this is not the case at all is clear from the start of the novel, making 
the passage above exhibit Briony’s blindness and even ignorance to 
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her own weaknesses. This argument can be interpreted as a cynical 
commentary, since reading fiction has lead to Briony’s making very 
unethical and uninformed decisions that, in fact, rather underscore 
how misguiding fiction can be to the naïve reader.
Briony continues to utilize her version of Robbie to fight her battles. 
She makes the reader believe that Robbie’s life is only made bearable 
through fiction, which also generates a point of connection with Bri-
ony who, too, finds relief in fiction. When Briony depicts Robbie’s 
daily life during the war, literary elements creep into his daily routine: 
“He walked / across / the land / until / he came / to the sea. A hexam-
eter. Five iambs and an anapaest was the beat they tramped to now” 
(ibid., 219). The importance of poetry is unquestionable here, since it 
is suggested that a lyrical rhythm becomes the only familiar element in 
this unfamiliar country and the only thing Robbie has to lean upon. 
Even Robbie’s relationship with Cecilia falls prey to Briony’s obvious 
agenda. It is insinuated that maintaining the relationship with Cecilia 
is only possible by virtue of fiction. The letters Robbie received from 
Cecilia when he was in prison were written in code to prevent their 
being confiscated: “So they wrote about literature, and used charac-
ters as codes” (ibid., 204). Drawing from fiction upheld their love and 
without this reassurance Robbie would have completely faltered under 
the pressure: “When he wrote back, he pretended to be his old self, 
he lied his way into sanity” (ibid.). Thus, instead of reflecting on the 
tempting and misleading nature of fiction, Briony prefers to point out 
the importance and relevance of fiction for Robbie, the first victim of 
her own imaginative acts. These passages explicitly link Robbie to Bri-
ony, implying that they might experience the world in a similar way, 
namely saturated with fiction, day dreams and wishes. In fact,  McEwan 
has pointed himself to the close relationship between Robbie and Bri-
ony: “It’s a novel full of other writers—not only Briony of course […] 
but Robbie too has a relationship, a deep relationship with writing 
and storytelling” (Reynolds and Noakes 19). Nevertheless, for Briony, 
to suggest this kind of innate kinship between Robbie and herself is 
rather obscene, since it was exactly Briony’s faulty perception, fueled 
by her love for the imagined and the fictionalized, that has put Rob-
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bie into prison. Briony treats her victim the same way she has in real-
ity—she assigns him a place in her poetic design. This poetic design 
was also a contributing factor in causing Robbie’s imprisonment. She 
incriminates Robbie, since he is the necessary ‘bad guy’ set in opposi-
tion to her own characterization as the ‘good guy.’ Head supports this 
argument, writing that “[t]he young Briony’s wish for a harmonious, 
organized world is a mark of her immature inability to accept contin-
gency and the randomness of experience. This is also the source of her 
‘crime’” (168).
Despite Briony’s attempts, fiction’s use as an instrument of atonement 
remains questionable. In fact, by trying to make a case for fiction Bri-
ony rather reveals the inadequateness of her actions and underscores 
her distorted view of the world. Obviously, Briony attempts to clear 
her own name, using Robbie as her accomplice. This is discussed by 
Schwalm in more general terms:
Briony’s fictional transparent minds acquire the status of overt fabrica-
tion; however, in the pragmatic context of seeking impossible atonement, 
they are particularly suspicious in suggesting a hidden agenda behind the 
authorial concealment and a kind of usurpation of the other for Briony’s 
own purposes (178).
The high point of this strategy is reached when Briony begins ques-
tioning even, again through Robbie’s mouth, the definition of guilt:
But what was guilt these days? It was cheap. Everyone was guilty, and no 
one was. No one could be redeemed by a change of evidence, for there 
weren’t enough people, enough paper and pens […] The witnesses were 
guilty too. All day we’ve witnessed each other’s crimes. You killed no one 
today? But how many did you leave to die? (ibid., 261).
This passage suggests that guilt is relative and more common than 
expected. If everyone is guilty, then how guilty can Briony be? Does 
she even have to be punished, if no one can be considered truly inno-
cent? Robbie’s thoughts are directly fed by Briony’s own opinion 
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which makes her characterization of Robbie extremely problematic 
and even selfish. In fact, some of Robbie’s thoughts—or rather the 
thoughts of his fictionalized version—as well as the detailed account 
of the war seem to be superfluous to the novel as a whole, indicating 
that they serve another purpose. Schwalm writes that they have only 
one function:
the fictional author possibly generates a certain relativity of her own guilt 
by juxtaposing it with ubiquitous guilt, individual and collective, and by 
projecting the consciousness of this onto her character, freeing herself 
from any suspicion of self-interest (178–179).
Briony fleshes out Robbie’s life not primarily to give more context, but 
to provide more excuses for her crime. Head agrees with this when he 
writes: “the novelist Briony’s rhetorical trick […] appropriates the epi-
sode of Robbie’s death for the larger theme, and […] simultaneously 
allows Briony’s crime to be subsumed in—and overshadowed by—
the larger movements of twentieth-century history” (171). Her novel 
proves that her attitude towards Robbie has not changed at all—she 
is still using him for her own agenda that is informed by her quest for 
power, in particular the power of interpretation.
Once the reader has realized that it was Briony’s voice behind Robbie’s 
character, it is no longer possible to read the passages that chronicle 
Robbie’s life and emotions as unbiased. Seaboyer writes: “Her moving 
identification with the man who was her victim is an atoning act of love 
and respect. But is it also a violation, a colonization” (32). Her novel is 
not an apology, but rather a manifestation of her power as an author. 
By subjecting Robbie to her web of imagination she bears witness only 
to herself, to her own status as a failed witness. She is foremost a pow-
erful author who cannot resist structuring the world to please herself 
by casting “her narrative spell” (McEwan 7). When the fictional Rob-
bie hopes that “Briony would change her evidence, she would rewrite 
the past so that the guilty became the innocent” (McEwan 261), the 
reader cannot yet fathom how obscene this quote will become in light 
of Briony’s own attempts to cover up her guilt. She will indeed change 
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the evidence, not to clear Robbie’s slate, but her own by turning her-
self into the innocent by-stander. Thus, she does not use her autho-
rial prowess to investigate or repay her debt to Robbie so much as to 
manifest and consolidate her power. This renders her aim of atoning 
rather questionable. Müller-Wood maintains that “Atonement is essen-
tially a novel about the narrator’s protracted non-atonement” (148); 
her atonement never takes place. Briony is still captivated by fiction’s 
promise and she is unable to break free, this is made overtly clear by 
her unethical behavior that favors fiction and displays a disregard for 
the victim. Ellam argues that Briony is, in fact, unable to act in any 
different way and her novel is evidence of this:
It [Atonement] becomes, then, a fiction that always remembers the child’s 
ambition and tells the reader how she never relinquishes it. Her danger-
ous imagination, which has led to the vilification of Robbie, becomes the 
necessary drama of the plot. In this light, the role of the imagination is 
central to the writing and, consequently, places doubts over the claim that 
this is a work of atonement (34).
Entranced by fiction, Briony becomes fiction’s advocate while Robbie 
becomes the sacrificial lamb. Thus, her novel is a repetition of her ini-
tial crime. As the only witness to her cousin’s rape, she provided a dam-
aging testimony on Robbie. Since this testimony was not completely 
truthful, she could be considered the author of his fate. When writing 
down the novel as an actual author, again she becomes the author of 
this fate, this time however making him an unwilling accomplice. In 
both cases it is her allowance to let herself be captivated by fiction that 
motivates and determines her questionable actions, paving the way for 
her horrid transformation into an author-demon.
That her status as a witness possesses a rather savage component is 
ironically implicated by Briony herself when she describes how she sur-
prised Robbie and Cecilia making love in the library: “Briony moved 
slowly into their view, stopped by the desk and saw them. She stood 
there stupidly, staring at them, her arms hanging loose at her sides, like 
a gunslinger in a Western showdown“ (ibid., 139). The witness’ power 
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is not to give an adequate account of what has happened, but to draw 
first and to defend oneself. Instead of being the witness of the injustice 
that Robbie experienced, she exhibits her power over Robbie. Her tes-
timony reveals her captivation—her weakness for fiction—and exposes 
her as the perpetrator who still has not learned her lesson, which makes 
her act of literary atonement ignorant and selfish.
4.3.3 The Gathering—The Blind Witness
4.3.3.1 Introduction
Anne Enright is a well-known Irish writer whose novel The Gathering 
has gained international success by being awarded the Booker Prize in 
2007. Enright had had success previously, having collected awards for 
her other novels and being short-listed numerous times for the White-
bread Novel Award. The Gathering deals with the issues of sexual abuse, 
which is in particular relevant in Catholic Ireland where the system-
atic mistreatment within Irish-Catholic institutions made headlines in 
the 1990s.107 The novel chronicles how the main protagonist, Veron-
ica Hegarty, comes to terms with her brother’s having been abused 
and tries to find ways of giving an adequate account of his life. Meany 
points out how the testimonial nature of the book makes it distinc-
tively not postmodern: “The need to bear witness and the uncertainty 
of the event have a renewed urgency in the twenty-first century as anxi-
ety replaces ennui as the postmodern condition. Enright’s novel takes a 
story that has become a cliché, ‘yet another miserable Irish childhood,’ 
and makes it unbearable” (124). Meany’s observation indicates that 
the novel is not satisfied with stating the inaccessibility of an event, as 
107 Liam Harte has written a more detailed analysis of the topic of sexual abuse in Ireland 
in reference to The Gathering: “The most damning evidence to date of the Irish state fa-
cilitating the cover-up of clerical sexual abuse is contained in the Report into the Cath-
olic Archdiocese of Dublin, also known as the Murphy Report, published in Novem-
ber 2009. The Report exposed the Irish Catholic hierarchy’s sustained suppression of 
scandal and protection of paedophile priests at the expense of innocent children from 
1975 to 2004. It also laid bare the failure of state agencies to fulfill their responsibili-
ties by investigating complaints and prosecuting the perpetrators” (202–203, Fn 1).
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many postmodern novels have done. The epistemological questions 
are pushed into the background in favor of the emotional needs that 
go along with dealing with traumatic events. 
Enright’s novel, like McEwan’s Atonement, portrays the relationship 
between a faulty witness and a victim. Veronica, a member of a big Irish 
family clan, consisting of nine brothers and sisters, begins her narra-
tive by stating that she feels obliged to “bear witness to an uncertain 
event” (Enright 1). Her obligation is triggered by the suicide of her 
older brother Liam who was sexually abused as a child. She appears to 
be completely unaware of his having been mistreated at first, reveal-
ing herself as an inadequate witness who is blind to the obvious. This 
limitation probably derives from a psychological mechanism, since she 
discovers later on that she was also sexually abused as a child. Her igno-
rance about this trauma is her state of captivation of which she is only 
released when an event changes her view, making her into an exemplary 
witness on behalf of her brother. She not only provides testimony of 
his victimhood, but becomes his doppelganger, beginning to share his 
view on the world and his emotional unrest. In doing so she becomes 
an incomparable witness, since she limits her testimonial not only to 
what she has seen, but also to what her brother has felt.108 The fact that 
Veronica’s own guilt is rooted in her limited perception also points to 
a larger guilt, namely that of a nation struggling to look at its problem-
atic past and the way it dealt with its victims.109
108 In Veronica’s role of honoring the memory of her brother she can also be seen as an An-
tigone-figure (cf. Meaney “Walking the Dead: Antigone, Ismene and Anne Enright’s 
Narrators in Mourning”). 
109 Anne Enright herself has stated: “You kind of think of history as what happens after 
people are dead, it is the story that is told when there is no one left who remembers, 
no one there to contradict it. And yet history is something that has to be broken open 
again and again and retold, even though officially it’s something that has stopped. But 
as we continue, history shifts and changes all the time. We see different things. […] 
child abuse fits in with all of these problems and concerns” (Bracken/Cahill 31).
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4.3.3.2 The Inadequate Witness
Veronica seems to be the worst person to count on as a witness. Even 
though her state as a witness is inscribed to her via her name; Veron-
ica, which refers to Saint Veronica, is unable to recognize this. Saint 
Veronica accompanied Jesus Christ on his way to his execution, car-
rying his cross. She takes care of Jesus’ wounds with her veil and pro-
duces, as a side effect, a relic, since the veil later displays the imprint of 
Jesus’ face.110 The veil becomes proof of Jesus’ existence and his suffer-
ings, and Veronica becomes the one witness who can actually produce 
physical proof about Jesus. This makes her rather exemplary. The con-
temporary Veronica is, however, not even aware of her connection with 
this holy witness at first, since she misidentifies the origin of her name. 
She mistakes Saint Veronica for ‘the bleeding woman’: “I confused 
Veronica with the bleeding woman of the gospels, the one of whom 
Christ said, ‘Someone has touched me’” (ibid., 129). Then she confuses 
her “with the woman to whom He said, ‘Noli me tangere,’ which hap-
pened after the resurrection” (ibid., 129). The last story refers to Mary 
Magdalene who is the first person to meet Jesus after he is resurrected 
from the dead and who is ironically a deficient witness herself, since 
she mistakes Jesus for the gardener.111 When Veronica finally discovers 
the true origin of her name, she denies that the meaning can be applied 
to herself: “I am not Veronica” (ibid., 129). However, she immediately 
contradicts herself right away: “it is true that I am attracted to peo-
ple who suffer, or men who suffer, my suffering husband, my suffering 
brother, the suffering figure of Mr Nugent” (ibid., 129). With this 
claim she unwittingly allows herself to be connected to both, Saint 
Veronica and Mary Magdalene. She is not unlike Saint Veronica, since 
she feels attracted to suffering individuals. Yet, she also shares qualities 
with Mary Magdalene in terms of her inability to give accurate testi-
mony: she describes the man who is later revealed to be her brother’s 
abuser, Mr Nugent, as a “suffering figure.” It is ironic that her supposed 
misidentification—mistaking St. Veronica for Mary Magdalene—is 
absolutely fitting: Similar to Mary Magdalene who mistakes Jesus for 
110 This story is not part of the Bible, but is apocryphal content. The only reference in the 
Bible is the bleeding woman (cf. Mark 5:25; Matthew 9:20).
111 See Jhn 20:11–18.
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a gardener, she mistakes the abuser for a victim. Her proneness to mis-
identification is what constitutes her captivation. In a way she is blind 
to the most obvious things going on around her. Because of this she 
draws false conclusions, limited by her restricted (in)sight.
Her captive state—being a deficient witness—is made most evident by 
Veronica’s misinterpretation of her grandmother Ada’s and Nugent’s 
relationship. The setting of the story that Veronica constructs around 
the first meeting between Ada and Nugent is a hotel foyer in 1920s 
Dublin. It is never explained what Ada and Nugent, who don’t know 
each other at this point, were doing at the hotel. Veronica creates a mys-
terious, almost cinematic scene which is, it seems, a natural backdrop 
for the kind of romance she imagines. In Veronica’s scenario Nugent 
is the unfortunate lover whose love for Ada remains unrequited: “And 
Nugent’s eyes swell with the unfairness of it, and with the force of 
love denied” (ibid., 20). But Veronica learns that contrary to her fan-
tasy, the relationship between Nugent and her grandmother was not 
based on a failed romantic relationship, but had a distinct economic 
foundation: “She was a poor girl, who turned her face to the wall as 
the coins clinked on the bedside table, and the dark shape of a man 
left the room” (ibid., 92). There is no romantic relationship between 
Ada and Nugent, only a distinctly practical and banal one: Nugent is 
Ada’s landlord. The image above, however, insinuates not only a deal 
between Ada and Nugent, but even depicts Veronica’s grandmother as 
a prostitute. Thus, their economic relationship is sexually charged. Yet, 
what is even more significant about the scene is the fact that in it she is 
turning “her face to the wall,” implying that she was looking the other 
way from whatever was happening in the room. Since Veronica identi-
fies Nugent later as her brother’s abuser this phrasing implicates Ada as 
an accomplice in Nugent’s crimes. The following passage underscores 
this assumption. Veronica, her brother and maybe even their little sis-
ter Kitty (about this Veronica’s memory remains unclear) are visiting 
their grandmother’s house on Nugent’s property one fateful summer. 
The children’s position, on Nugent’s turf, is recounted in a very specific 
way, suggesting that the children are part of a deal:
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But there is a sense of thrall to it, too; of Nugent working in the garage, 
that he owned, at the back of the house and then walking round to the 
door, that he owned, at the front, and knocking. […] He had the house, 
and he had the woman, more or less, and he did what he liked with the 
children passing through. […] We three Hegartys were manifestly of little 
account (ibid., 235–236).
The fact that the children are referred to in economic terms, being “of 
little account,” suggests that they have been swallowed by the economic 
logic which prevails at Ada’s house. Since this logic has been indicated 
to be of a sexual nature, this all points to the fact that Ada has either 
agreed to the children’s sexual abuse or has at least condoned it. In 
hindsight, Veronica realizes how false her own naïve assumptions were. 
Ada and Nugent were not lovers at all and Veronica fails to recognize 
the truth, even during most of her adult life:
Over the next twenty years, the world around us changed and I remem-
bered Mr Nugent. But I never would have made the shift on my own—
if I hadn’t been listening to the radio, and reading the paper, and hear-
ing about what went on in schools and churches and in people’s homes. 
It went on slap-bang in front of me and still I did not realise it (ibid., 
172–173).
4.3.3.3 The Victim: Liam Hegarty
Liam Hegarty is clearly portrayed as a victim. There are several mark-
ers that point to this fact which will be elaborated in the following. 
They include his close association with death, his being in contact with 
cancerous growths, being compared to a cancer himself, the general 
exclusion he has to experience in his own family and finally the lack of 
self-respect that results from this.
Liam’s character is shaped by his closeness to elements typically asso-
ciated with death: “My brother Liam loved birds and, like all boys, he 
loved the bones of dead animals” (ibid., 1). His morbid fascination 
never leaves him; as an adult he chooses a job that associates him with 
his old passion:
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Liam, my brother, spent most of his working life as a hospital porter in 
the Hampstead Royal Free. He pushed beds down corridors and put can-
cerous lumps into bags and carried severed limbs down to the incinerator, 
and he enjoyed it, he said. He liked the company (ibid., 39).
It is his job to dispose of organic material, excessive growths that endan-
ger one’s life and that have to be surgically removed. While describing 
his passion for his job, it is said that he “enjoys the company.” At first 
one might assume that this relates to the colleagues at the hospital, but 
they are not mentioned in the passage above. The passage indicates an 
unusual company, namely that of the severed limbs. This depicts Liam 
as a person removed from society, identifying with body parts that 
are thrown away, considered to be worthless and toxic. This penchant 
can be linked to Liam’s character, since at times Liam himself appears 
to take the position of an excessive and toxic growth in his own fam-
ily. His family considers him a black sheep: “We looked at the likes 
of Liam and had […] a different set of words. Pup, gurrier, monkey, 
thug, hopeless, useless, mad, messer” (ibid., 162–163). About this Harte 
writes: “Here, Veronica zones in on one of the cruxes of child sexual 
abuse, the way in which victims are simultaneously robbed of their 
subjectivity and condemned to a life of indelible social stigmatization” 
(197). In terming him “monkey,” Liam is being animalized; “thug” and 
“useless” marks him as an outsider who does not support a functioning 
society, but undermines it. This negative impression is further stressed 
by the fact that he is perceived as radiating danger. He is able to pick up 
on things and expose them: “This was Liam’s great talent—exposing 
the lie” (ibid., 125), “he just picked it up. Liam could be a completely 
shocking human being, but it was hard to say what exactly he had done 
to make you feel off-key” (ibid.), and finally “the way Liam worked best 
was under your skin” (ibid.). His ability to look behind the facade is 
what frightens Liam’s family who are used to looking down on him. 
His ability to expose what is hidden, makes it somewhat necessary for 
the family to ignore him, in order to gain control over him. The way 
the family deals with Liam’s alcoholism supports this reading. Nobody 
intervenes or tries to stop him from feeding his addiction. Instead, his 
addiction serves as the determinate proof of his inferior status and 
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makes it only easier to ignore him: “A drinker does not exist. What-
ever they say, it is just the drink talking” (ibid., 55). His alcoholism is 
not a disappointment, but an expected occurrence. In fact, his weak-
ness is almost a necessity, proof of an unspoken rule: “There is always 
a drunk. There is always someone who has been interfered with, as a 
child” (ibid., 185). This description limits Liam’s fate to a structural 
abnormality in which he is subjected to an invisible rule. In this case 
the rule of family life, where, as the novel suggests, there is always one 
cancerous growth.
The cancer image becomes a theme exclusively linked to Liam. Veronica 
uses the image when explaining her brother’s suicide to her daughters:
For a week, I compose a great and poetic speech for my children about 
how there are little thoughts in your head that can grow until they eat 
your entire mind. Just tiny little thoughts—they are like a cancer, there is 
no telling what triggers the spread, or who will be struck, and why some 
get it and others are spared (ibid., 175).
Liam’s reasons for his suicide are described as cancerous thoughts 
which have taken over Liam’s mind like a tumor. (This passage also 
alludes to the sexual abuse in veiled terms.) Linking Liam to cancer, 
considering his job, implies an inner paradox. The one who disposes 
of tumors seems to be a tumor himself and must be, in some way 
opposed to his own nature. That he is, is conveyed in Liam’s family 
life. Once, during an argument, Liam aims a knife at his mother. His 
family responds immediately: “the whole family piled into him, and 
kicked him around the back garden. […] And there was a great satis-
faction to it, as I recall. Like a scab that needed to be picked. He had it 
coming to him“ (ibid., 169). Nobody supports him, he is immediately 
shunned and treated like an outsider. But Liam appears not to care, he 
does not even feel offended or betrayed as one might expect him to 
be. On the contrary: “And my lost brother, Liam, laughed: the knife 
thrower, the one who was being kicked, he laughed too” (ibid., 6). He 
supports his own exclusion, he mistreats himself, the cancerous ele-
ment in the family.
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This lack of self-respect is what surprises Veronica most, and it is in 
this that she recognizes her own failure: “If I believed in such a thing 
as confession I would go there and say that, not only did I laugh at 
my brother, but I let my brother laugh at himself, all his life” (ibid., 
167). Veronica has failed to see her brother’s vulnerability and has sim-
ply watched while he slowly succumbs to his fate. That he supports 
his own status as an outsider is for Veronica the most evident sign of 
their failure as a family. She, like all the other family members, has 
witnessed and approved of her brother turning against himself. She 
has not intervened but has left him to suffer in his miserable situation. 
There seems to be no real sympathy between them as a conversation 
with her young daughter indicates: “‘I didn’t even like him [Liam],’ 
she [Veronica’s daughter] says, in a final, terrible whimper, and this 
makes me [Veronica] laugh so much she stops crying to look up at me. 
‘Neither did I, sweetheart. Neither did I’” (ibid., 200). Liam’s aban-
doned status becomes unquestionable in the moment of his death. 
Veronica, informing her siblings about Liam’s death, receives strange 
and bored reactions like that of her brother Jem: “‘Well, at least that’s 
done’” (ibid., 24) as if Liam’s life was always waiting for its annihila-
tion. And later Veronica herself capitulates and writes: “We will look 
around and say, One less. One less” (ibid., 44). Liam’s death appears 
to be of no relevance and in some way expected. Thus, Liam’s status 
as a victim is completely overlooked not only by the captive Veronica 
who is unable to make connections and to identify the obvious, but 
also by the whole family.
4.3.3.4 Turning into an Involuntary Witness
However, after Liam dies Veronica cannot continue her marginaliz-
ing of Liam and making fun of his suffering and his status as the black 
sheep in the family. In fact, when Veronica encounters her brother’s 
corpse, she is overwhelmed by an unfamiliar impression: she recog-
nizes Liam as a victim for the first time. This event in her life changes 
everything that succeeds it. It imposes a visual impression on her. She 
compares Liam’s corpse to Andrea Mantegna’s Lamentation of Christ 
(1480). This painting was groundbreaking in its time, since it forced 
the spectator to observe Jesus’ dead body in a singular sudden move-
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ment. In the scene that the painting presents, Jesus has been already 
taken down from the cross and is laid out on a stone table. The view of 
the spectator is at first fixed on Jesus’ pierced feet, then the gaze travels 
upwards and leads straight to the face of the obviously dead and very 
human man. The painting deals with Jesus’ death in a more dramatized 
way than previous representations, since it forces the spectator to expe-
rience the sudden shock of seeing a corpse in front of one’s eyes before 
realizing that this is supposed to be God’s son, namely Jesus Christ.112 
The lamentation turns into an enforced public viewing, pushing the 
mourning crowd—in this case two women whose faces cannot be seen 
completely—to the edges of the painting, giving privilege to the view 
on the corpse. This view characterizes Veronica’s experience: it gives 
an account of the shock she experienced when she saw Liam’s corpse, 
it reflects her inability to look elsewhere and it also communicates 
her absolute and unshakable certainty about her brother’s status as a 
victim.
Veronica decides that “[i]t is time to put an end to the shifting stories 
and the waking dreams. It is time to call an end to romance and just 
say what happened in Ada’s house, the year that I was eight and Liam 
was barely nine” (ibid., 142). She breaks off with her previous narrative 
style that was characterized by poetic and atmospheric descriptions, 
replete with vague hints about the abuse. Instead, Veronica, similar 
to Mantegna, presents the reader with an abrupt change of pace by 
losing the vague context. She lists three facts of her brother’s death: 
“The first is that Liam was wearing a short fluorescent yellow jacket 
when he died […] The second is that he had stones in his pockets. The 
third is that he had no underpants on under his jeans, and no socks in 
his leather shoes” (ibid., 141). This information—the ‘veil’ that Liam 
leaves behind—haunts Veronica who recognizes a carefully planned 
suicidal act: Liam wanted his body to be found, therefore he was wear-
112 Other painters that dealt with the topic of lamentation before Mantegna stuck to cer-
tain attributes that marked the portrayed scene as a lamentation. Often there is the cross 
in the background, the mourners are grouped around Jesus’ body, and transcendence 
is suggested by halos or angels, i.e. in Giotto di Bondone’s lamentation (1304–1306) 
and Fra Angelico’s lamentation (1436–1441).
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ing an eye-catching jacket, and he put stones in his pockets in order to 
drown himself. The missing underwear is to Veronica a sign of Liam’s 
lost and deteriorating state. Liam’s ‘veil’ becomes proof of his suffering, 
imposing itself upon Veronica like Mantegna’s painting, clearly repre-
senting Liam as a victim.
As a result her narrative becomes disturbing, invasive and challeng-
ing. Without any introductory remarks she narrates a shocking scene, 
pressuring the reader into experiencing a revolting anamorphosis and 
 placing the reader under a similar visual captivation to that which she 
experienced while looking at her brother’s corpse. She tells of a faint 
memory of the time when she and her brother were living for a sum-
mer in their grandmother’s home, where Veronica made a confusing 
discovery:
What struck me was the strangeness of what I saw, when I opened the 
door. It was as if Mr Nugent’s penis, which was sticking out of his flies, 
had grown strangely, and flowered at the tip to produce the large and 
unwieldy shape of a boy, that boy being my brother Liam, who, I finally 
saw, was not an extension of the man’s member, set down mysteriously 
on the ground in front of him, but a shocked […] boy of nine, and the 
member not even that, but the boy’s forearm, that made a bridge of flesh 
between himself and Mr Nugent. His hand was buried in the cloth, his 
fist clutched around something hidden there. They were not one thing, 
joined from open groin to shoulder, they were two people that I knew, 
Mr Nugent and Liam (ibid., 143–144).
Veronica introduces Nugent in this scene at the same time as she men-
tions his sexual organ. Thus, instead of beginning this passage with 
informing or even warning readers that they will encounter a scene of 
abuse, Veronica provides impressionistic images that situate them in 
medias res. The readers are confronted with the image of an overlarge 
penis onto which Veronica’s brother appears to be attached, a grotesque 
and shocking image, particularly for an eight year old girl. When the 
young Veronica takes a closer look and realizes that she has mistaken 
the forearm of her brother for a penis, the image remains revolting, 
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since the implication of the scene is the same: Veronica has become 
a witness of her brother’s sexual abuse. As in Atonement, the event 
is presented as a strange picture that undergoes a shocking transfor-
mation. Veronica’s perception is faulty yet nevertheless correct. The 
sex scene captures the essence of an inappropriate relationship. Con-
sequently, everything seems wrong, distorted, too large, too close, 
and produces a traumatic image that the reader experiences up close. 
‘Truth’ is an image, here, that overwhelms and that provides a certainty 
that remains unexpressed in language.
Veronica also becomes a witness on another level. Her status as a wit-
ness is not merely constituted by telling her brother’s story, but by 
becoming her brother. With this she tries to “make her brother come 
alive as the dead man he was in life” (Harte 189). She becomes a 
ghostly being as Harte argues: “At its dark extremities, Veronica’s aver-
sion to human fleshiness mutates into a desire to transcend her own 
body entirely and become as ghostly as her brother” (196–197). When 
the narration starts Veronica has discovered herself to be in a position 
not unlike Liam’s. Veronica, similarly to Liam, seems to be affected by 
body parts, namely bones: “sometimes we find, on the beach, a cuttle-
fish bone so pure that I have to slip it in my pocket, and I comfort my 
hand with the secret white arc of it” (ibid., 1). In fact, Veronica associ-
ates her writing process with gathering and laying out bones: “I write 
it down, I lay them out in nice sentences, all my clean, white bones” 
(ibid., 2). That her narrative consists of her bones points already to 
the fact that she shows the same affinity to death as Liam. In fact, she 
feels removed from the rest of the world: “There’s something wonder-
ful about a death, how everything shuts down, and all the ways you 
thought you were vital are not even vaguely important” (ibid., 27). She 
adapts her brother’s world view, removed from the world and seeing in 
life only the promise of death. Veronica’s dark take on life even infects 
her memories. Everyone who is part of her past is marked by his or her 
own death. About her grandmother she says: “She moves towards her 
grave, at her own speed” (ibid., 231). And also Liam is already a dying 
man in her memories: “Liam’s hand on my forearm, already livid with 
decay” (ibid., 65). Both her grandmother and her brother are dead 
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and one might argue that this affects her perception. But even her 
own children, who are very much alive, embody only loss, death and 
aimless procreation to her:
I look at my hands on the railings, and they are old, and my child-battered 
body, that I was proud of, in a way, for the new people that came out of 
it, just feeding the grave, just feeding the grave! I want to shout it at these 
strangers, as they pass (ibid., 79).
To Veronica, her children do not signify new life, but instead life 
that will end irrevocably. Every hint of transcendence—like love—is 
brushed aside. She perceives such phenomena as a “waste of energy,” a 
figure in a calculation that makes no sense in respect to life, whatsoever:
And what amazes me as I hit the motorway is not the fact that every-
one loses someone, but that everyone loves someone. It seems like such a 
massive waste of energy—and we all do it, all the people beetling along 
between the white lines, merging, converging, overtaking. We each love 
someone, even though they will die. And we keep loving them, even when 
they are not there to love any more. And there is no logic or use to any of 
this, that I can see (ibid., 28).
In her stance towards sexuality her aversion towards life becomes most 
visible: “I love my husband, but I lay there with one leg on either side 
of his dancing, country-boy hips and I did not feel alive. I felt like a 
chicken when it is quartered [emphasis added]” (ibid., 40). Even in an 
act that is supposed to be an expression of life, she only recognizes yet 
another death scene, the dismemberment of a dead chicken.
By identifying with her brother she becomes more perceptive to the 
supernatural realm. She constantly sees Liam’s ghost hovering around 
her house. Once, she even thinks she sees Ada, her dead grandmother. 
I lift the book and turn to show it to Liam, and I see Ada watching us 
from the doorway. There she is. I see her not as I ‘saw’ the ghosts on the 
stairs. I see her as I might see an actual woman standing in the light of 
the hall (ibid., 217).
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But quickly the scene is rationalized: “It was Ita [her sister] at the door, 
of course, I should have known. It was not Ada” (ibid., 221). The sup-
posedly transcendent moment has a factual basis in reality. Veronica is 
drawn back into reality, but cannot shake this trick of the eyes and the 
case of mistaken identity. Her mistake jars something loose in Veron-
ica‘s memory:
This is what I remembered, when I saw her. I remembered a picture, I 
don’t know what else to call it. It is a picture in my head of Ada standing 
at the door of the good room in Broadstone. I am eight. Ada’s eyes are 
crawling down my shoulder and my back. Her gaze is livid down one 
side of me; it is like a light: my skin hardens under it and crinkles like a 
burn. And on the other side of me is the welcoming darkness of Lambert 
Nugent. I am facing into that darkness and falling. I am holding his old 
penis in my hand (ibid., 221).
The description of her memory bears several similarities to revela-
tions in the Old Testament.113 In the Book of Daniel, a revelation is 
characterized by its relationship to light and darkness: “He revealeth 
the deep and secret things: he knoweth what is in the darkness, and 
the light dwelleth with him” (Daniel 2: 22). Ada takes in this con-
stellation the place of God who sheds light onto the world. Veronica 
is spellbound and Ada’s eyes become living creatures that have inju-
rious effects. Under the bright gaze of her grandmother Veronica’s 
skin changes and deteriorates. The receiver of this revelation is not 
merely enlightened, but set on fire. Moving away from this violent 
gaze, Veronica is welcomed and relieved by Nugent who provides her 
with cooling darkness. Yet darkness is the precise element that a revela-
tion should dispose of, since darkness is associated with the unknown. 
Thus, Nugent’s darkness offers no real relief. Instead, it exposes a sex-
ual act, and, considering the young age of Veronica in this scene, also a 
taboo, distorting the revelation pattern completely. The event has not 
revealed God’s face, but a sexual predator. It also reveals that Veronica 
113 Ewin notes how religious allusions help structure the novel overall: “[f ]or all its secu-
lar, even blasphemous demonstrations, the novel is shot through with resounding re-
ligious metaphors” (132–133).
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has not only failed to recognize her brother’s abuse, but also her own. 
This opens the door for more detailed and explicit visions, even though 
they are somewhat disfigured by memory:
But it is a very strange picture. It is made up of the words that say it. I think 
of the ‘eye’ of his penis, and it is pressing against my own eye. I ‘pull’ him 
and he keels towards me. I ‘suck’ him and from this mouth there protrudes 
a narrow, lemon sweet. This comes from a place in my head where words 
and actions are mangled. It comes from the very beginning of things, and 
I can not tell if it is true. Or I can not, tell if it is real (ibid., 221–222).
The statement of being fed a substance of “narrow, lemon sweet” relates 
to the description of a sexual encounter filtered through the eyes of an 
innocent child. It is also noteworthy that the word ‘eye’ is central to 
the image; the organ of perception is related to Nugent’s sexual organ 
which blocks Veronica’s sight. Thus, it is indicated that it might be her 
own abuse and the ensuing trauma that has prevented her from seeing 
what happened to her and her brother.
In fact, this has been hinted at earlier, when Veronica describes how 
her grief for her brother influences her sexual encounters with her hus-
band. The event becomes an ‘er-äugnis’ (in reference to Martin Hei-
degger)—it is not only experienced through the act of perception, her 
eye is literally ‘touched,’ that is, it has come in physical contact with 
Nugent’s ‘eye,’ his sexual organ.114 In a way Veronica is the perfect wit-
ness of Liam, since what she has witnessed happened in a similar way to 
herself. Her alliance with her brother is more than an act of solidarity, 
but expression of a shared trauma. By her brother’s death she becomes a 
witness of herself and takes responsibility for what happens. As a result 
of this experience, she leaves her family, retreats into a hotel room, and 
awakes after a long sleep with a new sense of purpose: “I wake again, 
114 The connection between perception and eventfulness has been established by Martin 
Heidegger who writes: “Ereignen heißt ursprünglich: eräugen, d.h. erblicken, im Blick-
en zu sich rufen, an-eignen” (28–29).
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and shower. I put on new pants and leave the old ones in the bin. I dis-
card this other life, and leave the hotel behind” (ibid., 257). Like Saint 
Paul she begins a new life and spreads the word: 
I know what I have to do—even though it is too late for the truth, I will 
tell the truth. I will get hold of Ernest and tell him what happened to Liam 
in Broadstone, and I will ask him to break this very old news to the rest 
of the family (ibid., 259).
Matthew Ryan points out that it is noteworthy—in light of Veron-
ica’s attempts to write down what happened to her brother—that 
“[s]ignificantly, this is to be a spoken truth rather than a written one” 
(180). Veronica realizes that she might be unable to pinpoint exactly 
her brother’s history, to give a detailed account of how the crime first 
started and how it affected Liam. By speaking the truth rather than 
writing it down, she seems to underscore that the truth has to come 
out, even if the details can no longer be recounted. From a captive 
being, a limited and even failing witness, she turns into an exemplary 
witness, not only by embodying her brother and thereby accounting 
for his victimhood, but by passing on the message to her family. Even 
though she still has doubts about the adequacy of her memories, Liam’s 
victimhood is more important than the details of his abuse.
4.3.4 Conclusion: Seized Witnesses
The witness is an ethically problematic figure, since he/she is requested 
to speak on someone else’s behalf. This involves issues of power and can 
even hurt the person who one is speaking for, as seen in Atonement, 
in which the witness clearly takes advantage of the person she should 
only report on. In the presented cases, responsible acts are not carried 
out by responsible people, they are seized from people, they are forced 
out. Briony, in Atonement, is trying to prove her supposed innocence, 
but fails miserably, only proving that she is easy prey when it comes to 
fiction. In bearing witness she repeats her initial crime, judging her vic-
tim by her own standards, not allowing for anyone to interfere with her 
interpretation. Thus, she gives testimony of her own guilt and shows 
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not only how Robbie could become a victim in this, but even how the 
reader can be captivated by her false report. Her testimony is not an 
atonement, but rather evidence of her own guilt. In that way, she is a 
perfect witness, incriminating herself, she reveals the truth about her 
flawed character unwillingly. In The Gathering the witness Veronica is 
overwhelmed by images that demand a reaction from her, forcing her 
to recognize her brother as a victim and herself as not only a witness 
to his abuse, but also a victim of this abuse. From a blind and failing 
witness she develops into an exceptional witness, not only presenting 
the long hidden ugly truths without compromise, but also by living 
through her brother’s trauma by becoming his doppelganger. The fact 
that she brings him to life by this can be considered a dedication to 
his memory and to the pain he felt, which had never been truly rec-
ognized before.
None of the figures actively chooses to become responsible for others; 
each one of them is a captive, cornered into this position by their own 
limitations. In both cases, to become a witness means giving testimony 
to oneself, turning the testimonial act into an event of self-manifesta-
tion. When manifesting, they are revealed as deeply inadequate as wit-
nesses—they cannot give true accounts of the crimes or injustices nor 
of the victims. This chapter shows most obviously how captivation—a 
fundamental weakness and limitation of the character—is absolutely 
necessary to trigger their later becoming subjects. The witnesses in 
this chapter could only become witnesses because of their failings and 
inadequacies.
The subjects in this chapter bear strong similarities to Marion’s con-
ception of the subject. He considers them foremost ‘witnesses’ to an 
event and sees their role as secondary to the event, being there mainly 
to give shape to that event. Only by this task can they become subjects 
in the first place. Thus, their role is to serve as vessels and to give form 
to something else that in turn shapes them. Being a witness to an event 
is, thus, in Marion’s understanding the central step to becoming a sub-
ject in the first place. In my examples, the subjects turn necessarily into 
ethical ones and what makes this even more interesting, these ethical 
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subjects have only a limited control over their own actions. Their eth-
ical ‘shape’ then is also given to them by the event, since they are not 
really able to reflect or interfere with their ethical impulses or motiva-
tions. Thus, both Briony and Veronica manifest their own true ‘ethical 
shape’ by testifying on behalf of the victims, though unlike Marion’s 
subjects they are involved in their victim’s fates. They both helped in 
victimizing their victims, making them immoral, yet, ethical witnesses, 
which renders this conception of ethical beings extremely paradoxical.
5 Captives of the Sacred
5.1 Introduction
In Friedrich Nietzsche’s Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, “der tolle Mensch” 
explains to his audience: 
“Wohin ist Gott? rief er, ich will es euch sagen! Wir haben ihn getödted 
[sic], —ihr und ich! Wir Alle sind seine Mörder! Aber wie haben wir diess 
[sic] gemacht? Wie vermochten wir das Meer auszutrinken? Wer gab uns 
den Schwamm, um den ganzen Horizont wegzuwischen? Was thaten [sic] 
wir, als wir diese Erde von ihrer Sonne losketteten? Wohin bewegt sie sich 
nun? Wohin bewegen wir uns? Fort von allen Sonnen? Stürzen wir nicht 
fortwährend? Und rückwärts und seitwärts, vorwärts, nach allen Seiten? 
Giebt [sic] es noch ein Oben und ein Unten? Irren wir nicht wie durch 
ein unendliches Nichts? Haucht uns nicht der leere Raum an? Ist es nicht 
kälter geworden?” (§ 125).
The “tolle Mensch” has discovered that God is gone and the world as 
we know it is an illusion. Without a God the individual has lost his 
guidance, does not know where to look or where to go. The death 
of God forces individuals to reevaluate their position in the universe. 
Whereas in Nietzsche’s story the announcer of the death of God real-
izes that his message has been spread too early and that humanity is 
not capable of receiving this news yet, in postmodernism, with the two 
world wars in the rearview mirror, the claim that God is dead seems 
rather dated. Whereas Estragon in Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot 
is “giving up again” (9) at the beginning of the play; the postmodern 
subject has long given up hope that someone named ‘Godot’ or God 
is about to show himself. The postmodern subject knows that God has 
died and, thus, does not wait in vain. In light of this, it is not surprising 
that the disbelief in a higher sphere or a God is expressed in a different 
and more indirect way in postmodernism compared to its modernist 
representation.
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In postmodernism the critique against God becomes a critique of hier-
archical structures that demand centers of authority. The theological 
argument is transferred to the realm of language and linguistics. The 
transcendent in the realm of language refers to three elements: the sub-
ject who ‘sends out’ messages to a receiver; the idea of a ‘message’ as the 
starting point of communication; and some form of ‘original’ or ‘first’ 
word that does not need other words in order to be understood. All 
these aspects are closely related to each other. As Derrida has brilliantly 
argued throughout his early work, to believe in the idea of an original 
word—a transcendental signifier—is a fundamental misunderstand-
ing of how language operates. He states that “no element can function 
as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not sim-
ply present” (“Semiology and Grammatology” 26) and “each alleg-
edly ‘simple term’ is marked by the trace of another term” (ibid., 33). 
Language, to Derrida, is a system of referents that denote each other 
and thereby create meaning. Meaning does not pre-exist its use as lan-
guage, as Wittgenstein argued at the beginning of the 20th century. In 
a lecture delivered in Cambridge, Wittgenstein contends that language 
does not just ‘translate’ thoughts into communication, contrary to the 
common opinion at that time: “In the process of thinking, the thought 
does not appear first, to be translated subsequently by us into words or 
other symbols. There is not something which exists before it’s put into 
words or imagery” (Wittgenstein’s Lectures 86). Derrida would agree 
here, expressing that “there is no linguistic sign before writing” (Of 
Grammatology 14) and argues against the notion of a ‘pure meaning,’ 
that is to say a “prelinguistic […] meaning whose presence would be 
conceivable outside […] and before the process or system of significa-
tion” (“Semiology and Grammatology” 31). The notion of a “prelin-
guistic meaning” has a religious ring to it; it can be seen as a function 
God usually inhabits—ordering and giving meaning to the world.115 
Derrida refutes the existence of such an organizing principle, declar-
115 In fact Jean Baudrillard makes this argument in Simulacra and Simulation: “All of 
western faith and good faith was engaged in this wager on representation: that a sign 
could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could exchange for meaning and that 
something could guarantee this exchange—God, of course. But what if God himself 
can be simulated, that is to say, reduced to the signs which attest its existence? Then the 
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ing that “no transcendent truth present outside the field of writing can 
govern theologically the totality of the field” (“Différance” 7). Thus, 
the notion of the origin (an author of a message; a message as begin-
ning of communication; a primary word)—is denied in all three cases.
In fact, for Derrida, there is nothing ‘outside’ or beyond language. One 
of his most seminal works in this regard is “The Truth in Painting,” in 
which Derrida investigates the nature of the frame and its relevance 
for paintings. Derrida reasons that the frame (which he refers to as 
‘parergon’) belongs and does not belong to the painting at the same 
time; the true nature remains undecided: “A parergon comes against, 
beside, and in addition to the ergon, the work done [fait], the fact [le 
fait], the work, but it does not fall to one side, it touches and coop-
erates within the operation, from a certain outside. Neither simply 
outside nor simply inside” (“The Truth in Painting” 54). The frame, 
like the context of a piece of work, can never be pinned down: “The 
frame labors [travaille] indeed. […] Like wood. It creaks and cracks, 
breaks down and dislocates even as it cooperates in the production of 
the product, overflows it and is deduc(t)ed from it. It never lets itself 
be simply exposed” (ibid., 75). In fact, there is no way to exclude even 
oneself from the process of language, meaning that there is no way to 
actually inhabit a position that is truly located ‘outside.’116 The subject 
is never the origin of a linguistic message; rather, he is formed by it. For 
Derrida the subject is simply part of language, meaning that he or she 
is subjected to the movement and inner logic of différance: “Nothing 
[…] precedes différance […] There is no subject who is agent, author, 
and master of différance” (“Semiology and Grammatology” 28).
This philosophical insight can be transferred to postmodern fiction. As 
signs can only be grasped through their relation to other signs, a text 
as conceived in postmodernism can only be understood in relation to 
whole system becomes weightless, it is no longer anything but a gigantic simulacrum—
not unreal, but a simulacrum, never again exchanging for what is real, but exchanging 
in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference” (5-6).
116 The most famous quote by Derrida refers to this fact: “there is no outside to the text” 
[Il n’y a pas de hors- texte] (Of Grammatology 163).
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other texts. No work of art is singular, as Paul Auster’s character Quinn 
formulates it in City of Glass: “What interested him about the stories 
he wrote was not their relation to the world but their relation to other 
stories” (7). A text is always based on its predecessors, from which it 
borrows or delimits itself. The idea that there is no piece of art that 
is completely ‘new’ was most famously stated by John Barth in “The 
Literature of Exhaustion”: “By ‘exhaustion’ I don’t mean anything so 
tired as the subject of physical, moral, or intellectual decadence, only 
the used-upness of certain forms or the felt exhaustion of certain possi-
bilities—by no means necessarily a cause for despair” (64). The critique 
of God has evolved into a general critique of overarching structures. 
Their claim to authenticity and originality is strongly refuted. 
To illustrate how this critique is expressed in relation to sacredness 
in postmodern fiction, I have chosen two short stories by Jorge Louis 
Borges. Even though there has been some dispute about whether 
Borges should be considered a modern writer or an early postmod-
ern one, I think it is clear that there are certainly traces in his work 
that connect very well to postmodern issues, in particular in terms of 
sacredness, as I will explain in the following.117 In “The Aleph” (1945) 
Borges narrates how his character named ‘Borges’ finds out about an 
aleph that is hidden in the cellar of a friend. The fictive Borges explains:
“aleph” as we all know, is the name of the first letter to the alphabet of 
the sacred language. […] In Kabbala, that letter signifies the En Soph, the 
pure and unlimited godhead; it has also been said that its shape is that of 
a man pointing to the sky and the earth, to indicate that the lower world 
is the map and mirror of the higher (285).
117 Frisch writes, referring to “Aleph,” that Borges “contrasts monistic truth with pluralistic 
skepticism” (21). Frisch also explains in his study that Borges’ work could be considered 
to be a postmodern predecessor, but that Borges combines modern and postmodern 
elements with each other: “monism and pluralism strike a balance and live together 
in Borges” (24), and: “Borges defines a pluralistic vision that challenges and subverts 
some of the perceptions and values of aesthetic modernism, and yet how he avoids a 
radical relativism that argues for chaos rather than a cosmos” (17).
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Borges goes to look for this so-called aleph where “without mixture of 
confusion, all the places of the world, seen from every angle, coexist” 
(ibid., 281). When he encounters this supernatural phenomenon the 
character Borges fails to put it into words, too grand is its effect on 
him. However, the ontological status of the aleph is never stated clearly. 
Mark Frisch notes that the character in Borges’ story “leaves doubt in 
the reader’s mind about whether the vision was illusory or real” (21). 
In this respect what Borges describes is a true phenomenon located 
‘outside,’ since the epistemological sphere described by language can-
not re-present it. And yet, this impression is only temporary; later the 
narrator qualifies what he has seen, claiming that it was a “false Aleph” 
(ibid., 285) and goes on to list several similar phenomena that have 
been documented. In fact, it is only when he learns about the other 
phenomena that he seems able to understand what he has witnessed. 
What is called aleph in the story could be what one understands as a 
‘beginning’—of the universe, time or existence. Such a phenomenon 
is here brushed aside by claiming that it was not an extraordinary phe-
nomenon, as there are others similar to it. Implicitly, the uniqueness 
of God is questioned, even qualified, which makes Borges’ story post-
modern in the way that it problematizes sacredness. By questioning 
the originality of a supposedly otherworldly thing and by insinuating 
that it can be repeated, copied and even faked, sacredness desolves.
In another short story by Borges this line of argument is followed up 
to an even stronger degree. In “The Circular Ruins” (1940) a man 
creates a being—similar to God creating humanity—and breathes it 
into existence. Later he recognizes that he too has been a creation of 
another’s mind: “With relief, with humiliation, with terror, he real-
ized that he too, was but appearance, that another man was dreaming 
him” (“The Circular Ruins” 100). He is not a god, and likewise not the 
origin of the child he has imagined and brought into existence. He is 
the product of another man, who might be the ‘real’ God—but then 
again, maybe there is yet another creator, who created his creator. The 
origin can only be followed by the traces of dreamed up people it leaves 
behind. In Borges’ story the issue is not that there is no God, but that 
there might be a multitude of Gods, each of which in turn nullifies 
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the possibility of sacredness. I am not suggesting that Borges makes a 
philosophical or even theological statement here, rather, I would like 
to point out that the critique of God—as a singular being, a centre, an 
origin, a beyond—is accentuated in postmodern literature in a particu-
lar way. The critique is directed against the notion of transcendence in 
general, which is dependent on the notion of an ‘outside,’ dependent 
on the possibility of inhabiting a singular position that exists separately 
from any other structure.
Yet, this critique does not reduce a character’s yearning for such a 
transcendent figure or form of guidance. In fact, very often characters 
are confused by the world and hope for guidance. However, they strug-
gle and are pushed from one place to the other instead, as in Pynchon’s 
The Crying of Lot 49 (1966). Pynchon’s character is left in a state of 
indecision, waiting for some event that might give her clarity, but the 
novel ends before this can happen. With the death of God, the neces-
sity of guidance is as strong as ever. The characters clearly struggle with 
their place in the world, yet postmodern writers cannot provide them 
with any meaningful sense of security or reassurance, since this would 
require that they possess an authority they themselves criticize.
In contemporary literature, forms of guidance are re-introduced. This 
does not mean that the authority of a controlling God is simply re-es-
tablished. The characters are struck by events that restructure their 
worlds; as a result their status as a subject is completely inverted. How-
ever, this does not suggest that these characters are more open to the 
sacred or could even be considered ‘believers.’ On the contrary, often 
the characters’ attitude towards sacredness and God is filled with 
doubt. This is most evident in McCarthy’s The Road where the belief 
in God has been shattered by a catastrophe that has destroyed nature 
and has made the earth uninhabitable for humankind. In such a world 
God must have ceased to exist, otherwise he would not have allowed 
this to happen. In Atwood’s Oryx and Crake the question of god is 
not even an issue, since scientists have replaced God by reshaping the 
world with genetic engineering projects, ultimately killing humanity. 
However, in each of the novels discussed captive characters turn into 
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sacred figures. They are never assumed to be truthful or ‘real’ in the 
sense of a ‘return’ of a God. The captives themselves are inadequate 
and often failing characters, and the events rather banal occurrences. 
Yet, the characters possess an immanent sacredness, since they have 
the effect of sacred figures. Suddenly they mean more than they really 
are, which describes their transformation from captives into subjects.
5.2 Oryx and Crake—The Prophet
5.2.1 Introduction
“Death hangs over [Oryx and Crake] from the start,” writes How-
ells about Atwood’s dystopic novel (2006: 162), whose title refers to 
the names of two characters who, at the beginning of the novel, are 
already dead. Humanity has been wiped out by a deadly virus, and the 
only survivors seem to be Jimmy and a genetically engineered human 
race, called the ‘Crakers.’ In the chapter on responsibility it was out-
lined how Jimmy became the victim of Crake’s mad plan to annihilate 
humanity and replace it with his own new humanoid race. Jimmy has 
in the end no other choice than to become the guardian of the inno-
cent Craker race. However, I will show that Crake’s plan has unfore-
seen side-effects. Bound to and held captive by his obligation to be a 
guardian, Jimmy becomes an involuntary prophet, accidently altering 
Crake’s plan for the new world.
5.2.2 Becoming a Guardian
Long before the virus break out environmental catastrophes have made 
the fictional United States’ nature highly unstable: “the coastal aquifers 
turned salty and the northern permafrost melted and the vast tundra 
bubbled with methane, and the drought in the midcontinental plains 
regions went on and on, and the Asian steppes turned to salt dunes” 
(Atwood 29). The seasons are out of balance and staying outside has 
become dangerous: “June was now the wet season all the way up to 
the east coast, and you couldn’t have held an outdoor event then, what 
with the thunderstorms. Even early February was pushing it: they’d 
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ducked a twister by only one day” (ibid., 211). The novel’s title itself 
is proof of these environmental changes, since it refers to two species, 
Oryx Beisa (an antelope common in East Africa) and the red-necked 
Crake (a waterbird), that are both extinct in the novel (cf. Atwood 98; 
373–374). Thus, the future world is already out of control when the 
novel starts. Now, however, after the virus breakout the world has been 
turned into one big ‘outside.’ There are no more sheltered communi-
ties; there are no more boundaries between nature and civilization. A 
deformed state of nature that is harmful to human life has been acti-
vated. There is no more order in the world whatsoever: 
Out of habit he [ Jimmy] looks at his watch […] He wears it now as his 
only talisman. A blank face is what it shows him: zero hour. It causes a 
jolt of terror to run through him, this absence of official time. Nobody 
nowhere knows what time it is (Atwood 5).
The world is a timeless sphere, unregulated by office hours or dates. 
Having lost its original function, the watch becomes Jimmy’s talisman, 
a relic from a lost world. Zero hour marks a new beginning that only 
Jimmy witnesses: he experiences the first hour of a new humanoid race 
that is making itself comfortable in a world without humans. In this 
zero hour there is only a small and diminishing space left for the (sup-
posedly) last human. Animal-human hybrids that were developed in 
laboratories have broken out of their cages and are roaming the streets. 
The literary critic Crane comments on this: “His [ Jimmy’s] status as 
a human who has control over his environment is thus […] reverted 
to that of one organism among many” (173). Jimmy is exposed to the 
circumstances, covered only by a simple sheet, and has retreated into 
the woods, where he lives on tree branches, careful to avoid the glar-
ing sun in the day and the freezing cold at night. Crane points out the 
comparison of Jimmy to a “manlike ape” (Atwood 10) and calls him 
“the missing link to a prior level of evolution” (Crane 159). However, 
I contend that Jimmy has not simply reverted to a prior level, but that 
his situation is more precarious—he is a human being who is made into 
a homo sacer-figure and has been thrown into a state of nature human-
ity has accidently created.
5.2 Oryx and Crake—The Prophet 207
This is further supported by the outsider status he possesses in the new 
society. To the Crakers, the new species on earth, Jimmy is a freakish 
being. When he introduces himself to the Crakers he calls himself 
“Snowman.” 118 Kuhn believes that this name alludes to ‘no man’ (391) 
which suggests that Jimmy loses touch with civilization and takes on 
a non-human form. Indeed, his new name embodies not only his per-
sonal decay, but the decay of the whole of humanity: “the last Homo 
sapiens—a white illusion of a man, here today, gone tomorrow, so eas-
ily shoved over, left to melt in the sun, getting thinner and thinner 
until he liquefies and trickles away altogether” (ibid., 271). In compar-
ison to the robust Crakers, Jimmy is highly vulnerable, even to such 
an extent that he considers himself sick: “His whistle is like a leper’s 
bell: all those bothered by cripples can get out of his way. Not that 
he’s infectious: what he’s got they’ll never catch. They’re immune from 
him” (ibid., 187). Ironically, the homo sacer in this context is the one 
who is not genetically modified. Agamben would regard the geneti-
cally engineered human being as the homo sacer, since this person’s life 
would have been controlled even before conception. However, in this 
scenario Jimmy is the homo sacer, because his natural body leaves him 
unprotected. The Crakers have genetically manipulated and, thus, very 
capable bodies that allow them to live in “complete instinctual har-
mony with their environment” (Dunning 95). Further, the Crakers are 
completely self-reliant and only tolerate Jimmy. He, however, desper-
ately needs them: “He needs to be listened to, he needs to be heard. He 
needs at least the illusion of being understood” (Atwood 127). Jimmy 
is a captive, because he simply does not belong, is unable to adapt and 
is therefore completely helpless: he has no home, no shelter, has diffi-
culty nourishing himself and cannot access the Crakers’ community, 
a problem which he voices as follows:“I’m your ancestor, come from 
the land of the dead. Now I’m lost, I can’t get back, I’m stranded here, 
I’m all alone. Let me in!” (ibid., 129; emphasis omitted).
118 Schmalfuss views this as the first evidence of Jimmy’s struggle against Crake’s rules: 
“Even though he recalls Crake’s warnings against symbolism now and then, Jimmy’s first 
words to the Crakers are already a lie: ‘My name is Snowman’ [Atwood 348]” (100). 
208 5 Captives of the Sacred
Jimmy realizes that he needs to find a way to become part of the Crak-
ers’ realm, which he can only do if he offers them something they can-
not attain without him. He recognizes that the only positive thing that 
sets him apart from the Crakers is his relationship to Crake, thus he 
starts telling them stories about Crake and also Oryx, turning them 
rather by accident into the Crakers’ godly parents. Jimmy does not 
want to install his friends as gods, but he has to keep the Crakers inter-
ested otherwise they would “wander away” (ibid., 126). Since his dead 
friends are the only people that the Crakers knew besides Jimmy and 
the only people they show an interest in, Jimmy has not much of a 
choice. Their sacralization starts rather harmlessly, even accidentally. 
In the beginning he alludes to Crake in a very literal way. When he 
leads the Crakers out of the compounds, he legitimizes their journey 
by claiming: “They needed to do this because Crake had said that this 
was the proper way” (ibid., 417). This is, of course, true, however, this 
is also a double entendre, allowing Crake to be understood as a god-
like figure. Yet, this is not the first time that Crake is referred to as a 
God. Crake’s girlfriend, Oryx, who worked as a teacher for the Crak-
ers before the catastrophe, already paved the way for turning Crake 
into a deity:
“Do they ever ask where they came from?” said Jimmy. “What they’re 
doing here?” “You don’t get it,” said Crake, in his you-are-a-moron 
voice. “That stuff ’s been edited out.” “Well, actually, they did ask,” said 
Oryx. “Today they asked who made them.” “And?” “And I told them the 
truth. I said it was Crake. […] I told them he was very clever and good” 
(ibid., 374).
Oryx’s phrasing moves Crake into the sacred sphere: he is an absent 
figure, defined as the Crakers’ creator and described as “good.” Most 
importantly, however, he exists to the Crakers only as an idea. They 
have never seen him or talked to him. Crake’s deification goes directly 
against Crake’s will, as he was trying to dispose of such concepts for 
the new generation of humans: “Crake was against the notion of God, 
or of gods of any kind, and would surely be disgusted by the spectacle 
of his own gradual deification” (Atwood 126). In fact, to maintain 
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the Crakers’ innocence, Crake is convinced they must be kept in an 
almost pre-linguistic stage. Although they are able to speak, they are 
only taught to recognize what is in front of them. They are not allowed 
to be introduced to metaphysical concepts: “It was one of Crake’s 
rules that no name could be chosen for which a physical equivalent 
[…] could not be demonstrated. No unicorns, no griffins, no manti-
cores or basilisks” (ibid., 10).119 When Crake is regarded as a God by 
the Crakers, Jimmy feels no satisfaction by having destroyed Crake’s 
plan for a secular world, but envy: “He too would like to be invisible 
and adored. He too would like to be elsewhere” (ibid., 198). Instead, 
Jimmy becomes the ‘inside-man’ of a new mythology and in this way 
he becomes part of the Crakers community: “He’s the only one left 
who’d known Crake face to face, so he can lay claim to the inside track. 
Above his head flies the invisible banner of Crakedom, of Crakiness, 
of Crakehood, hallowing all he does” (ibid., 117).
Not only do these stories pave the way for Jimmy’s acceptance in the 
Crakers community, they also ensure his survival. His stories nour-
ish the Crakers on a spiritual level only, serving as “symbolic food” 
(DiMarco 2011: 141), but they feed Jimmy on a very literal level and 
are fundamental to his survival. Jimmy invents a fish-ritual, an offering 
to him that he claims Crake has decreed:
Every week […] the women stand in tidal pools and call the unlucky fish 
by name—only fish, nothing more specific. Then they point it out, and 
the men kill it with rocks and sticks. That way the unpleasantness is shared 
among them and no single person is guilty of shedding the fish’s blood. If 
things had gone as Crake wanted, there would be no more such killing—
119 The disappearance of certain vocabulary is reflected by Jimmy throughout the novel: 
“From nowhere a word appears: Mesozoic. He can see the word, he can hear the word, 
but he can’t reach the word. He can’t attach anything to it. This is happening too much 
lately, this dissolution of meaning, the entries on his cherished wordlists drifting off 
into space” (Atwood 45–46). Cooke notes on this matter, in reference to the literary 
tradition: “Part of the biotechnological eschatology that informs the book is the idea 
that with the death of the human race comes the death of language. This is an idea that 
is not uncommon in post-apocalyptic texts, generally figured within a cold-war, nucle-
ar scenario” (120). 
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no more human predation—but he’d reckoned without Snowman and 
his beastly appetites. […] The people would never eat a fish themselves, 
but they have to bring him one a week because he’s told them Crake has 
decreed it (Atwood 122).
He needs this ritual in order not to starve. DiMarco calls Jimmy a ‘sym-
bolical’ cannibal, ‘absorbing’ the dead with his stories about them (cf. 
DiMarco 2011: 141). But Jimmy not only absorbs the dead, he liter-
ally nourishes himself with the dead via the stories. The Crakers would 
never kill an animal and he is not skilled enough to do it himself. It 
is necessity that makes him adopt religious patterns. Jimmy demands 
these offerings from the Crakers not as a deity who needs his subjects 
to prove their adoration and loyalty, but as a simple man who is living 
on the edge, isolated, abandoned, starving and unable to hunt food 
for himself. The ritual is, thus, a selfish ploy. Thus, whatever religious 
contents Jimmy falls back on, they are always grounded in the banal 
and the common. Nevertheless, Dunning points out that these stories 
bear several similarities to general Christian concepts:
The relationship between Crake, Snowman, and Oryx unmistakably sug-
gests the Christian Trinity whose authority science has effectively dis-
placed. Crake assumes the role of Father, creator of all, triumphant over 
chaos; Snowman, that of sacrificial Son and immanent Logos (and per-
haps also of Gnostic Logos marooned in matter); and Oryx, that of Spirit, 
omnipresent, “feminine” Paraclete (95).
Jimmy certainly relies on known concepts, using them as models for 
his own mythology/religion. However, the deification of Crake and 
Oryx is a rather accidental outcome of Jimmy’s doings than a calcu-
lated strategy. Only late in the novel, does he recognize what power he 
had and how he could have changed the whole mythology to his own 
advantage. When he realizes this, however, his teachings have already 
become dogmatic and he cannot make any major changes any more: 
“At first he’d improvised, but now they’re demanding dogma: he would 
deviate from orthodoxy at his peril. He might not lose his life […] but 
he’d lose his audience. They’d turn their backs on him (Atwood 126). 
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Jimmy is the Crakers’ connection to the sacred world, but that does not 
make him part of their group. In fact, he remains in his captive state, 
having only slightly rearranged and ameliorated his position. Yet, the 
basic facts remain the same: he is still the leper with his ringing bell, 
only now it summons the Crakers to join him and listen to his stories.
5.2.3 Becoming a Prophet
Jimmy is a story-teller born out of necessity, and born under captive 
circumstances. He simply has no other choice than to invent stories 
that keep him alive, turning into a sort of post-apocalyptic Schehe-
razade. He continues to refer to absent people and, thus, creates a reli-
gious structure. These made-up stories eventually create an unexpected 
side-effect: “He is Crake’s prophet now, whether he likes it or not, 
and the prophet of Oryx as well” (ibid., 126). In a way, he really is a 
prophet, since he is connected to a world about which the Crakers 
know absolutely nothing. Though Jimmy is acutely aware of the illu-
sory nature of the world he is creating, his inventions have an effect 
on him. He, too, begins to think about Crake in a different way. He 
begins to talk and pray to him: “‘Crake!’ he whimpers. ‘Why am I on 
this earth? How come I’m alone? Where’s my Bride of Frankenstein?’” 
(ibid., 207). The way he addresses Crake makes Crake into a strange 
mixture between god and mad scientist, and Jimmy into one of his 
followers, since he asks him to explain to him the reasons for his exis-
tence and he also demands—similar to the biblical Adam—a mate. 
He becomes swallowed up and even captivated by the mythology he 
has made up; not so much by his belief in Crake as a God, but by his 
nostalgia and his inability to let the past go.
Jimmy’s stories do not remain fiction, but have real consequences. 
Although he is clearly not a holy being—unable to care for himself, 
shabby looking—he is recognized by the Crakers as a prophetic figure. 
This becomes evident when he leaves the Crakers village for a couple 
of days to look for food and other supplies back at the compound. To 
the Crakers he explains his absence by telling them that he is ‘visiting’ 
Crake. This is a statement that is not untrue, since Crake’s corpse is still 
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back at the compound. When Jimmy returns he makes an astonishing 
observation. He discovers that the Crakers are following a ritual he has 
never before seen them perform:
As he approaches the village, he hears an unusual sound—an odd croon-
ing, high voices and deep ones, men’s and women’s both—harmonious, 
two-noted. It isn’t singing, it’s more like chanting. […] They’re sitting in 
a semi-circle around a grotesque-looking figure, a scarecrowlike effigy. 
[…] What’s the thing—the statue, or scarecrow, or whatever it is? It has 
a head, and a ragged cloth body. It has a face of sorts—one pebble eye, 
one black one, a jar lid it looks like. It has an old string mop stuck onto 
the chin (ibid., 428–429).
The Crakers have constructed a small statue that is supposed to repre-
sent Jimmy. Sitting around Jimmy’s double they pray for his safe return. 
This means, they have come up with their first religious ritual on their 
own. Jimmy mishears at first, believing they are chanting ‘Amen.’ How-
ever, this mistake is a first clue to Jimmy’s new role. In fact, they are 
actually chanting ‘Snowman’ which means Jimmy has been made into 
a religious figure they are calling out for. Dunning summarizes how 
Jimmy unwillingly changes from a holy mouthpiece into a holy being: 
Though Snowman begins narrating the novel simply as interceding priest, 
he is eventually promoted into heaven, a development conceived by the 
Crakers alone, and affirmed during a ceremony in which they attempt to 
commune with and manipulate him through his effigy (95).
Contrary to Jimmy’s expectations, the Crakers do not simply consider 
him an intermediary to Crake. They have given him his own position 
in his mythology. Jimmy, the Snowman, isolated and hunted, forced to 
be their story-teller, is now an adored holy being for whose safe return 
the Crakers pray. The Crakers make Jimmy a transcendent being; he 
becomes a prophet, simply because in the world of the Crakers there 
is no other category for him; they have no concept of culture or art, 
but regard his stories as truth.
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Cook considers the invention of myths as part of the rebuilding of a 
community and thus as a logical step in the evolution of the Crakers:
After the end of civilization and the decimation of humanity through a 
nuclear war, survivors must rebuild not merely their technological infra-
structure, but their linguistic, cultural, and mythic infrastructure as well. 
Scavengers for food and technology, the survivors must also be linguistic 
scavengers, constructing new myths out of the remnants of old ones (120).
However, in this case, there is only one human survivor, Jimmy, who 
only accidently constructs myths, as the side-effects to his attempts to 
survive. Clearly, story-telling, writing and myths are central to Oryx 
and Crake, as it is to the two other parts of Atwood’s trilogy, The Year 
of the Flood and MaddAddam. In the last novel the Crakers even learn 
how to write and are taught the concept of historiography. Dunning 
detects in Atwood’s interest for myths a general critique. According 
to him, Atwood reflects on the contemporary experience that has dis-
posed of myths, referred to as ‘grand narratives’:
It finds our current vulnerability to unprecedented disaster arises not 
from dystopian societies with hostile political structures, underwritten 
by oppressive metanarratives, and established through threat of impris-
onment, torture and death, but rather within the qualitative vacuum of a 
culture that has lost its ‘great’ narratives (86).
Thus, although Atwood portrays a dystopian world in Oryx and Crake, 
shaken by environmental catastrophes and a virus breakout, the world 
at the end of the novel has one advantage to the contemporary one: it 
has regained its myths, beliefs and rituals. That these are completely 
fabricated and the products of an incapable guardian, seems to be 
rather secondary. After all, Jimmy is successful. He becomes part of 
the Crakers’ new community and thus humanity can survive. To show 
how a character invents new and even comical narratives and rituals 
instead of retrieving the ‘grand narratives’ emphasizes the fact that the 
creation of new myths is not carried out with total naiveté by Atwood, 
but with an awareness of past criticism.
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To summarize, Jimmy’s repositioning in the new world stems from 
an initial captivation. By doing what he was supposed to do—taking 
care of the Crakers—Jimmy inadvertently subverts Crake’s plan. Even 
though Crake has lured and locked him into his personal experiment, 
Jimmy takes control—or, as DiMarco described it, “Jimmy becomes 
the monkey looking back, having the potential to turn Crake’s game 
plan upside down” (2005: 186). He destroys Crake’s plan for a new 
innocent race by ‘soiling’ the Crakers with metaphysical and religious 
concepts, while he himself becomes a prophet. The Crakers turn into 
believers, dependent on a ‘sacral’ sphere; exactly what Crake tried to 
prevent. Dunning comments on this as follows, pointing out the irony 
of this situation:
Atwood ensures that we do not miss the telling irony. Crake believes that 
he has successfully removed their capacity for any form of metaphysical 
speculation, though he admits that their prototypes consistently frus-
trated his attempts to eliminate their dreaming and singing. Yet we learn 
that Snowman has been required to satisfy their relentless curiosity about 
their origins by telling them sacred stories, religious cosmologies in which 
Crake and Oryx figure as creative and sustaining deities (95).
From captive story-teller Jimmy not only captivates the Crakers with 
his stories, but turns into a sacred being by accidently ‘captivating’ him-
self. He becomes inscribed into his own mythology. This reinvention of 
myths does not only occur in Atwood’s novel. In fact, in many contem-
porary novels myths, religious concepts and sacred figures are intro-
duced that bear similarities to known concepts; they are not a nostalgic 
reversion, but rather a construction of new and very limited concepts. 
These constructions will also be relevant in the other two novels to be 
discussed in the following two chapters.
5.3 The Road—The Voice of God 215
5.3 The Road—The Voice of God
5.3.1 Introduction
Cormac McCarthy is known for his brutal and dark novels that often 
imply the meaninglessness of the world, which has led many critics to 
characterize them as ‘nihilistic.’ Graulund renders this consensus with 
“[a]s some of his critics have suggested, it may even be that the central 
meaning of McCarthy’s authorship, the central message, is that there 
is no meaning to be found” (69). McCarthy’s projected worlds speak a 
violent language that negates any form or even possibility of transcen-
dence. Blood Meridian, McCarthy’s critically most acclaimed work, is 
summarized by Graulund as follows:
The world described in Blood Meridian is the world in its primal condi-
tion, a world in which mercy is non-existent and death will always win 
out. But it is also a world in which the defeated will be replaced by another 
living being, be that man, animal or plant (63).
Arnold notes, however, about McCarthy that “there is also evident 
in his work a profound belief in the need for moral order, a convic-
tion that is essentially religious” (144). Kuczma adds that McCarthy’s 
novels are religious, but without real religious content (cf. 111). In 
general there is no hope given to any of McCarthy’s characters in the 
novels preceding The Road even when they might strive for this. Tran-
scendence is never attained. Nevertheless, the characters are searching 
for answers. In The Road, which has one of the most severely hopeless 
settings, McCarthy has chosen not to withhold answers, but to let the 
characters create them on their own.
In the chapter on responsibility it was described how the father in The 
Road, captivated by his son, develops ethical guidelines for his son. The 
son, his only companion, demands from him to be nurtured—both 
physically and metaphysically, otherwise the son would simply degen-
erate. Following this demand, the father presents ethical guidelines to 
the son that go against his personal beliefs. He shapes the son into an 
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ethical being, even though he does not believe in morality anymore 
and knows that this new world turns all good deeds into, at best, fool-
ish mistakes. In the following I wish to examine a phenomenon similar 
to this on the religious level of the novel. The father’s belief in a higher 
power is severely shaken. Paradoxically, as the novel progresses, the son 
becomes a sort of messiah figure for the father —and in the conclusion 
the father (at least in the eyes of the son) attains a god-like sanctity. 
These occurrences are, however, not located in a Christian belief, but 
are rather very convincing delusions that attain a form of reality. I will 
show how the father, captivated by his son, turns into a god. What is 
significant is the role of language in this instance. The reduced and 
simple language in The Road mirrors the hopeless state of mind of the 
survivors, who can only focus on the things that ensure their survival, 
having no energy for anything else. The conversations are spare and not 
very complex, since they are unable to put into words what is going 
on around them and do not see the point of it. However, this simple 
language to which they cling by using the same phrases over and over 
again becomes their way out. By being repeatedly used these words 
recreate the world around them.
5.3.2 Language: Empty Signifiers and Hidden Meanings
The world in The Road has lost its meaning, has become a “non-world, 
the ‘absolute here’” as De Bruyn writes (782), meaning that the tran-
scendent sphere is utterly shattered. The role of language is crucial to 
the understanding of the novel. Philipp and Delys Snyder contend that 
McCarthy is not only writing about a dystopian world, but moreover 
about the language of a dystopian world: “McCarthy interrogates the 
very meaning of language in a world full of empty signifiers—that is 
a world with names for a multitude of things which no longer exist 
outside of memory and books” (36). As with everything else in The 
Road, language has eroded, simplified, been stripped down to a bare 
pragmatism:
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The world shrinking down about a raw core of parsible [sic] entities.120 
The names of things slowly following those things into oblivion. Col-
ors. The names of birds. Things to eat. Finally the names of things one 
believed to be true. More fragile than he would have thought. How much 
was gone already? The sacred idiom shorn of its referents and so its reality 
(McCarthy 88–89).
Language has been cut down to its raw elements. The changed world 
changes the vocabulary of the world. Not only has the old world sunk, 
the language used to describe it is about to follow. Thus, language joins 
in the ongoing deterioration of the world. About the passage quoted 
above Graulund writes:
Even the power of the word, McCarthy suggests, is in the end divested of 
its power in the face of such devastation. In a world ‘shrinking down,’ there 
can be no beyond, no redemption and no hope. In such a world, there can 
be only desertion, a space that is ‘desert,’ bereft of any significance but the 
fact that it has been forsaken (67).
Language reflects what the world has become—de-sacralized. It can-
not make up for what has been lost. The ‘power of the word’ is usually 
God’s power, and it has disappeared, deserting humanity along with 
everything else. De Bruyn writes: “We are not only living in a ‘bor-
rowed world,’ [McCarthy 130] […] but also speaking with borrowed 
words” (783). Thus, the duo’s desolate state also shows on a linguistic 
level; their language fails, leaving them no way of expressing their new 
state of being. Banco writes that McCarthy’s use of language mirrors 
the world’s inherent poverty:
This negation of the modern world coincides with the minimalist struc-
ture and style McCarthy uses in this novel. Paragraphs are short; chapter 
breaks and quotation marks around dialogue are absent; punctuation is 
rare; and his tiny cast of almost entirely nameless characters speaks in bare 
120 Neologism by Cormac McCarthy, from “to parse.”
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monosyllables. Such restraint helps McCarthy’s thematization of absence 
and lack, of moral and existential nihilism (276).
However, on the level of reception, language becomes, in fact, extremely 
meaningful. Kunsa writes “it is precisely in The Road’s language that we 
discover the seeds of the work’s unexpectedly optimistic worldview” 
(58). Kunsa views the barrenness of the new world as more positive, 
underscoring the fact that the world’s lack of sacred idioms is not nec-
essarily a proof of decline but can also be considered a potential:
The narrative’s strategy is actually one of withholding place names, a 
provocative rhetorical move that forces the reader to imagine new possi-
bilities, to think not solely in terms of the world that was, but also of the 
world that will be. The burned out landscape, strangely, is a new if unlikely 
Eden awaiting once again those perfect names (62). 
Other scholars like Woodson have argued for the exact opposite, 
namely for an ongoing loss of a transcendent sphere:
Although the story contains images and references to religion and spiri-
tuality, these too are largely signifiers without signs in the existing world, 
empty like the holes in the mantle of the father’s childhood home where 
tacks had formerly held the stockings as the family celebrated Christmas 
[McCarthy 26] (2008: 93).
In fact, however, language does show a distinct sacredness on the level 
of reception. The sparse sentences often frame the characters as devout 
or holy beings. The bunker passage is informative in this instance. In 
this passage father and son discover a bunker filled with cans of food. 
The father’s reaction to the bunker allows the passage to be read in a 
double way if one follows the argument of Wilhelm.121 The father’s 
first words when he realizes what miracle they have stumbled upon are 
“Oh my God.[…] Come down. Oh my God. Come down” (McCarthy 
138). The father is addressing his son asking him to come down into 
121 Cf. Wilhelm 136.
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the bunker to see all the food stored there. However, to the reader it 
appears that he could also be addressing God in this passage. Wilhelm 
points out this double entendre: banal sentences are adorned with a 
second, theological meaning. The two sentences quoted are combined 
in such a way that their meaning goes beyond what is common. This 
writing technique invites the reader to speculate on the father’s belief. 
Even though the father obviously did not address God, there is an 
underlying sacredness to this passage. Along with the bunker passage 
there is another dialogue between father and son where this phenome-
non appears again. Impatient and angry with the son, the father accuses 
him: “You’re not the one who has to worry about everything” to which 
the son responds “Yes I am, he said. I am the one” (ibid., 259). Kunsa 
points out that this passage marks a turning point for the son:
This moment shines not simply for its transparency, but also for its singu-
larity and the change it suggests: here, the boy unequivocally states who 
he is, whereas previously he has looked to his father for answers, asking 
whether they are the good guys (67).
Not only does the son take charge here, Joseph points out that the son’s 
response clearly alludes to biblical language and portrays him even as 
a messiah figure:
he is echoing Jesus in a number of instances—I am the way, the truth and 
the light ( John 14:6); I am the door of the sheep ( John 10:7); I am the 
light of the world ( John 8:12); I am the alpha and the omega (Revelation 
1:8), to mention a few of the most obvious. Suffice it to say the procla-
mation “I am” is among the strongest phrases in the Old and New Testa-
ments, the latter inevitably an echo of God’s pronouncement to Moses: 
“I AM THAT I AM” (Exodus 3:14). Not only does the boy offer to take 
responsibility, he offers to do so in unmistakably religious language (25).
The words that are used by the son position him in close proximity 
to a messiah figure. There is no real evidence to support this beyond 
language—the son is not equipped with supernatural powers nor does 
he carry a message from God—, the only ‘evidence’ provided comes in 
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the form of linguistic suggestions. The language the characters employ 
is so simple that it becomes biblical to the reader. Thus, it is precisely 
the poverty of language that produces this sacral atmosphere on the 
level of reception. Meaningful and promising phrases like these stand 
in contrast to the novel’s overall godless impression.
5.3.3 Keeping Promises
Father and son find themselves in a world where language has lost its 
meaning, however, the son demands what sounds unreasonable to the 
father, namely that they should believe in language nevertheless. Thus, 
the son holds his father yet again captive, forcing him to do what he 
would not choose to do on his own. The boy empowers language and 
restores its (sacred) power by showing an unwavering belief in words 
and demanding the same from his father. The son orders his father to 
take words seriously and to speak the truth: “If we were going to die 
would you tell me?” (ibid., 94; cf. ibid., 184–185), and even refuses to 
listen to stories that he does not consider true (cf. ibid., 268). Every-
thing the father says must be true or become true to the son. In a way 
this becomes a dogma, so that even simple phrases acquire a religious 
ring. Kunsa notes that father and son turn banal sentences into qua-
si-religious ones, into small prayers: “the repetition of ‘carrying the 
fire,’ phrases […] become incantatory in the manner of a litany or a 
prayer” (59). As shown in the chapter on ethics, the son becomes the 
ethical fire, turning the metaphor into a reality. Thus, the son appears 
to be able to fill empty words with meaning again by believing in them, 
turning them from empty signifiers into truths. Another word, namely 
‘okay’ is also provided with excessive meaning. Throughout the novel, 
the father takes care of his son by promising him that everything will be 
okay. Critics like Woodson’s have argued that the use of the word ‘okay’ 
is proof of language having lost its power in The Road: “The potential 
for the power of language as a stay against death no longer exists as is 
demonstrated in the minimalism of the prose itself, in the primal rep-
etition of ‘okay’” (2013: 22). I strongly disagree, sharing rather views 
like Holm’s, who interprets the expression even as a “minimal theod-
icy” (241), maintaining that “[i]n the absence of any external warrant 
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for the meaning of the world, minimal theodicy has shrunk to a sin-
gle performative sentence, a human breath making a linguistic prom-
ise: ‘Everything’s okay. I promise’” (ibid., 241; emphasis omitted). The 
word ‘okay’ appears to be the only adequate choice of word, since more 
positive or optimistic words like ‘good’ would appear ill-fitting. More-
over, the word ‘okay’ is more than a minimalistic expression or proof 
of an empty world. Instead it is a promise, describing not what there 
is, but what could be there. 
Promises are very meaningful in The Road. De Bruyn argues that the 
use of promises is proof that language does not mirror the world’s bar-
renness, but rather suggests a contrast to the meaninglessness of the 
new world:
The bonds of language also play a crucial role at the novel’s end. If the 
dangerous man encountered at the beginning “has made of the world a 
lie every word [McCarthy 75],” the rugged but reliable man at the end 
honors his “promis[e]” [ibid., 286] to cover up the boy’s father. As this 
re-lexifying gesture indicates, words may again become our bond. After 
the apocalypse, humans may still find shelter in language, even if nature 
may not (784–785).
Thus, words and promises defy the banal world and ignore the new 
circumstances of the world. This is also why the son commands the 
father to keep his promises: “If you break little promises you’ll break 
big ones. That’s what you said” (McCarthy 34). That the son’s demands 
transform the father in the end becomes evident at the moment the 
father is dying. Here, the effect of the son’s captivation is most visible. 
The father gives the boy a promise that appears impossible to keep:
If I’m not here you can still talk to me. You can talk to me and I’ll talk 
to you. You’ll see. 
Will I hear you? 
Yes. You will. You have to make it like talk that you imagine. And you’ll 
hear me (ibid., 279).
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He promises him what he has promised the son throughout the novel: 
whenever he is leaving the boy to search for wood or to scout their 
neighborhood, he assures the son that he will never be far away and is 
within calling distance: “I wont be far away. I’ll be able to hear you if 
you call” (ibid., 70).122 But now the father’s promise touches transcend-
ent realms. When he dies he cannot respond to the call anymore, not as 
a physical presence. Nevertheless, he advises his son to address him as if 
he were alive and to talk to him in his thoughts. He basically advises the 
son to pray to him when he is gone. This is distinctively different from 
the original promise in one other aspect. Before, when he left the son 
alone for a short period of time and the boy did not want the father to 
leave, the father was rather cruel and advised his son to kill himself if 
danger should approach: “Stop it. I want you to do what I say. Take the 
gun. I dont want the gun. I didnt ask if you wanted it. Take it” (ibid., 
70). This contrasts emphatically with his attitude now. Instead of leav-
ing him an instrument of death, the father provides his son with an idea 
and with hope and also reveals that he has started to believe in his son. 
Cooper notes that the father’s “journey […] is a moral quest to become 
a father, but the fathering of a human child is merged with a meta-
phoric journey towards authorship. The Road in particular emphasizes 
the creative force of language as a prophetic ‘fathering’ of humanity” 
(139). However, it is really the son who ‘fathers’ language and even 
shapes his father. Even though the father provides his son with faith 
in the moments of his death, that same faith was accorded the father 
by his son. As Wielenberg points out the father’s promise to talk to the 
son when he is gone binds both, the father and the son: “The child’s 
promise to talk to his father every day and the father’s promise never to 
leave the child are intertwined; by keeping his own promise, the child 
enables the father to keep his” (5). Thus, as throughout the novel, even 
after the father’s death the son makes sure the father is sticking to his 
promises by keeping them himself.
122 This was pointed out to me by Dianne Luce at the McCarthy conference in Berea, 
Kentucky 2013.
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With this promise, the father turns himself into a god-like character 
in the eyes of his son. After the father dies, the son meets a family that 
appears out of nowhere. The mother of the new family is religious and 
tries to include the boy in her belief, but the son already has someone to 
believe in: “She would talk to him sometimes about God. He tried to 
talk to God but the best thing was to talk to his father and he did talk 
to him and he didnt forget” (McCarthy 286). What were originally 
practical concepts (namely the father’s ability to hear the son when he 
calls) are taken out of their banal context and enriched with theolog-
ical meaning. The novel’s ending suggests that the father takes on the 
function of a god. Throughout the entire novel the son captivates his 
father who bases his whole life on his son and leads his life according 
to the son’s rules. In the end, a promise turns the father into his son’s 
ersatz god; he is the one the son addresses in times of need or sorrow. 
Following this, however, the son must now be considered God’s—the 
father’s—son, proving what the father has known all along—the son is 
simply ‘more.’ In fact, the father conceives of his son as the holy word: 
“If he is not the word of God God never spoke” (ibid., 5). Tyburski 
points out that this formulation alludes to biblical context:
The man refers to the boy as “the word of God” [McCarthy 5], which of 
course, is how Christ is described in the New Testament ( John 1.1–3; 
Heb. 4.12–13; II Pet. 3.5; I John 1.1–3; 5.7), and how the Messiah is 
described in the Old Testament (Ps. 138.2) (125).
Frye argues that this should not be considered a metaphor only: “the 
man’s belief in the boy as the incarnate Word of God could be taken 
as an expression of mere sentiment, were it not for the many refer-
ences to divinity, in the context of description and allusions to God” 
(172–173).123 In a way, the son is now truly the ‘word of God,’ since 
his character is spoken into existence by the father-god. It is the father’s 
words that have made out of a boy God’s son.
123 In fact, the boy exemplifies pure excess when described. He is designated as “God’s own 
firedrake” (McCarthy 31), as “golden chalice” (ibid., 75), and compared to a “glowing 
[…] tabernacle” hinting at an “unimaginable future” (ibid., 273). The boy is clearly as-
sociated with a messiah and/or holy vessel. The father even asks once: “What if I said 
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5.3.4 God’s Image
The last passage of the novel suggests an ongoing dialogue between 
deified father and son that implicates a restored transcendent sphere:
Once there were brook trout in the streams in the mountains. You could 
see them standing in the amber current where the white edges of their fins 
wimpled softly in the flow. They smelled of moss in your hand. Polished 
and muscular and torsional. On their backs were vermiculate patterns 
that were maps of the world in its becoming. Maps and mazes. Of a thing 
which could not be put back. Not be made right again. In the deep glens 
where they lived all things were older than man and they hummed of 
mystery (McCarthy 286–287).
It is not entirely clear who voices this last passage. Critics like Cooper 
have pointed out that the voices of the narrator and the father are, in 
general, hard to distinguish from each other: “In The Road, revelations 
of the protagonist’s interior world are tightly interwoven with the nar-
rator’s, to the extent that the two viewpoints merge and are frequently 
indistinguishable” (138). However, this passage cannot be attributed 
to the disinterested omniscient narrator, because it carries too many 
subjective markers. Yet, the only other character who is alive at that 
point is the son, who has never seen brook trout in his entire life and 
has never smelled moss before. Thus, the passage cannot stem from 
him. The passage starting with ‘once’ indicates a story that is told, sim-
ilar in structure and style to the stories the father tells the son through-
out the novel. Thus, I argue that it is likely the voice of the father that 
the son still hears when his father is in his thoughts. The father has 
pondered this particular kind of fish twice before in the novel, which 
links the topic to him.124 Therefore, in the last passage the boy ‘listens’ 
that he’s a god?” (ibid., 172).
124 “He stood on a stone bridge where the water slurried into a pool and turned slowly 
in a gray form. Where once he’d watched trout swaying in the current, tracking their 
perfect shadows on the stones beneath” (McCarthy 30) and “He’d stood at such a riv-
er once and watched the flash of trout deep in a pool, invisible to see in the teacolored 
water except as they turned on their sides to feed. Reflecting back the sun deep in the 
darkness like a flash of knives in a cave” (ibid., 41–42).
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to his father creating a sensual image of brook trout, described in such 
a way that speaks to the son’s personal interests: the brook trout are 
depicted as carrying maps on their backs and maps are also the only 
objects the boy is fascinated by throughout the novel.125 All this makes 
it very plausible that the passage is voiced by the father, whether it be 
merely a memory that the son is replaying in his head, or a moment of 
transcendence, linking the father and the son through the symbol of 
hope represented by the image of the fish. Luce writes on this issue:
The imaginistic links between the father’s recurring memories of the trout 
and his vision narrated after his death suggest that the coda is another ver-
sion of his own memory displaced in time, or the boy’s memory of what 
his father has communicated to him about the lost world, or a vision that 
comes to the boy when he talks to his dead father, and his father, now 
internalized within the psyche of his beloved child, responds to him when 
he calls, as promised (81).
The fish becomes sacred imagery, however, placed in the new religious 
realm of the father rather than being part of a Christian theology. 
Holm notes that the image of the trout is “ripe with allusion,” refer-
ring to Plato, Christian theology and a recurrent theme in American 
literature (cf. 245). The use of this particular image could have more 
than one purpose. Phillip argues that the type of fish could be seen as 
a fellow survivor:
Brook trout are survivors from another era and another place. Holed up 
in refuges from southern Appalachia northward, they rode out the end of 
the last ice age, which had driven them from their arctic home (they are 
actually char, not trout) and then, as the glaciers receded, left them high—
but not dry—and lonesome, isolated in pockets of high-country water-
shed, where they have been playing out their endgame ever since (187).
125 Holland neglects this fact, instead she writes on the maps: “The uselessness of the pat-
terns on the fish echoes the uselessness of the maps loved by the man when he was a 
boy” (135). The useless maps are certainly of relevance, since nothing can serve as a 
blueprint for the world anymore. However, in this instance the maps suggest that new 
orders are created. These might be not very practical, but they still possess a mythic 
quality, in particular because they are carved into the bodies of fishes.
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For my reading the fact that it invokes religious notions is significant.126 
Usually, the fish serves as a symbol of Christ, adopting different mean-
ings depending on the textual basis it is related to. Fish are mentioned 
for example when Jesus is able to feed a large group of people with 
only bread and fish. This has been regarded as a ‘prototype’ of the last 
supper.127 The nurturing aspect of the fish is certainly relevant for The 
Road since the father is continually striving to nurture his son: in a lit-
eral way, but also in a philosophical and metaphysical way. The father’s 
actions are guided by the question of how he can provide the son with 
hope, and how he can enrich an essentially poor life. The image of the 
fish is the last meal the father can offer to his son. Thus, the fish does 
carry sacral importance, but it refers not to Christian content, but is 
rather linked to the father as the new figure of orientation.
Father and son are mutually dependent on each other, but this depend-
ence is incredibly rewarding for both of them. The father is a captive to 
his son: the son demands of him that he be a better man (cf. Captives of 
Ethics) and he demands that words express truths. In the same manner 
that the son made his father into an ethical man, the son restores the 
father’s faith in the sacred. In both cases the son convinces the father 
of the existence of ethics/the sacred by becoming himself the embodi-
ment of the respective concept. Not only is the son the most ethical 
being, the “best guy” (McCarthy 279), he is also a sacred being, the 
word of god. The son becomes a messiah-figure to the father and thus 
evidence of the existence of the sacred. But the father also experiences 
a transformation. Whereas he feels like a “thespian” (ibid., 10) before 
whenever he tries to behave in a moral way for his son, in his dying 
moments he becomes a believer. After his death he takes on the role of a 
god—in the eyes of the son. Thus, the son becomes likewise captivated 
by his father, turning to him as one would to a God. Consequently, 
each of them undergoes a captivation by the other that allows them 
to become sacred figures, giving the statement “each the other’s world 
126 The master thesis of Swartz “‘Ever is no time at all’. Theological Issues in post-apoca-
lyptic fiction and Cormac McCarthy’s The Road” deals extensively with the Christian 
imagery of fish and its employment in The Road (cf. 60–67). 
127 Cf. Forstner and Becker, eds. Lexikon christlicher Symbole, 255.
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entire” (ibid., 6) new meaning. Language mirrors their captivation and 
also their empowered state. By using a language that seems to fail them 
every day they enter a pact, they believe in their words as long as their 
respective other does the same. In that way, the father becomes a god 
and his son the word of god. By taking the words they speak seriously, 
thus, by keeping their promises, father and son turn into subjects, safely 
integrated into the sacred sphere.
5.4 The History of Love—The Child God
5.4.1 Introduction
In the first chapter of this dissertation, “Captives of Authorship,” it was 
mentioned that the main protagonist in The History of Love, Leopold 
Gursky, is delivered a package that contains a manuscript he thought 
he had lost a long time ago. The child responsible for these actions, 
Bird, takes on the function of a God figure in the novel. He influences 
and manipulates his environment, helps people struggling through-
out the novel to ‘find’ each other, he further creates little ‘miracles’ 
and turns banal occurrences into ‘callings.’ The reader does not know 
about Bird and must assume that some things are carried out by a secret 
or even a higher power—e.g. an all-knowing character who has not 
revealed itself yet to the reader. In reality, however, Bird suffers from 
the trauma of losing his father at a young age and as a coping mech-
anism, he turns towards the Jewish faith and becomes drawn to the 
idea that he might be the next messiah. He decides to do good in the 
world in order to prove to himself that he is a holy figure. This delu-
sion, which is clearly an expression of his traumatized state, is his cap-
tivation, since his view of the world is completely determined by his 
childish assumptions. From being a traumatized child he turns into a 
sacred subject, interfering with the lives of others, successfully connect-
ing them and reshaping their lives.
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5.4.2 Bird—The God Behind the Curtain
Bird, a twelve-year old boy, is a dreamer and a highly imaginative child. 
Every member of his family is stuck in a state of mourning caused 
by the father’s passing away a couple of years before. Bird’s mother 
retreats into her work, his sister Alma begins writing lists compulsively 
and Bird turns to the Jewish faith. In the beginning the reader learns 
about Bird mostly through his sister’s narrative. At one point she stum-
bles over his diary, which gives some insight into Bird’s rather peculiar 
character: “I have been a normal person for three days in a row. What 
this means is that I have not climbed on top of any buildings or writ-
ten G-d’s name on anything that doesn’t belong to me or answered a 
perfectly normal question with a saying from a Torah” (Krauss 149). 
Bird tries to act normal, although, in reality, he believes he is anything 
but. He tries to foster the somewhat delusional idea that he might be 
a holy person:
“I think I might be a lamed vovnik. […] One of […] [the] thirty-six holy 
people. […] No one knows who they are. Only their prayers reach God’s 
ear. […] In every generation there’s one person who has the potential to 
be the Messiah. Maybe he lives up to it, or maybe he doesn’t. Maybe the 
world is ready for him, or maybe it isn’t” (ibid., 52–53).
This idea continues to develop, when Bird is confronted with doubt 
at the time another tragedy occurs in his life and Bird begins to sus-
pect that he has lost the connection to God: “When I was almost 100 
percent positive that I was a lamed vovnik I used to think G-d could 
hear me. But I’m not sure anymore” (ibid., 207). Instead of distancing 
himself from his beliefs, he plunges deeper into them and thus gives in 
to his captivation. Bird intensifies his relation to God. He attempts to 
prove to himself that God is still on his side. If that’s the case, then he 
can influence the world around him and even change fates: “If I could 
do one good thing to help someone and not tell anyone about it, maybe 
Mr. Goldstein [his friend] would get better again, and I would be a 
real lamed vovnik!” (ibid., 207). His turning towards the Jewish faith 
is more than a way of dealing with his grief. It is also a way of making 
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sure he is not doomed to passiveness. Instead of waiting for a sign that 
proves God’s existence, he wants to deliver this proof by himself by 
becoming the evidence himself. Similarly to the character Amélie Pou-
lain in Le fabuleux destin d‘Amélie Poulain he begins manipulating his 
environment, but whereas Amélie was driven by the utter need to do 
good, Bird needs to prove to himself that he is the messiah.128
Bird decides to help his sister Alma in order to find proof of his spe-
cialness. He falsely assumes that Alma is looking for her real father, an 
assumption that is based on an erroneous and naive corollary. When 
Bird is at home, wondering how he could be helpful in his sister’s quest, 
he turns towards God, and believes he receives a gift from God: 
After I heard the door close and the key turn in the lock I went to the 
bathroom to talk to G-d. Then I went to the kitchen to make a peanut 
butter and jelly sandwich. That’s when the telephone rang. […] when I 
answered it the person on the other end said Hello this is Bernard Moritz, 
may I please speak with Alma Singer? That’s how I found out G-d can 
hear me (ibid., 216).
His prayers seem to be answered, when he receives a call in a literal 
sense: the phone rings. The timing is conspicuous and aids in the crea-
tion of a transcendent moment for Bird. As in Atonement, the event is 
not ‘meant’ for Bird. In Atonement the letter should have been received 
by Cecilia only, but Briony seizes the letter, coming between the mes-
sage and its intended recipient. Here, it is Bird who receives and pro-
ceeds to act upon a call that was not meant for him, but for his sister. 
Similarly to Briony, he was just waiting for something like this to hap-
pen; Bird was literally praying for such an event. Due to the coinci-
dence of these two events, he sees the telephone call as a sign from 
128 The observation that Amélie Poulain is a ‘miniature’ god figure is made by Eshelman 
who writes on the film: “In terms of plot, playing God is perhaps the most direct way 
of emulating a transcendent, personified source. A fine example of this is the movie 
Amélie, in which the eponymous heroine sets up little, contrived situations that help 
unhappy people change their lives for the better (or, in this case, to punish a despotic 
bully). In contrast to what one might expect from religious tradition, this doesn’t lead 
to acts of hubris and abuse of power on the part of Amélie” (14).
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God. The caller gives him the name of a man and an author—Leopold 
Gursky. The call received by Alma would have been merely an act of 
communication, one person exchanging information with the other. 
In Bird’s hands this call becomes more than it was supposed to be. 
Bird has a revelation: he thinks Leopold Gursky must be Alma’s father. 
Bird’s conversation with the caller overwhelms him:
Inside I was going crazy because even though I didn’t understand every-
thing I was sure I was very close to solving the mystery about Alma’s father, 
and that if I could solve it I would be doing something helpful in a secret 
way I might still be a lamed vovnik, and everything would be OK (ibid., 
217).
This is, of course, highly amusing to the reader who knows that half of 
these assumptions are wrong. In fact, a completely different story is tak-
ing place. Nevertheless, this incident shares similarities with a spiritual 
or religious call: what a person experiences when called by God goes 
beyond one’s capacities, knowledge and imagination. Thus, Bird is 
“going crazy” because what he encounters surpasses his own scope 
of knowledge. He is overwhelmed by what the phone call revealed 
to him and acts according to this new knowledge. As a consequence, 
Bird sends the manuscript to Gursky and sends letters to both Alma 
and Gursky, arranging their meeting which I discussed in the chap-
ter on authorship. Bird’s ‘calling’ not only reestablishes his faith in a 
transcendent outside communicating with him. Bird is also given an 
assignment that—as far as Gursky and Alma are concerned—results 
in a good deed, since it gives relief and a sense of closure to each of the 
parties, most of all Gursky (cf. Captives of Authorship). When meet-
ing Alma, Gursky realizes that he is a published author and that the 
girl Alma was even named after one of his characters. He also learns 
that his son had identified him as his true father before he died. This 
information seems miraculous to Gursky, who feels recognized for the 
first time. Not only did he never expect this kind of recognition, he 
also considered it practically impossible. All of this, he would not have 
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known had Bird not arranged this meeting. In a way, Bird not only 
proves to himself that he is a lamed vovnik, he demonstrates this to 
the other characters as well by arranging miracles.
The positive outcome of the novel might seem kitschy to some readers; 
however, the reason for this is that Bird’s story is connected to bigger 
themes, namely to the traumatic past of Holocaust survivors. Even 
though Bird has not been impacted by the Holocaust himself, he has 
lost his father at a young age and is dealing with an individual loss. In 
addition, by his real name, ‘Emanuel Chaim,’ he is very much linked 
to the generation of Holocaust victims/survivors:
the Jewish historian Emanuel Ringelblum, who buried milk cans filled 
with testimony in the Warsaw Ghetto, and the Jewish cellist Emanuel 
Feuerman, who was one of the great musical prodigies of the twentieth 
century […] and her [his mother’s] uncle Chaim, who was a joker, a real 
clown, made everyone laugh like crazy, and who died by the Nazis (ibid., 
35).
However, Bird refuses to be called by that name, underscoring the need 
to construct his own identity, unburdened by the memories of his par-
ents (who have no first-hand experience of World War II themselves). 
In a way, Bird is part of a larger trauma, which is evoked by his parents 
by giving him a name that connects him to the victims of the Holo-
caust. One could argue that Bird’s fate serves as a stand-in for a greater 
loss. Under these circumstances, the fact that Bird can reposition him-
self is hopeful. The subject can take on another position in life and start 
again. This positively formulated subjectivity is relevant in the context 
of Holocaust fiction, since it suggests a strengthening and rejuvenation 
of subjectivity and overall an overcoming of trauma. A new beginning 
can even be created by utterly passive figures (Gursky and Bird), failing 
and deficient creators who do not even know about their own actions.
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5.5 Claiming the Sacred
The universe is not empty and cold anymore, as Nietzsche proclaimed. 
It has been warmed by the actions of sacred figures. All these sacred 
figures appear against the background of a de-sacralized world which 
makes the appearance even more noticeable. Most of the captive states 
that generated receptive characters were of an existential nature. In 
these cases, the characters’ receptivity was fueled by the will to survive. 
They had to find a way to continue living, to continue to have hope in 
order to persevere. Their openness to an event was thus conditioned 
by extreme circumstances that endangered their lives. It becomes most 
evident in these examples, how under the pressure of these captiva-
tions even the most banal occurrence necessarily appears like a mira-
cle and how the event emerges out of a constricting frame. This is also 
linked to another phenomenon, namely that all the sacred figures are 
the result of a misrepresentation. They only appear to be sacred figures, 
because of the circumstances, because of their own captive state or the 
captive state of others. Thus, it is captivation that creates sacredness 
and not an inherent sacred essence. Their banal and brutal captivation 
is reworked by their efforts, allowing them to position themselves as 
newly strengthened subjects in a hostile world.
6 Conclusion
The intention of this dissertation was to find a method for describ-
ing contemporary literature in a systematic way and by doing so to 
underscore its divergence from a postmodern aesthetic. The procedure 
proposed for this project was to take a close look at the ‘event’ and 
analyze how it affects the ‘subject,’ and thus the dynamic relationship 
between event and subject became the main concern of this disser-
tation. It was assumed that this relationship would indicate most 
convincingly how contemporary literature goes beyond postmodern 
notions of eventfulness and subjectivity, and therefore postmodern 
principles in general.
It soon became obvious that the contemporary subject-event-rela-
tionship that I defined with the term captivation stands in contrast to 
the general openness that underlies many of the postmodern notions 
that are reflected for example in Derrida’s différance, Foucault’s ‘dis-
cursive practices’ and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s rhizome. In a postmod-
ern environment structures of meaning are in flux, are dependent on 
the context and are highly changeable under varying circumstances. 
Although this has consequences for the postmodern subject who is 
considered equally changeable and even elusive, I could not discover 
a similar phenomenon in contemporary literature. Instead, I noticed 
stable and capable beings, even if this stability lasted only for a limited 
period of time. The reasons for this stability are powerful events that 
exert their influence long before they are apparent to the subjects them-
selves. I described the attraction and effect of these events with the 
term captivation, which is a concept defined by a type of coercion that 
can range from visual or intellectual limitations to physical and violent 
imprisonment. This concept suggests that subjects in contemporary 
literature are cornered and made to react and are in general more eas-
ily determined than their postmodern predecessors. In fact, I consider 
this passivity and ensuing receptivity to be one of the key characteris-
tics of contemporary literature. It enables the subject to become open 
to an event and empowered by it. Accordingly, the characters in the 
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novels are shown to become powerful authors intervening in the lives 
of innocents, or dominant guiding figures in the form of fathers, sci-
entists or murderers, and even sacred figures who introduce forms of 
transcendence into the world.
The way subjects are capacitated and empowered in relation to author-
ship, ethics and the sacred is decisively different from a postmodern 
understanding of these topics. In the post-postmodern examples used 
in this dissertation all three topics were found to be determined by 
what Marion calls ‘counter-intentionality.’ Forms of authorship, ethics 
and the sacred emerge by accident, against one’s expectation, surprising 
everyone including the respective subjects themselves. The emergence 
of these phenomena is based on the subjects’ fallibility, shortcomings 
and ignorance. Instead of being in control of either authorship, ethics 
or the sacred, the subjects are involuntarily governed by these mat-
ters and forced to adopt concepts that might not be their own. This 
reduction of the subject to a reactive element cancels a postmodern 
critique that focuses on the detrimental effects of power structures 
and an authorial subject, since the contemporary subject is not really 
in power, but overpowered.
The overpowering effect is one of the key arguments in this disserta-
tion and is crucial in interpreting the term captivation. Clearly, cap-
tivation has been developed in order to provide a strong contrast to 
the postmodern concepts described above. Nonetheless, the attempt 
to identify the exact nature of passivity that captivation necessitates 
has been problematic, since the exact motivations of a character in a 
literary text are not always that clear and should perhaps not be com-
pletely clear in order to keep a reader interested and to allow a literary 
text to remain ambivalent. Locating decisively when the captivation 
of the event begins and the active participation of the subject ends 
was not always an easy undertaking. The reasons for this are multiple: 
sometimes actions take place slightly below the level of the character’s 
intuition, often the characters are simply blind to their own motiva-
tions, and there is also the fact to consider that a literary text does not 
reveal everything about its characters, but may have necessary blind 
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spots itself. In some cases it seemed that the characters supported and 
even helped in generating events, even though it was not clear if was 
done intentionally. This is why, in one case (The White Tiger), I relied 
on Agamben’s descriptions, whose theory does not depend on a sub-
ject’s inactivity, but presents symmetrical power-relations. I expanded 
the concept of captivation in this case in order to go into depth about 
the empowered subject’s ensuing relationship with other captives that 
have now become his. The empowerment was not singular, there were 
similar cases in which the powerful subject defines its power by the 
submission of the other, however, never has it been implied as a poten-
tially endless cycle without any possibility of change. It was this spec-
ification that made a reading without Agamben almost impossible. 
Yet, captivation remained, even in this case, the identifiable core struc-
ture and backbone of my analysis. The term captivation has proven to 
be productive, showing how the subject’s (re)actions could be read in 
relation to a privileged event. The presumption of a fortified event is 
not only based on theoretical notions, but is echoed and underscored 
by the literary texts themselves, which all presented at least one signifi-
cant event, and this makes it difficult to argue that events do not play a 
great role in contemporary literature and that subjects are not seriously 
affected, formed and shaped by these events. What could be viewed 
differently, however, is how the involvement of the subject should be 
evaluated in this respect. The term captivation does not account for all 
of the subject’s complexities, but it does describe its unique relation-
ship with the event and explores the multi-layered dynamics between 
event and subject.
To put my findings in perspective, the comparison with postmod-
ern literature was crucial. As the subject today does not return to 
a previous concept of subjectivity, but goes beyond a postmodern 
understanding of it, I referred to this situation as ‘post-postmodern.’ 
Post-postmodern literature transforms the notions of authorship, eth-
ics and the sacred by turning destructive strategies into affirmative 
methods that help in defining the subject and its capacities anew, espe-
cially when it comes to writing, helping, supporting and believing. As 
a result, authorship, ethics and the sacred are granted an investigation 
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unbiased by postmodern principles and thus they are permitted to 
take on new forms. These new forms are briefly summarized in the 
following.
Post-Postmodern Authorship
The most interesting author figures in the novels discussed are an 
extreme version of the overbearing author figure, who captivate their 
audience by force. Postmodern theory’s greatest success has been to 
reveal what kind of authority the readers relay to authors and how 
this reflects power-mechanisms in general, implementing a general cri-
tique of authority. As a result, author figures in postmodern literature 
are destabilized, qualified, ridiculed and even destroyed. This is based 
on the assumption that authorial figures are corrupt, misleading and 
deceiving. Briony from Atonement and the spirit from Ghostwritten 
prove to be precisely such controlling and even deceiving characters. 
They exhibit all the negative effects a powerful author can have. How-
ever, this does not mean that their portrayal is in line with a postmod-
ern reading of authorship. In fact, I argue that these novels reject the 
postmodern treatment of authorship. Atonement and Ghostwritten do 
not fragment the author or destabilize the concept. Instead, the author 
figures are allowed to go to the extreme and display their power to the 
fullest. By manipulating the reader these figures make the reader part 
of this process. The novels force readers to become skeptical of the 
author concept on their own. Thus, instead of reading about the criti-
cism of the concept, the reader experiences it first-hand, beginning to 
question not only one’s own stance towards the guiding author figure, 
but also towards the conventions of fiction. Thus, the reader is not 
‘taught’ or even fed with the insight that the trust in author figures or 
narrators is rather arbitrary and dependent on conventions, instead the 
readers are affected by this insight directly, without knowing about it 
beforehand. Either, they are surprised and flabbergasted or provoked, 
enraged and may even become furious. This is a completely different 
reaction than one might have towards a postmodern novel, since the 
readers are now not allowed to keep their distance from the novels or 
even remain slightly uninvolved. They are made part of the game, even 
if they did not agree to be so.
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Even though the reader feels duped and mislead, Atonement and Ghost-
written seem to suggest that the reader is partially to blame. It is his or 
her captivation that made them fallible. This argument is implied in 
central metaphors that the novels provide and which describe essen-
tially the same thing: a phenomenon that is existent and visible all 
the time, yet, not recognized. In Ghostwritten, one of the characters 
compares the appearance of a ghost to the humming of a fridge. Its 
humming sound increases until it cannot be ignored anymore. The 
metaphor indicates that the ghost-narrator, as the humming, has been 
there all the time and could have been spotted before, if the reader had 
been more attentive. Thus, even though the two novels mislead their 
readers, they place the blame for this on these very readers themselves. 
Thus, the reader is forced to take on responsibility for his reading, the 
mistakes he has made, the things he has overlooked, etc. The reader is 
made accountable by this particular form of authorship—he is pres-
sured into having an ethical response and owning up to it.
The hierarchical structure between author figures and readers is similar 
to the relationship between homo sacer and sovereign—the powerful 
being can only become powerful because he has someone weak he can 
hold captive. Admittedly, the violence of the relationship Agamben 
describes certainly does not apply to the relationship between reader 
and author. Here, it is more a captivating force than captivity, and the 
weakness of the reader is a construed lack of information. Yet, the 
essential concept remains valid: as long as the author can captivate the 
reader with his narrative he exists to the reader—otherwise the reader 
would simply put the book down. Thus, in a sense it is required of the 
author to make captives out of his or her audience in order to force the 
immersion in a wholly aesthetic and manipulated experience. This cer-
tainly questions a postmodern understanding of authorship, in which 
the reader has difficulties immersing him- or herself in the fiction, since 
the qualification and destabilization of the author removes the reader 
from the narrative, treating it as that which it is: a fantasy whose inhab-
itants are painfully aware of their fictitiousness, ‘ruining’ the illusion 
for the reader. Thus, one could argue that the forceful author figures in 
Atonement and Ghostwritten, however ethically dubious they may be, 
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create an aesthetic experience that is difficult to shake off, because the 
reader is pushed to new ground. Captivation is thus a captivation by art 
(and even a definition of art), an infection that one remains unaware 
of, a hypnosis that one cannot remember entering.
Post-Postmodern Ethics
Ethics is probably one of the topics which is presented in the most 
diverse ways in the novels under discussion here. In postmodernism the 
notion of ethics and responsibility is severely doubted, since postmod-
ernism questions the existence of an act that is without reason, without 
thought or calculation by the subject. Post-postmodern ethics, how-
ever, neither argues for a naïve and simplistic understanding of ethics, 
nor for the non-existence of ‘true’ ethics. The selected texts exhibit a 
deep and serious involvement with ethics, negotiating and discussing 
the definitions and workings of responsibility, loyalty and faith. Eth-
ical issues are intertwined with a paradoxical range of phenomena in 
these texts: passivity and accident, but also power and violence. Thus, 
instead of declaring ethics to be ‘true’ or ‘false’ these texts succeed in 
shedding light on the complexity and inner contradictoriness of ethics.
The analyses reflect this complexity, introducing a spectrum of ethical 
acts that are not always carried out voluntarily and not always with the 
best intentions at hand. Some of the subjects one finds here come very 
close to Marion’s understanding of the subject, which is basically an 
unknowing and helpless witness who simply responds to what’s coming 
to him, and thus being purely reactive. This raises the questions of how 
voluntary these acts are and whether an ethical act can be considered 
as such when there is no clear form of agency or intention behind it. 
However, these passive subjects, or ‘witnesses,’ as I called them in refer-
ence to Marion’s notion of the subject, have a specific ethical purpose. 
They not only give an account of the victims and what happened to 
them, but also give an account of themselves. In fact, it seems that they 
primarily present themselves and the relationship they have with their 
victims. The witnesses are clearly restricted by their own perspective, 
their limitations and faults. However, instead of completely destabi-
lizing the reports of the witnesses and qualifying their insight, the wit-
6 Conclusion 239
nesses prove their own fallibility themselves, which makes them invol-
untarily very authentic witnesses. They deliver the truth about their 
victims in an indirect way and often even accidently. In that way, they 
turn into perfect witnesses, communicating a truth that seems inacces-
sible to them themselves. They become mediums of the truth. Thus, 
these novels made possible what would lead to an epistemological crisis 
in postmodern fiction. Even though it is undeniable that the perspec-
tive of the witness can distort their account, the exposure of the truth 
and the ethical act itself are not hindered or qualified by this. Authen-
ticity is made possible by creating passive subjects that are unwillingly 
and uncontrollably authentic—they do not know any better.
However, there are also other types of subjects, active and even des-
perate characters who purposely pursue ethical acts, but whose 
motivation may be flawed. In these cases, ethical actions are accom-
panied by longings for power which can result in violence. Yet, 
responsibility is not presented as a ‘false’ or ‘untrue’ act, but rather 
as always having had the potential of being misused, insinuat-
ing that this lies in the sheer nature of responsibility. To be respon-
sible for someone else means taking control over someone’s 
life to a certain extent. One novel, The White Tiger, has taken this quite 
literally, making a murderer the responsible person. Novels like these 
seem to follow the line of thought that Agamben describes in his figure 
of the homo sacer—to take care of someone necessarily has biopolitial 
implications. Agamben shows this most obviously in the case of the 
comatose patient whose caretakers made efforts to determine when life 
is worth living and thus when it is allowed to be ended. While taking 
care of the patient and thus trying to find legal solutions for his/her 
situation, they also endanger his/her life by determining the quality 
of life and thus by determining the parameters for when it no longer 
possesses ‘value’(cf. HS 163 ff.).
Ethics in post-postmodern literature are not simply ‘good’ deeds com-
mitted by ‘good’ people; the characters portrayed in the novels are 
highly complex in their motivations. They are conflicted, distracted, 
act out of calculation or out of a misunderstanding, by mistake or 
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by accident. Responsible subjects are made, they never choose their 
actions by themselves. While acting responsibly or in an ethical way 
the characters are bound to the imperfect world they are living in, 
reflecting in their actions the limitations of that world. Ethics can even 
be considered to be dangerously limited in some cases. This becomes 
clear whenever the novels tend to be very closely related to Agamben’s 
conceptualization of power relations. The existence of the homo sacer 
is proof that the political structure is faulty and that this original fault 
is constantly reproduced by creating new homo sacer-figures. When a 
political system has this flaw in its matrix, all ethical actions carried 
out inside this system are necessarily restricted by this fault and thus 
hindered from being an unbound ethics. Accordingly, the characters’ 
ethics are imperfect in the manner that they are more a make-do-ethics 
than anything else. They suffice —for the moment, for this specific sit-
uation, under these specific circumstances. Are they more capable than 
that, can they even become universal ethics? This is highly question-
able. Their ethics are ethics for those who need it, even those who are 
needy. To van Dijk and Vaessens this poses a problem; they complain 
that “their late- or post-postmodern ‘rhetorics of sincerity,’ and ‘reality’ 
and ‘truth’ don’t have a universal and absolute base” (14). However, I 
do not see that this is a problem for post-postmodern texts, but rather 
a fact that they wholeheartedly embrace and underline. None of these 
novels presents a form of universal values. Ethics are not established as 
a general system of rules, instead ethics are individual rules; they can 
even be the imperfect rules of a little child. Yet, these imperfect rules 
prove again and again to be productive, once they are believed in. This 
is why ethics is thus oftentimes closely associated with sacral images, 
ideas and occurrences, underlining how belief factors into ethics. Nov-
els like The Road and Oryx and Crake further suggest that the reality 
of the world, however brutal or failing it might be, has nothing to do 
with the nature of ethics; ethics makes its own world.
Post-Postmodern Sacredness
What sacredness shares with authorship and ethics is that it is a simi-
larly complex and highly reflected topic in post-postmodern literature. 
The transcendent sphere in all the novels discussed is the immanent 
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sphere; the sacred stems from the banal, even the comical. The tran-
scendent is not located outside, it surrounds us. This observation shows 
how much post-postmodern sacrality can be understood in terms of 
Marion’s theory, since he, too, sees the excess of the event in the banal 
givenness of it. Marion’s phenomenological understanding of transcen-
dence locates it in the normal everyday world. Sacredness is a product 
of this deficient and barren world. 
In all of the novels selected one finds a sacred figure, an incompetent 
human being whose neediness turns him or her into a sacred being. 
This sacred figure can only exist because he has created an audience 
that makes him one, which makes sacredness the outcome of a per-
formance and the sacred figures also artistic figures. This relation-
ship between performer and audience is always based on a mutual 
dependency. The father in The Road thinks of himself as an actor 
who enacts a drama for his son. However, through the demands of 
his audience he ceases to be an actor and becomes a believer, turn-
ing into an audience member himself when the son becomes a living 
light, a messiah figure. In Oryx and Crake the storyteller is turned 
into a sacred being by his audience, which draws sustenance from 
his stories. His performance inspires the Crakers to come up with 
their own religious ritual that honors him. The role of the audience 
is also crucial in the The History of Love. Bird is conceived of as a 
god only by an unknowing readership and by unknowing characters. 
It is only because of this audience that Bird can attain the effect of 
an all-knowing and intervening God.
The fact that an audience creates its own sacred beings and in a way 
its own ‘creators,’ constitutes the connection to the first analytical 
chapter of this dissertation. In this chapter on authorship, the audi-
ence, the readers, ‘helped’ unwillingly in creating its author figures. 
In fact, the novels suggest that only by way of a captive audience 
could these author figures appear. This connection implies a certain 
kinship between the mechanisms of religion and art, which is cer-
tainly not a new insight, however, it is noteworthy that the novels 
themselves provide the material for this speculation, and further-
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more, that they do not use it to devaluate religion or art, but show 
how the interplay leads subjects onto a new path: a regenerating one 
with new plans for the future.
The chapter on sacredness also revealed surprising insights into the 
changed role of language. Sacredness often develops through language 
operations alone. Language creates meaningful structures, which con-
trasts with a postmodern view of language in which it is often pointed 
out how diverting, confusing and even misguiding language can be. In 
my introduction I mentioned DeLillo’s White Noise in which language 
cannot be trusted to be dependable. Instead, language is considered to 
contribute to confusion and to be standing in the way of perceiving 
reality in its ‘true’ form, in fact, creating a false sense of reality alto-
gether and turning reality into a simulation. In contrast to this, in Oryx 
and Crake, and in particular in The Road, language is often all the char-
acters have left, and they lean heavily on language for moral support. 
They have only communication to reassure them, repetitions of simple 
words that structure their day and also the way they understand and 
categorize the world. In a slow evolution it is shown how words turn 
from empty signifiers into meaningful concepts and beliefs. Instead of 
being a hindrance and an untrustworthy nuisance, language is a maker 
of meaning. It sacralizes the secular world and provides it with mean-
ing the dead world cannot produce by itself anymore. These language 
operations, for example giving promises, are completely contrary to 
the reality of the fictional world and construct nevertheless a belief 
system that gives the characters hope, agency and intent. By trusting 
in language, using it to their own advantage and insisting on its mean-
ingfulness, the characters find a way to deal with the harshness of their 
world. In that way language takes on a crucial role, inhabiting the cen-
tre of post-postmodern sacredness.
Concluding Remarks
The possibilities for further research in this area are infinite, since con-
temporary literature seems to be increasingly creative in coming up 
with its own concepts, and thus leaves postmodern criticism behind. 
Following the argumentative structure of this dissertation, I think it 
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would be fruitful to look at more phenomena that have been influ-
enced by a distinct postmodern interpretation and investigate how 
they are treated in contemporary literature. An example for this would 
be language, communication and the concept of ‘meaning.’ How is lan-
guage presented in contemporary fiction, what capabilities and what 
kind of limitations does it have and how does one deal with them in 
a productive way? Does a shift in a subject’s position create a linguis-
tic transformation as was apparent in The Road? Another matter that 
could be discussed along this line are the particular genres popular in 
postmodern literature. Especially the historical novel has been utilized 
for postmodern writing. Recently, there has been an emergence of suc-
cessful contemporary historical novels, for example Hilary Mantel’s 
Wolf Hall (2009) and David Mitchell’s The Thousand Autumns of Jacob 
de Zoet (2011). It would be interesting to compare how these contem-
porary forms deal with the rules of the genre differently and how they 
alter conventions of the genre.
What remained completely untouched within the scope of this dis-
sertation is the question of gender, which can certainly be considered 
significant in the context of subjectivity. If one regards traditional or 
conventional gender constructions as forms of captivations—limita-
tions that constrain characters and restrict their agency—it seems logi-
cal to investigate subjects’ empowerment also within the gender realm. 
Can gender limitations be overcome, and how can this be presented? 
In relation to the theoretical approach of this dissertation, it would 
be productive to pursue Agamben’s theory further, in particular the 
way in which a subject’s empowerment is linked to social and polit-
ical structures. In this area, the problem of the (bio)political power 
of the subject could be further discussed by posing the question of 
whether there are alternatives to the opposition between weak and 
powerful and even possibilities for dissolving or transcending this hier-
archy. Finally, when considering that the act of turning into a subject 
is intrinsically an artistic one, as I have argued in this dissertation, it 
might be constructive to analyze the performative process between 
the event and captive artistic subject in other kinds of contemporary 
literary exploration.
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